John Mearsheimer - Offensive Realism

YouTube Channel member ⁠@spacecometrue ⁠ asked me to share my analysis of the causes and course of the Korean War. North Korea invaded the South on June 25, 1950, and nearly won before the U.S. stepped in. MacArthur's Inchon landing pushed the North Koreans back to the 38th parallel. When we crossed it and headed for the Yalu River, China entered the war in October 1950, and from that point it was really a war between the U.S. and China. It ended in an armistice in July 1953, not a peace agreement. I also explain why each side fought. North Korea wanted to unify the peninsula. The U.S. came in after Dean Acheson's blunder, because a Soviet ally controlling Korea threatened Japan and Northeast Asia. China found U.S. troops on its border unacceptable, much as Russia saw Ukraine in NATO. I also cover how the war militarized the Cold War, and why I think the Korean Peninsula is stable today despite North Korea's nuclear weapons. ———————————————————— 
CHAPTERS 0:00 Intro: 0:04 A member's question on Korea 0:41 How the Korean War unfolded 1:36 The U.S. enters and the Inchon landing 2:08 Crossing the 38th parallel 3:15 China enters the war 4:31 Really a U.S.–China war, and the 1953 armistice 5:28 How Korea militarized the Cold War 6:55 Why North Korea invaded 8:27 Why the U.S. came in: Acheson's blunder 10:24 Why China came in 11:16 The Ukraine–NATO parallel 12:41 The Korean Peninsula today 14:01 Why North Korea's nukes are defensive 15:24 Verdict: another war is unlikely ————————————————————

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It seems clear that the Trump administration and its allies are working overtime to create the false impression that the United States is well on its way to defeating Iran and that Tehran should therefore submit to American demands sooner rather than later. If it does not, so the argument goes, not only will the economic punishment inflicted on Iran reach crushing levels, but President Trump will launch a devastating military attack that might even include putting U.S. ground forces into Iran. I will argue in this episode that this is largely a propaganda campaign—and that it is unlikely to work because Iran, not the Trump administration, is in the driver’s seat.

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CHAPTERS

0:00 Intro
0:42 The Administration's Propaganda Campaign
3:41 A Two-Pronged Approach
4:12 The Economic Argument: Blockade & Bessent's Strategy
6:21 The Military Argument: More Troops & Carriers
8:48 Why the Story Is Deeply Flawed
9:16 Why a New Air Campaign Won't Work
10:51 The "Three Carriers" Myth
14:28 Striking Oil Infrastructure & Iran's Second Strike
15:35 The Ground Invasion: How Many Combat Troops?
20:23 What Can You Do With 7,500 Troops?
23:05 Body Bags & Getting the Marines Ashore
25:19 Will Economic Pain Make Iran Surrender?
26:28 Lesson of History: Blockades Alone Don't Win Wars
28:38 Facing an Existential Threat
29:23 Iran's Doomsday Option
31:14 Is the West Really Doing Well?
32:01 New Strait Attacks & the Houthi Threat to Saudi Oil
34:30 Oil Is Flowing, but Economies Are Still Hurting
36:01 Bottom Line

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MUSIC

"The Ice Giants" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Music modified (edited/remixed) from the original.

I'll explain how the Vietnam War shaped my thinking about international relations, and the lessons it holds for today.

I'll explain why I believe a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the next decade is unlikely, and the one scenario that could change that.

President Trump and President Xi Jinping just concluded a three-day summit in Washington, DC, that was noteworthy for its lofty rhetoric and almost complete lack of progress in dealing with a host of truly important issues: AI, Iran, Taiwan, trade, and Ukraine. The Economist maintains that the two leaders “squandered a chance to tackle the world’s gravest threats,” which it argues “amounts to a dereliction of duty, and leaves the rest of humanity as the losers.” I disagree. I will review what happened at the summit regarding each of these issues and explain why, with the possible exception of trade, the underlying conflicts of interest between China and the United States leave little room for meaningful agreement.