Decisive Point Podcast

This podcast contends that the US Army should coordinate agile and expeditious Joint medical evacuation operations in the Indo-Pacific and develop novel capabilities to do so effectively.
Keywords: medical evacuation, maritime operations, novel capability, World War II, Joint health service
 
Host (Stephanie Crider)
You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
I’m talking with Mahdi Al-Husseini, Samuel J. Diehl, and Samuel L. Fricks today, authors of “Bridging Sky and Sea: Joint Strategies for Medical Evacuation in the Indo-Pacific,” which was published in the Spring 2025 issue of Parameters.
Al-Husseini was previously the director of the Medical Evacuation Doctrine Course for the Department of Aviation Medicine. He’s now a PhD student at Stanford University in aeronautics and astronautics, with a follow-on as an experimental test pilot.
Diehl was the commander of the 3rd Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment, and following the US Army War College, where he’s currently a student, he will be assigned as Medical Command G5.
Fricks serves as the chief of the Medical Evacuation Concepts and Capabilities Division and is responsible for air and ground evacuation modernization.
Welcome to Decisive Point, gentlemen.
Samuel L. Fricks
Thank you.
Samuel J. Diehl
Thanks. It’s great to be here.
Host
Why did you write this article, and why is now the time?
Fricks
The character of war is changing rapidly. Observations from the battlefield in Ukraine have shown that traditional ways of doing things don’t work, necessarily, when you’re under constant observation.
Why we wrote the article was, we have to change the way that we do medical evacuation, specifically—or especially—in the Indo-Pacific, in order to really have a chance.
Mahdi Al-Husseini
One of the ways we open up the article is by saying what is old is new again, and what is new changes everything, and I think that’s especially true in the context of medical evacuation in the Indo-Pacific. When we look back at World War II, which I would argue is one of the best case studies that we have, in terms of this particular problem set and this particular theater, a lot of what was true and relevant then continues to be true and relevant now. And, we see that on the tactical level. We see that on the strategic level. We see that across echelons and across mission sets.
And yet, despite that, I think so many things as, no doubt, Colonel Diehl and Colonel Fricks will allude to in a little bit, so many ways that our enemy operates has changed, right? And, those things need to be considered as well. And so, what we’re dealing with here is, I think, a very gnarly problem, and one that affects the lives of servicemembers. You know, I do think we’re at something of a junction point, and we need to be able to ensure we have the resources, the doctrine, the training necessary to ensure that when that next conflict comes, we are prepared for it. And, that’s another reason we really wanted to bring this article out to a larger community.
Samuel J. Diehl
And, I’ll give credit to Mahdi where it’s due that when I took command in May of 2023, he was already working towards a degree of experimentation and integration—both with joint partners, as well as with the Army Theater Sustainment Command—about how we tackle this problem, sort of at the micro/tactical level, more effectively from an integration standpoint, but then also how do we integrate and test new technologies?
As a career MEDEVAC [medical evacuation] pilot, I thought what he was doing was really exceptional, but I also understood institutionally, you know, where Colonel Fricks is coming from [in saying] that we have, you know, something of an obligation to get this information out there.
There’s a host of articles out now bemoaning the expectation that there is no more golden hour, that casualties will likely increase in a different conflict in the future, but we haven’t really taken many steps concretely to address that problem.
It’s known but then, also, there are elements, where I’ve discussed with Mahdi, where we evolved in World War II, but our organizations—our authorities, in some cases—haven’t necessarily evolved to catch up to some of the capabilities that we currently have.
So, capturing how do you exercise C2 [command and control] of these assets across joint and combined organizations is incredibly important. I think it’s important, probably, to just start with why is medical evacuation important?
We probably lose some degree of understanding—because we’ve taken it for granted in the last 25 years—that there are strategic implications for how we preserve our combat strength. And, we’ve done it historically very well, but it has implications for how we fight, right—how commanders can exercise audacity, how they can prevent culmination, and then how our individual soldiers see themselves on the battlefield. The risk that they’re willing to take reflects, right, their understanding and appreciation for how their medical system is going to take care of them.
Host
Tell me a little bit more about what you all are advocating for, not only in your article, but if there’s anything beyond that that you want to touch on, I’d love to hear it.
Al-Husseini
One of the luxuries I have here is having folks like Colonel Fricks and Colonel Diehl, who are, legitimately, I would argue, titans of the MEDEVAC enterprise.
So, I think all of us will have something of a different perspective. You know, I’ll kind of broach this from the tactical level—as somebody who was formerly, and very recently, a platoon leader and an operations officer in a MEDEVAC company—one of the challenges that we ask ourselves, we talk a lot about LSCO [large-scale combat operations], right, is to what extent do I have control, you know, in my foxhole and in my organization with the kind of impact that we want to have, given the challenges that we discuss in the article. When we talk about, you know, how do we enable medical evacuation to be effective over long distances, where the patient numbers are far beyond anything we’ve seen potentially, again, since World War II, where we have an enemy threat that is dynamic, that is evolving, whose weapon systems while, maybe known to us, we haven’t necessarily faced directly?
And those are tough, right? Especially, I’ll tell you, as a captain, as a platoon leader, as a section leader in a MEDEVAC company, I don’t have control over the acquisitions pipeline, right? So, I don’t have control over materiel, but what I do have an impact on is training.
And, one thing we try to advocate for in the article that is true for MEDEVAC, but also extends to other missions, is, you know, we can think critically about capability. And [that is] one of the things that the JCIDS [Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System] does very well. There’s a formal definition in there that kind of talks about capability in terms of integrating ways and means and means and ways. That’s something we also talk about in the article.
And, one of the things we advocate for is—even on the tactical level—to kind of think about, given, you know, the materiel that we do have, right, given the equipment that we have, given the force structure that we currently have, how can we think creatively about challenging problems and find ways to make a difference and to demonstrate potentially new capabilities given the things we already have?
So, to be a little bit more specific, you know, one of the things we talk about in the article, for example, is an exercise that we ran at the 25th Infantry Division, which we call MEDEVAC Projects Week. In that effort, what we effectively did was we demonstrated this concept of a maritime exchange point where we were able to use an Army watercraft to bridge the transport of a pace ship between two aircraft—hypothetically coming from different islands.
We had an existing setup in terms of what our force structure looks like. We know, you know, our aircraft have certain capabilities. We know we have a relationship with our watercraft teams—in this case down in Honolulu. How do we bring them together? How do we network, you know, all these various pieces of the puzzle effectively and in ways that can make a difference?
And so, one thing that we certainly want to bring to bear is this idea that even on the tactical level, there are ways to experiment and to consider how we use the things that sometimes we take for granted, but how do we use our existing units or our existing equipment to do new things in a way, in this case, in the case of MEDEVAC, impacts real-world patients in real-world conflicts?
Fricks
Yeah, just to build off what Mahdi indicated there, we also have to embrace, kind of, the new technologies, right, especially when it comes to autonomous systems. We’ve all seen the directives that are coming out, you know, unleashing drone dominance and such, and medical needs to be a part of that. The problem, though, is that we really lack the policy that addresses moving casualties on an autonomous system.
You know, there’s an ethical piece to it and there’s a policy piece. But, I think we would agree that we’d like to use it just like you would have used, you know, the helicopter in Korea. Remember, if you’ve ever seen MASH, they put the casualties on the outside of the aircraft, right, with no en route carrier. If we did that today, it would be considered wrong, but at the time, it was transformative and impactful—and that’s the way we really need to look at drones.
So, taking what Mahdi was talking about with what we have existed, we also need to look forward to how we can use evolving technologies to get after moving casualties in that really denied environment. And that’s where, you know, a lot of the observations from Ukraine, I think, really apply—the way that they’ve used ground robotics and remote systems to be able to evacuate in areas where we’ve traditionally sent a helicopter all the way to the point of injury to pick up a casualty. And that’s just simply not feasible in the future environment.
I think Colonel Diehl here will talk about, you know, how we command and control that economy of force to be able to task those things, but from my perspective, we really need to embrace that new technology to supplement—or complement—what we know works and what we already have in our inventory, like Mahdi alluded to.
Diehl
One thing Mahdi didn’t talk about, which we may be able to get to later, is how he’s working some automated decision-support tools, as well, to help apply algorithm solutions to some of these challenges.
My focus and specific interest is how do we see ourselves fighting? How have we fought as a military health service? And where do the gaps potentially exist?
The joint concept for health service support talks a lot about integration. It doesn’t talk an awful lot about command and control. And, I think commanders are essential at echelon—really even above the division level—in synchronizing these resources and how they fight. We know that it’s not prominent in the history. There were incredible challenges in historical conflicts in regulating patients, in prioritizing movement of resources and patients, in developing policies—or even best practices—as it pertained to medical care. And so, having senior commanders with a staff that’s capable, and provided the authorities to effectively exercise, that’s, I think, how we win.
War requires a tremendous amount of adaptation, and the medical community, just by virtue of supporting the war-fighting element, has to adapt in response to that adaptation. We have to think about how we expect to manage risk, and where are the leaders that are prepared to have very difficult conversations about how we employ very finite resources on the battlefield [and] where we accept risk for a patient or for a crew or employ an autonomous system at the end of the day, right, to preserve the health of the war fighter on the battlefield.
Host
Colonel Fricks, you brought up a really great point. If there’s no conflict, then likely MEDEVAC is not active. It’s kind of out of sight, out of mind, I guess, is what I’m getting at. What does our audience need to understand about MEDEVAC?
Fricks
It’s not out of sight, out of mind. It’s actually on the table for reductions because it’s not being used.
And that’s a battle that has gone back since the ’60s, when Charles Kelly, you know, one of the big names in MEDEVAC, kind of the father of MEDEVAC, was really fighting hard to protect his assets because they were out there on the ramp when everyone else was using their aircraft. The ones [aircraft] with the red crosses weren’t being used, so the commander wanted to take them and use them.
So, we are currently facing very similar challenges where we have this fleet of aircraft that are not necessarily engaged all the time, and those same questions are really being asked. Why do we have all these aircraft? And, there’s a cost that comes with maintaining them and a cost in training and folks for maintaining those aircraft. So, the risk is how do we maintain a large fleet that’s large enough to support the entire Joint Force, which the Army has been directed to do for air medical evacuation, at a time when we’re trying to save money and reduce spending when the demand’s really not there?
Now, we do have to keep some capability for homeland defense and some contingency operations—but the Army has actually already reduced MEDEVAC through Army transformation initiatives—because it takes a long time to build that up and to train everyone and be proficient. Because the MEDEVAC mission set is one of the most difficult missions to fly because we’re always flying in the worst weather, the darkest nights—because that’s when the casualties happen. It’s not an easily replicatable [replicable] capability to build from the ground up.
Host
We’re getting close to our time here, but I know you had some really good recommendations. I think there were six of them. Can we briefly go through them?
Diehl
I’ll lead off.
I’ll give credit where it’s due, to Mahdi, as the previous director of our MEDEVAC Doctrine Course. [One item] is updating our doctrine to make sure that we’re not comfortable with the status quo of how we’ve developed the system and that we challenge leaders. We institutionalize an understanding of how we can and should employ our assets in a littoral environment. I don’t think we’re there yet, though we’ve made some challenges, but that’s really, you know, institutionally how we communicate in a shared language, how we have to train. And so, if our doctrine doesn’t reflect that [it causes problems]. That’s step one is making sure that we have commanders who understand the imperative to operate in this environment and think through the challenges at the tactical level that need to be overcome, right, because that’s the best place to find out where they need top cover, where they need a better process, where they need to better understand risk, or there’s training that comes from the bottom up. So, that was number one.
And Mahdi, I’ll give you credit where it’s due or an opportunity to chime in on that.
Mahdi
Absolutely, sir. Doctrine is the foundation, right? So, every year, of course, we get a new crop of excellent “67 Juliets” [aeromedical evacuation officers], who come to us at the doctrine course to learn the fundamentals, which they then take out to their unit and can then start really meaningfully applying critical thinking to.
A lot has changed, actually, since we published the article, ATP 4-02.2, [Army Techniques Publication] Medical Evacuation, which is the, I would argue, preeminent piece of doctrine, on the techniques level, for all things medical evacuation in the Army. My understanding is a new one is shortly here to be published, but it really does include quite a bit on the maritime theater that, up until this point, has really not been the case.
And so, it’s really wonderful to see folks like Larry Smith and the MEDCoE [US Army Medical Center of Excellence] Doctrine Division pushing forward on the importance of the maritime theater and considerations for the maritime theater and how we do evacuation in that space in the foundations, right? That all 67 Js [Juliets], right, must understand—in many ways, in my opinion, from front to cover—before going out and doing this sort of critical thinking and unique demonstrations and extending capability that we talk about in this podcast.
That being said, I think there’s certainly a lot of work to be done there. There’s also, you know, how do we integrate with the other forces—or the other joint forces—in our doctrine through things like the Joint publications? And how do we think about how the Army fits into the larger puzzle with the use of our air ambulances in light of, you know, ships and the other capabilities that the other branches bring to bear? And, I would argue that’s still something of an open question that we’re still trying to figure out to this day, but it’s a start. And the doctrine is really where we start.
Diehl
The second recommendation, I think, just as ordered in the article, was about watercraft, right? And we certainly don’t have a lot of control over that. And the Army, arguably, is still at a deficit. I think between the Army and the Navy in World War II, we had upwards of 30 hospital ships in use. How and when we identify those, equip those, and man those is a discussion that’s far above my level.
But even at the tactical, low-operational level, understanding how we would interface with those and how they are integrated into a joint medical plan, I would argue we’re likely not there yet. And, that’s just informed by five years in Hawaii and a couple years in Korea. I haven’t seen a lot of concrete analysis that we’ve thought through that problem about how watercraft would be used. And, we understand contested logistics.
We understand TPFDD [Time-Phased Force Deployment Data] constraints and the incredible demand across 7,000 miles of ocean for [a] very finite number of resources to move people and resources. What we identify as a specific medical-lift capability and how many [are] questions, that I don’t have the answers to but, arguably, could use some refinement, I think, at this point.
Al-Husseini
One of the recommendations that we make is that we should continue to build on existing research agreements with our academic partners to develop and assess new evacuation capabilities at scale in some of these irregular theaters, where we have constraints like vast distances and kind of this distributed patient instantiation across islands, for example, and these enemy constraints. And, we’ve tried to do that. MEDEVAC Projects Week itself was kind of a joint effort, not just between the 25th Infantry Division and 8th TSC [Training Support Center], but also, actually, the Army Research Lab and Stanford University. And so, we brought all team members to the table to kind of figure out, hey, how do we introduce this capability in a way that, number one, operationally makes sense for the problem at hand? Number two—technically, on the backside—can be supported in a way that meets our requirements for things like continuity of care and also, of course, respects the employment of unique assets like HH-60 aircraft and the LSV [Logistics Support Vessel] aircraft that we were working with.
And so, it really does take kind of all parties to kind of come together to figure out some of these problem sets, and we want to kind of continue to be able to do that. And so, we currently have an existing research agreement for the next several years between the Army Research Lab in Berkeley, [California], and the Department of Aviation Medicine.
I’ve also kind of been privy to that and supported that effort to, kind of, continue exploring some additional capabilities in light of not just our current inventory but our future inventory. And then, the other part that we’re very interested in, and Colonel Diehl alluded to this, is the automated decision making, or how do we meaningfully employ data and historical trends in a way that allows our evacuation dispatchers in our control cells to make difficult decisions with regards to what platforms go where [and] in support of what patients and, again, what is oftentimes a very, very challenging and complex environment.
And so, you know, one thing we’re actively working on right now is a program we call MEDEVAC X, where we basically have this incredibly high-fidelity simulator for MEDEVAC operations, both in the European and the Pacific theater, and we’re able to employ a series of automated dispatching tools to evaluate not just, you know, how we might deal with these kind of very unique and extremely large casualty flows, but how we integrate, right, with medical planners and automation so we can really have the best dispatching, the best planning possible for any kind of given conflict. And so, we want to continue to kind of push the envelope on that, and we do think it’ll pay dividends down the road, but it is kind of early on in the research phase. But, we do advocate for more of this kind of exploration and bringing in bright minds, not just from within, you know, the Department of War, but beyond that to our academic institutions and even industry where it calls for it.
Fricks
So, to Mahdi’s point, there’s a lot of utility in applying AI solutions to some of these problems. One of the recommendations we make in the paper is applying those solutions in a denied, degraded, or disrupted environment, right?
Understanding that the fog of war is going to preclude a surgeon cell or a command team that owns those assets from having uninterrupted understanding of where those assets exist, where the casualties exist. There’s value in having some algorithmic input on how we allocate very finite resources. That also speaks to, you know, the larger challenge of who is making those decisions and who’s owning risks.
Ultimately, all of this conversation is about risk, assuming risk for the war fighter, assuming risk for a platform that’s in jeopardy. And so, how do we help commanders make better decisions is where Mahdi’s putting a lot of work. And, though his MEDEVAC X project is specific to MEDEVAC, I think one could argue that there’s a lot of potential utility in how that algorithm can drive point-of-need delivery or resupply, et cetera.
Al-Husseini
And, I’ll just say one more thing on that point. There is, of course, a lot of interest in AI and, oftentimes, I talk about decision-making support systems rather than calling them decision-making systems. And, that’s very intentional because having that human in the loop, especially when we talk about things like MEDEVAC, is critical, right? In general, I also just don’t think it’s a good idea to remove the human in the loop and allow a lot of these decisions to happen in an entirely decentralized way. There’s a lot of difficulties with that.
And so, one of the things I certainly advocate for when we think about AI implementation, especially in the MEDEVAC community, is safety and validation. What is the safety [mechanism] and how do we validate these tools so that when we are in an operational scenario, we have some level of guarantee? Because we’re not talking, of course, about moving bullets and beans, right? We’re talking about moving war fighters, folks who’ve been injured and who deserve, right, those sort of guarantees should these automated systems be used.
So, I know my team and I here at Stanford are certainly hard at work at that area. And, there’s a lot of others who are doing excellent work across the spectrum in support of the Army and the other branches doing the same thing, but those are some of the really difficult questions I think we have and we’ll continue to ask ourselves. And I think that is especially true for MEDEVAC.
Fricks
The military should pursue autonomous evacuation solutions and the policies that govern them. The big recommendation—and that’s kind of really tied into the complete autonomy one—is we have to have a policy that addresses the use of it because we’re not building drones specific for that [autonomous evacuation]. Even for CASAVAC, you know, which is casualty evacuation, not necessarily MEDEVAC, you can put a casualty on a drone and move it, but is it built to the standard or the airworthiness requirements to support human life? Can it recompute weight and balance? Does it know not to go above 14,000 feet with a human on board because of oxygen and the other human factors? So, a policy would help drive that, and then we can get into the materiel side of it and actually build capability that can support that. So, the world of autonomy is our oyster, right? But, we have to have the policies in place to govern its build and design. Between Sam and Mahdi, they can bring it home on the maritime evacuation concept, and I think they’ll have the last recommendation.
Diehl
I’ll add, autonomy absolutely has its place, but manned platforms also are not going away, not anytime soon, and there will be conversations about how far forward those can go. Future vertical lift capabilities, along with the HH-60s, are not going anywhere.
What we need to do, though, is understand that there have been proofs-of-concept—use cases—in Ukraine for unmanned capabilities in environments where putting a manned crew at risk could not happen, right, without almost their assured destruction. And so, what capabilities can we push farther forward, right? We want to get the best care as far forward as possible and get the patient to the rear as rapidly as possible. There’s always a risk conversation surrounding that. And so, if you have additional unmanned capabilities, that supports the conversation of developing it.
The last recommendation we make in the paper is really about a joint medical evacuation concept in littoral environments, and I would put a little bit of a finer point on it, understanding that there’s no boilerplate. You know, theater-nonspecific solution is about authorities, right? Who can integrate medical resources across joint forces in a specific geography to reduce risk to the war fighters, right? Who can do that in such a way that reduces the JFLCC [Joint Force Land Component Commander] or division or maneuver commander’s risk in a way that they don’t have to be concerned about culmination, right? Or about their soldiers lacking the care that they should have.
What the medical community can provide in a future conflict, you know, that standard may shift based on threat, but we have an obligation to plan against the very best standard of care. And so, that takes commanders. That takes commanders that are empowered to apply resources, integrate them across formations, across geographies, and that might be water. That might be land. But, there are battlefield frameworks that we don’t currently exercise. And I say this [based on] what I’ve seen in the Pacific, in Hawaii, and in Korea. We talk an awful lot about integration, but we don’t do very well in defining roles specifically for the theater medical command, right?
The Army has a theater-enabling command that is somewhat analogous to the TSC [Training Sustainment Command] but lacks some of the authorities and/or capacity to really fulfill the role, I think, for which they’re intended. And so, you know, whether or not there is a joint concept that’s published, forcing us to think about, right, where historically we have been very challenged, I think, is in placing the responsibility for medical advice and decisions on a surgeon or the surgeon’s staff instead of a commander, right? And medical command and control is foundational to this conversation—understanding how to integrate, how to anticipate, how to conform.
We’ve got to attack some of those challenges in the Indo-Pacific. And MEDEVAC, specifically, is one of 10 medical functions where, as a Joint Force, we need to understand better how we see to those assets.
Host
Listeners, you can read the genesis article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 55, issue 1. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for making time to speak with me today. Very interesting conversation.
Diehl
Thanks, Stephanie.
Al-Husseini
Thank you very much.
Fricks
Thanks for the opportunity.

In this podcast, Bruce Busler and Ryan Samuelson argue that the United States must prepare for “the fight to get to the fight,” focusing on deploying and maintaining military forces from a contested homeland amid near-peer threats.
Keywords: USTRANSCOM, Transportation Command, contested homeland, conflict, Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise

Stephanie Crider (Host)
You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College or any other agency of the US government.
I’m talking remotely with Mr. Bruce Busler and Mr. Ryan Samuelson today.
Busler is the former director of the Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center, or JDPAC, and the US Army’s Transportation Engineering Agency, or TEA. He’s the author of “Deploying and Supplying the Joint Force from a Contested Homeland,” which was published in the Spring 2025 issue of Parameters.
Samuelson is the current director of JDPAC and TEA, USTRANSCOM (US Transportation Command), at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.
Let’s start at the beginning. What do JDPAC and TEA do?
Ryan Samuelson
Sure. Well, Stephanie and Mr. Busler, thank you very much.
You know, JDPAC is . . . it’s the analysis center for the combatant command. It’s the analysis center that allows us to fulfill our Unified Command Plan responsibilities. And so, we bring engineering and analytical work together both with JDPAC and the Transportation Engineering Agency, which TEA is focused on improving the employability and sustainment of the Joint Force by providing the Department [of War] expert engineering analysis, policy guidance, and additional analysis.
And so, when you take an engineering center from the combatant command and the analysis center and combine that with the Transportation Engineering Agency, what you have is a fusion of the ability to look at engineering solutions and then also to look at how we are moving from predictive to prescriptive analytics to ensure that the Joint Force can deploy and sustain itself.
Host
Mr. Busler, I’m really interested in how you came to write this article, but also why it matters for the Parameters [and] Decisive Point audience.
Bruce Busler
About two years ago, I had the chance to speak at a conference that was hosted by the [US] Army War College that involved many of the service and Joint players that were addressing homeland defense topics and the ability to project power from the homeland. And, as an outgrowth of that conference, I was asked to write a journal article, which I was happy to do, because I really wanted to help people understand what is it that TRANSCOM and JDPAC and TEA were doing on behalf of the Joint Force to be able to operate from a contested homeland.
And, that was really becoming a point of awareness of the fact that we’re [no longer] going to operate with impunity. It’s just an administrative activity to get the Joint Force to the airfields and seaports and get them into the fight. And so, what I wanted to do was kind of capture my thoughts and then help people see the great work that was being done at TRANSCOM on behalf of the broader community to ensure we could prosecute this mission.
In the article, I kind of distill my thoughts into three key areas. First of all, how we understand and minimize the impact of high-consequence events, versus all the potential points of disruption, so that we can continue to operate when we are going to be disrupted—and it’s not if, but when, we’re going to be disrupted—and then, also, how that works with all of the providers we have.
So, the first point was minimizing the impact of high-probability / high-consequence events. The second one was maximize how this thing called the Joint Deployment Distribution Enterprise can continue to operate with all of our providers. And, we have to maintain not only the primary capabilities but have resilient approaches for how we can use alternate ways of conducting our mission in finding other paths [that] allow us to continue to move the force forward.
And lastly, I wanted to talk about optimizing those relationships we have to have with our commercial providers and with our federal, state, and local partners to be able to do this mission. We’re heavily reliant upon commercial providers and our interagency partners to do this kind of mission. So, how do we optimize and build relationships today that will sustain us when it really counts?
And so, those were the key themes I wanted to build in the article and help draw people’s attention to what we’re doing today and then point out some thoughts that maybe [help people understand that], you know, it’s not a panacea. What are we doing to maybe address some areas that are continuing to be a risk to us?
So, that’s kind of what I wanted to do to help people quickly see the essence of what that look[s] like. And so, one of the things I mentioned before, which maybe Ryan can help expound upon, is [introduce] this idea of what is a Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise?
And, Ryan, maybe I’m going to give it back to you, but can you talk a little bit about how, you know, our commercial partners and our federal, state, and local, interagency partners are so critical for TRANSCOM to conduct this mission with their component commands to do this hard work we just described?
Samuelson
Sure. Thank you, Mr. Busler.
 You know, Stephanie, one of the things I wanted to cover about the article, too, before I get into what really the Joint Deployment and Distribution [Enterprise] is, [that] it had key critical themes. And so, why am I here today? I’ll tell you why I’m here today. It’s because this article still is immensely relevant today, and it is driving an awful lot of what US Transportation Command is doing.
It was a paradigm shift, right? It’s [the transition] from uncontested to contested nature of our deployment and distribution activities. It’s about engineering. The article was about engineered resiliency—how we’re doing strategic analysis and the programs we do that [with] to engineer resiliency into our ability. It’s about commercial partnerships. It’s about network redundancy and resiliency, which is in itself protection of the ability to project the forces. It’s about Reserve components and their criticality to it. And ultimately, [it’s] about mission assurance through distributed ops. And so, we find it very relevant today. And in fact, the entire JDDE (Joint Deployment Distribution Enterprise) has likely read the article because it drives an awful lot of what we talk about.
So, what is the JDDE? You know, really, it’s a global network of interdependent systems of systems. It’s a blend of military, commercial, and government partnerships. If you think on the military side, it involves combatant commands, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Health Agency, [and] the Joint Forces. On the commercial side, our transportation providers are hugely critical. They are a key backbone of this ability to deploy globally. And then [it includes] our government partners from state and local partnerships with the Department of Transportation through the Maritime Administration, [and] our Highway and Rail departments, as well.
The JDDE also can include multinational partners if we are partnered with them on moving something for the Joint Force. It includes our allies and partners. And so, the way I look at it, the JDDE really is—it’s the equipment, it’s the people, the procedures, the information, the organizations, the training, [and] the facilities. All of that is required for the mobility enterprise to generate and sustain the mass at velocity across tactical and strategic distances. And that’s the key [to] this partnership.
Busler
And so, one of the things, you know, that I was going to kind of follow up on is [that] once you understand those entities that have to work together . . . one of the very first things I did in the article was talk about what are the potential ways they’re going to be disrupted? You know, one of the things that TRANSCOM focused on—you know, probably 15 years ago, and has grown over time—is the ability to look at the impact of cyber operations that will impact our ability to operate.
And that’s a relatively new area for us, but that isn’t the only way that we could potentially be disrupted. You know, I mentioned, you know, early on, that back even in World War II, we had attacks on the homeland. They just weren’t of high impact. You know, the Japanese floated balloons over the Northwest. They actually shelled—with a submarine. The Germans actually had espionage and other activities on the East Coast. But the thing was, they were relatively minor in their impact and really had no deep consequence to how we could operate.
That’s not the same today. We’re seeing that, especially in the cyber domain, which is probably the area that will be the most likely and have the, probably, most pervasive impact [on our] ability to operate.
But I think you’re seeing, out of the examples that we’re looking at in Ukraine, for example, the ability to look at drones [and] other things will happen. And so, then it becomes how do you think about operating when those conditions now are going to be imposed upon us? So, that became, you know, kind of a concern. And one of the other areas that I think people are aware of, is that, you know, within the cyber domain, it’s not just the technical means of disrupting us, there will be information operations that will try to disrupt our commercial providers from supporting us, from having, you know, the American people, you know, look at disruptions to their life, potentially, when it comes to the priority of service that we may have to restrict to be able to operate. And so, how do we address the myriad of things that will be happening as we elevate our activities to be able to go into a power-projection condition that would be of high scale and of high consequence to our nation?
And so, that’s really what I wanted to be able to kind of say—those things are going to happen. They will become disruptive, and how do we operate through those, and despite those kind of activities continuing to operate? So, you heard Ryan talk about, you know, mission assurance in terms of the cyber domain [and] resiliency, in terms of the physical networks and nodes we operate through. And, that’s one of the key things that the analysis center, with the engineering agency called TEA, has really been focused on for many, many years is looking at how we can employ those paths and understand to what degree we can continue to look at, you know, alternate paths [and] alternate nodes, and continue to provide the command and, really, the Joint Force, the ability to operate when those things happen.
So, that’s really the key thing I was trying to do in terms of thinking about, you know, how we must grapple with the complexity and the reality of what will be imposed upon us when these times come. So, from that I really wanted to maybe pivot back to Ryan and say, as you continue the work you’re doing today, has there been anything that’s been additional, that you think that we should be aware of, that we would want to provide in the context of this projecting power from the homeland?
Samuelson
You brought up an important point in the last [part of the discussion] that domains unseen by our trains, our ships, our planes, our trucks—those domains are as critical as the steel conveyances that are the visible backbone of our ability to project our force. And so, I think an important part in this article, and an important part that TRANSCOM, along with JDPAC’s assistance—and I will note that JDPAC just absorbed also the role of the Chief Data and Analytics Artificial Intelligence Officer role for the command as well—that’s the fusion of bringing data and looking beyond just the simple conveyances and capacities and capabilities but actually fusing in data as a new class of supply, as equally important as bulk fuel and Class IX parts.
But, I will tell you, what we are doing with our partners [is] looking at network intrusion- detection technologies, cloud resiliency solutions, vulnerability assessment products, and continuing to refine our optimization and distribution models, just to name a few [things], for the entire Joint logistics enterprise, and that Joint Deployment Distribution Enterprise and a new UCP (unified command plan) mission in the last couple of years for TRANSCOM, as well, the Joint Petroleum Enterprise.
Busler
In the context of, you know, all those things we’ve just talked about, now, you know, I did mention earlier that there were three main, I think, areas of organizing your thoughts here. I kind of want to re-emphasize that because I think it’s important to understand the proposition we put forward. And so, those things, again, were: if we can, as the Joint Force led by TRANSCOM, minimize the impact of high-probability threats (cyber being one of those) and [mitigate] the vulnerability of the enterprise, maximizing our ability to operate with our partners—both commercial and our interagency, both at the federal, state, and local [levels], and even our multinational partners—and find other ways of continuing to operate resilient paths, [a] means of mitigating disruptions when they do occur, and then [optimize] those relationships to where we can count upon them to not be put at risk when we have to go into conflict, then we have a higher probability that we’ll continue to operate and be able to succeed in terms of accomplishing the missions that are given to the Joint power projection apparatus that TRANSCOM has been [the] custodian for for so long.
So, that’s kind of the key thing I wanted to lay out there. And the takeaways really were, do we understand where there is consequence? And we talked about, you know, the potential for disruptions. You can’t worry about all the thousands of points of potential impact. So, what are the ones that are of highest consequence that we should focus on? And one of the things leadership needs to do is provide their priority to the areas that truly have the potential to be of high impact to our ability to operate.
So, that’s one of the key takeaways. Can we understand that? Can we work through those kind of things? And that’s one of the things the analysis, I think, is very good at because you can do modeling and simulation. Ryan mentioned some of the work we’re doing now with high-end analytics to be able to understand and then be able to be prepared to operate through those kinds of disruptions.
The second one is the ability to realize who our partners are and to work with them day in and day out and to have this apparatus. He mentions some of the things we have—and we actually have in place several standing relationships with some of these organizations. We have developed for many years, matter of fact, it goes clear back to President [Dwight D.] Eisenhower, this concept of a strategic highway network and how we work at the federal and local levels to ensure that we can have a highway network that we can use to be able to accomplish the national defense mission. And President Eisenhower saw it very clearly when he was both, you know, the commander in World War II and, later on, the president, for why we needed a national highway system that allowed us to operate.
So, our ability to, you know, do that analysis and work with them is really important. The same thing [is true] with our rail networks, that are privately owned, for how we can operate those—our seaports and our airfields—to operate with those partners to ensure we have alternatives, or that they can mitigate the impacts on those installations when those would be put at risk. So, our ability to look at those network paths and those nodes and understand the alternatives we have was a second key takeaway in terms of how JDPAC is doing that analysis and maintaining those relationships today.
The last one was really this realization that we have many key partners that we have to work with. And many of those, again, we mentioned are commercial partners underneath this concept called the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement. The work we do with our seaport providers through the relationships we have with them through executive working groups, our contractual relationships we have with our truck carriers, for example, all of those things are things we have in place today that are foundational for our ability to operate in the future. So, building and sustaining those relationships now is really the foundation for how we’re going to continue to operate when the time comes and we are put under duress.
And, you know, General [Jaqueline D.] Van Ovost [who] was one of the prior commanders, even in her congressional testimony, pointed out that the consequence of our commercial providers really is of deep, you know, importance to TRANSCOM, and our partnerships with them is consequential to the Department [of War] for how we think about that going forward. So, that third was optimizing those relationships and sustaining them so we can rely upon them when we go to war. [These items] were the three takeaways that I thought were important in this article.
[I] invite you to maybe add to that. Is there anything else that maybe TRANSCOM is doing today, especially with those partnerships we just talked about, that you think are important for the context of this discussion?
Samuelson
[I have] no better words than “minimizing disruption / maximizing resiliency” and our ability to get the mission done and then optimizing partnerships, which make all of this happen. The entire basis of the article really is [that] the key threat to mobility is delay, right? Delay through contested effects, delay through congested effects, delay through attrition and those things in our future war fights.
And, as we move from areas of competition [and] potentially into crisis and conflict, delay manifests itself in not getting the Joint Force where it needs to be, and TRANSCOM underwrites the lethality of the Joint Force. It is what determines whether or not the Joint Force is going to be able to get to the point of need for another combatant commander.
So, as we talk about those important optimization partnerships, the things that we also look at now, if you think on the partnerships, are do we have the proper understanding of the authorities and the responsibilities that we need? In the past, where we didn’t worry about a congested or a contested homeland departure, we didn’t think through what are the relationships with our other whole-of-government entities that operate within the continental US?
So, as we think through that, some of the things that TRANSCOM is doing is we’re expanding our exercise and collaboration—both with other government partners, as well as our industry partners and our commercial partners who are going to help us deploy that Joint Force.
I talked about restructuring. We are going back under the restructuring our data and analytics [framework]. We now are working back with other entities, even outside of the department, to ensure that we have the right authoritative data sets to make the decisions as we move forward on deploying that. We are exercising now at greater levels than we ever had before of exercising through disrupted networks, even here with our commercial partners and other members. And so, we’re looking at alternative route identification, port diversification activities, not just overseas, but here within the United States. [We are] looking at how do we handle expedited repair capabilities as well. And those are some of the things that we’re looking [at] as we think about minimizing, maximizing, and optimizing to deploy the Joint Force.
Busler
Ryan, I think you kind of hit on one of the topics we wanted to make sure to get to, [which] is not only the commercial providers but the key role we have with our federal and state partners. One of the areas that we mentioned before is we’re relied upon for getting the priority of service we need, you know, if the time should come or the Department [of War] now is putting demands on our commercial providers.
I mentioned maybe just a couple of areas that were really important to us. One of the areas that we have that we can use as a tool underneath the overall banner of the Defense Production Act is something called the Transportation Priority Allocation System—and we use that. And Ryan mentioned, you know, getting access to seaports. We would use that to get what’s called a “rated order” to allow a commercial provider to give us high-priority service, when the time came, to minimize that disruption.
And that’s done, by the way, through the Department of Transportation to communicate with our commercial entities to allow them to have confidence that we truly are asking for them to do something that’s of high consequence. That’s typically held at the TRANSCOM commander level, to ensure that that’s not done in a cavalier manner. The work we’re doing, for example, on the trucking system, you know, to allow us to say, “Is there a time and place where we look at potential waivers to time and service requirements for truck drivers who would need to operate over extended hours, potentially, to move things to our ports and airfields to allow us to then put them on ships and airplanes to allow us to deploy those things?”
And so, we think of those as kind of administrative and regulatory, but those are still part of the apparatus that has to be addressed to allow us to operate under these high-consequence events. Those are the kind of things we worry about, matter of fact, so much so that people don’t realize that when we’re moving really heavy equipment, which are the kind of things we’re going to be moving in a deployment activity, the ability to give waivers for overweight or oversize vehicles is held at the state level.
And so, how we work across that to have, kind of, a coordinated approach with our primary, our Army component that does that for TRANSCOM to allow that to happen in a very timely and efficient manner, is another thing that TEA does to work through those kind of things to allow that to happen in a very efficient way, should we put those kind of demands on the system.
So, I think we kind of talked about this, but I wanted to see, is there anything else that you saw? As you look at this overall, you know, approach we’ve identified, I think there’s a lot of strengths here, you know. Is there anything else you wanted to highlight or maybe even potential weaknesses that would be something that would be important to acknowledge as we, kind of, maybe bring this to some closing thoughts here.
Samuelson
We have a fairly robust view of what challenges are out there, focusing our efforts on what are those opportunities to address those, right? And, you’ve identified some of the things that we work with [including] state and local, even federal, entities, our commercial partners out there, for example, in trucking and rail. Part of the areas that we are working robustly with them is [to] make sure we understand and they understand what are their networks? What are their resiliency and redundancy plans? What are their points of consequences for their operations that may impact the ability to move in the time frame that we need to move?
Oftentimes, we have resiliency, but is that resiliency fast enough to have the cause and effect that we’re looking for as we deploy the Joint Force? One of the things that we’re doing on making sure we understand those challenges is we are pulling our partners—and [when] I say partners, I’m talking both commercial partners and other government partners—much more into integrated planning efforts. We’re expanding our exercise framework to ensure that they don’t just understand what we’re doing, but they actually observe and participate. We have had industry partners and government partners come to tabletop exercises where we walk through the speed in which we’ll need to make decisions with the authorities that are invested within our individual departments. It’s that robust relationship [we need].
We understand we have challenges. Now, let’s work through the authorities in the ways in which we address those challenges. That really is where we are focused at TRANSCOM right now.
Busler
You know, I’m glad that you emphasized that. You know, one of the things I was going to mention is how we have built these relationships and the tools we have to connect with our providers. And one of the examples was, you may recall, that we had to rely upon our commercial airlines to be able to do the withdrawal from Afghanistan. And, we had to activate [air]craft at stage one for only the second time in history. And helping them understand why we needed that response, why we needed that heavy, large aircraft passenger capability was one of the key things we had to be able to work with them [on]. And having that apparatus in place allowed us to work through that very efficiently and allowed us to communicate some of the challenges, even at the classified level, to do that. And, the same thing could be said for, you know, the ability to look at what was going on in the aftermath of operating in Ukraine and how we work with our commercial providers, who moved a lot of that material.
But you may recall that that kind of caused spillover in terms of impact to shipping in the Red Sea. And a lot of work was done to share, again, in a classified environment with our commercial providers, the kind of things that they would need to know to continue to operate in those areas that were now being contested by others that would be of a potential impact to them.
So, how we did that sharing of information, and doing that in appropriate environments, was one of the key things [that] allowed us to operate. So, you can think of that as a microcosm—the kind of things we would escalate and do on a much larger scale when we had to go into a, you know, a conflict that would be of even greater scale of operations and consequence of activity.
But those are the kind of things, I think, that you can expect TRANSCOM [to] continue to lead on behalf of the Department [of War] to allow us to have the right venues and the right relationships to do that. At the end of the article, I mentioned that we have a lot of strong things we’re doing.
I think the three approaches we’ve identified and the work we’re doing is a great foundation, but it’s not a panacea. It’s not a cure all that will cure and take away all of the potential negative things [that] would come. You know, I mentioned some of the things that I was concerned about when I wrote the article, and one of them is this idea of a black swan event that potentially could, you know, have a debilitating impact on our ability to operate, you know, things we didn’t think about, you know, an impact that is much deeper and much broader than we had understood.
So, this is, again, I think where the analysis center we can continue explore those kind of issues. And one of the things Ryan mentioned early on is the ability to leverage, you know, big data and the analytics work being done today and to use artificial intelligence to be able to expand our understanding of what those things are like and its ability to think through and operate, you know, under those conditions is an area that I see as a bright spot for how we can potentially mitigate this, this liability [we] identified.
[Something] I mentioned, as well, is that we have to work across a whole-of-government to do this work, and [that] many times [there] will be tension, potentially, in terms of the priority that different entities see for how we’re responding as a government—even to the point we mentioned before about providers. One of the key areas that we’re reliant upon is [the ability of] both the Reserve and the Guard partners we have to be able to support our operations, so much so that we have, you know, a high percentage of our Guard/Reserve forces, for example, in our airlifting / air refueling forces, in our aeromedical evacuation forces, and even the soldiers that operate our ports, for example, or operate any port, managing that activity. We are highly reliant upon them to be able to activate and get capacity from the Guard and Reserve.
Well, it could be at the same point in time that we’re getting access from these people, they could be pulled, even [in] their private, you know, commercial jobs, into the areas of activity that have also been elevated. And even as we think about, you know, in the homeland defense consequence management areas, [and] what people are doing to mitigate the consequence for what’s happening in the homeland, there could be tension for how we’re putting demands on these same groups of people to be able to respond.
And then, lastly, I mentioned [that] we need to worry about, you know, new threats that are now emerging. And one of the things we acknowledge is the fact that there will probably be, you know, drones and other activity we’ll have to overcome. So, how do we look at counter-drone response [and] worry about not only the capabilities but how we’re working across that at the federal level, like with the Federal, you know, Aviation Administration and others to look at the right mission authorities? Do we have the means of protecting ourself across the wide range of activities that potentially could put us at risk? We’re going to have to work through those kind of responses, as well.
And so, those are the kind of things that I think we have to continue to worry about as we look forward. And, Ryan, is there anything else that you saw, you know, that you think is important to acknowledge, [including] the fact that although there are some prudent things we’re doing here, we need to be mindful of other things we should be also, you know, thinking about as we continue to take this to the next level?
Samuelson
You know, Mr. Busler and Stephanie, one of the things that the analysis center at TRANSCOM does is these large mobility/capability requirements studies. And so, we are in the middle. We have just started one, a new one in MCRS 26, which is a look at end-to-end full-spectrum mobility requirements to fulfill the NDS (National Defense Strategy). So, we just had the new National Security Strategy [and], we’re anticipating at any time, the new National Defense Strategy. And we’ve seen the interim. And so, that’s actually work that we are going to explore beyond just trains, planes, and ships is we’re going to look at an entire spectrum of capabilities out there and, also, threats to those capabilities across multidomain. And so, that work is ongoing. And, that will wrap up, next year.
What I can say is that while the character of the conflict has evolved beyond the traditional domains of air, land, and sea—that now include space, cyber, and spectrums even beyond electromagnetism—the nature of the deployment distribution success to an outcome remains unchanged.
And so, we will continue to study on how TRANSCOM impacts the ability of the Joint Force to get its mission accomplished.
Busler
One of the things I was very proud of, that the Mobility Center does, is what Ryan just mentioned. Both the Department [of War] and the Congress expects TRANSCOM to produce these mobility studies, and these are very comprehensive, you know, end-to-end looks at how we have the national capabilities and capacities to prosecute what the National Defense Strategy is now imposing upon us collectively to do.
There’s an article I think that you’re going to provide as a link to this at the very end here. We have done eight of those major mobility studies since the end of the Cold War. The environment has changed, where we used to have large, forward-deployed forces, now, we rely upon, you know, forces we have to deploy from the homeland, which is why this article was so appropriate—because we have to deploy the Joint Force from the homeland, where 85 percent of that is now here. And to be able to provide the means [of] responding is what this Joint Deployment Distribution Enterprise must accomplish on behalf of the nation to do that kind of task.
So, I looked at, you know, how these strategies over the course of the last 30+ years have changed and the impact we have to have from the logistics and mobility footprint to prosecute that. And this article I mentioned was in Joint Forces Quarterly [and] calls for mobility in the context of analysis and strategies, it really looks at the end-to-end ability to do that and how that’s changed over time.
But at the end of the day, our ability as a nation to prosecute this is really what’s foundational. As Ryan mentioned, you know, that hasn’t changed much. A matter of fact, in 1981, even before the end of the Cold War, we were seeing, you know, the emergence of this as being something that was really consequential. I just need close to with this last thought.
And really, that study emphasized that our influence worldwide has become increasingly dependent upon our ability to project forces in support of our national interests. And, a comprehensive ability to look at the mobility footprint is central to our force protection strategy. So, that’s really what I wanted to emphasize here, was [that as] we looked at homeland in this specific article, the strategic mobility in the context [of] the end-to-end operations is really foundational [to] how we think about what provides the means of our national strategy to be fulfilled.
Again, what I’m so proud of is the work that Ryan’s now doing through JDPAC and TEA to support TRANSCOM on behalf of the Joint Force. It’s how we understand can we continue to do that mission and know the risks are being addressed appropriately, and do we have the right capabilities [and] capacity to do that looking forward? Again, I’m looking forward to the work Ryan and his team continue to do, but I’m so grateful to you to continue to put a spotlight on this. You know, again, I’m really proud of the work that Ryan [and] his team is doing, and I could not be happier, now that I’m retired, for the fact that Ryan Samuelson’s the new director of JDPAC and TEA.
And to Ryan, you get the last word.
Samuelson
Stephanie, I can just say it’s an honor to be able to be on a podcast with somebody who has had such critical, strategic thought for our nation, and that’s Mr. Busler—in multiple articles on the work that he did to put JPAC and TRANSCOM on the path that it’s on. So, I just thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
Host
It was my pleasure. I enjoyed your conversation very much—just a great overview of a really, really important topic that too many of us don’t think enough about.
Listeners, you can read the genesis article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 55, issue 1. There will be a link to the article in the show notes as well as a link to the article Mr. Busler referenced. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues and A Better Peace.

Military strategists Dr. Frank G. Hoffman (retired) and Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II analyze the 2026 National Defense Strategy. 

Host (Stephanie Crider)
You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
I’m talking with Dr. Frank G. Hoffman and Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II today.
Hoffman is the author of “The Next National Defense Strategy: Mission-Based Force Planning,” which was published in the Summer 2025 issue of Parameters. He recently retired from the federal government after more than 46 years of service as a Marine, civil servant, and senior Pentagon official. His last post was at the Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.
Echevarria is currently a professor of strategy at the US Army War College. He’s held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research and the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies and is the author of six books on military strategy.
So, Dr. Hoffman, a lot has happened since we published your article. I’m really looking forward to this conversation today. My first question, in fact, did you get what you were hoping for from the new National Defense Strategy [NDS]?
Dr. Frank G. Hoffman
Yes, [I am] satisfied. I have a certain sympathy for folks who write strategy documents, and so, I know how difficult it is, and I know that these documents have to talk to many audiences. And, you know, you could chop up the 10, 12 pages of actual texts of the summary that’s out there and see that it’s talking to the White House, that it’s talking to allies, it’s talking to adversaries, it’s talking to commercial vendors. I mean, it has a lot of audiences, and I’ve seen a lot of criticisms, and I’m sympathetic because I’ve been in the shoes of [those] trying to edit or craft a couple of these in my prior life.
But, I was pleased with the framework. It has some clarity to it. I think like Dr. E. [Echevarria], I took out all the op [operations] art terminology from the 2018 Strategy, things like lines of effort and things that aren’t as strategic, and I tried to, you know, visualize a theory of success for our strategy. And, I don’t get that necessarily out of these four elements, but the way they are clearly stated and prioritized, I agree with that, and it’s largely in sync with my article—with some improvements.
Host
I feel very fortunate to have two such esteemed strategists in the studio with me today, and I'm curious how each of you see theory informing the recently published NDS.
And also, where do theory and force planning realities collide most sharply?
Hoffman
On the theoretical part, dealing with strategy per se, you know, one of the things I’ve written about, I think Dr. E’s written about [it], too, is the importance of a theory of success, which I think deals with the ways of a strategy.
Of course, it’s also important to have coherence between the ends, ways, and the means. One of the reasons I was writing my article over a year ago was the insolvency problem, which really deals with the means gap.
So, I don’t see an overarching integrated theory of success for the four elements, but I do see—particularly for the China component of the strategy—a clear theory of success expressed. The foundation for that was in the 2018 Strategy. It’s [from] some of Mr. [Elbridge A.] Colby’s writings in his book in the past. So, I see that imprinted in there, and that’s the part of theory that I see practically employed in the Strategy.
But I do think that the NDS Summary, as I understand it—I understand it’s just a shell and the budget hasn’t been submitted, but I don’t see the Strategy as written for closing the insolvency gap very much. It’s not a compelling or persuasive story for Congress to fund the gaps that I’ve seen in the past, which are mentioned in the Strategy. The president has talked about a very large increase in the means, but I haven’t seen that submitted to the Hill. And this Strategy won’t lift up the attention of Congress on what to do with that money. It’s sort of written as a strategy that makes trade-offs that are pretty clear about Europe for Asia and the Middle East and things. It’s a strategy that’s largely trying to make [the most of] the harsh, constrained resources, which is applaudable, but it’s not a compelling story for a change if that’s what the president really wants.
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
From my standpoint, the theory and strategy mix has to do with our basic assumptions and how those are informed by a theory as a foundation. Even if we aren’t consciously thinking about a particular kind of theory as we’re trying to write a strategy, I think we are informed by the assumptions that are built into a theoretical approach and so on.
But I think Frank is right that one of the things that I did not see in this NDS was closing the gap. The $36 trillion, I think, is what you cited in your article last year, and the last number I saw was $38 trillion in debt.
Hoffman
It goes up $7 million an hour.
Echevarria
Yeah, so some serious effort is needed there, but maybe that will be forthcoming, and a plan to get there will be forthcoming in the upcoming months or something. I don’t know. We’ll see, I suppose.
Host
I’d love to hear about your thoughts on the two-war framework. Is it obsolete? Is it misapplied? And if it is, what should replace it?
Hoffman
I spent a lot of time [on this topic]. In fact, that was largely the motivation for writing that particular article. I’d have to go back to an article that Dr. Echevarria edited, I think in the 2016 time period, where I wrote my first two MTW [two major theater wars] article, and I’m in favor of giving a president options.
Presidents don’t want to be constrained if they can afford it. And so, you know, most of my time in the Pentagon, we’ve dealt with a two MRC [major regional conflict] or some version where we’re trying to give the presidents, you know, optionality. And so, my offer, because I was trying to close the gap in defense spending, was to say we’re gonna do one MRC, or war, unilaterally, and we’re going to do one with allies.
And [I] published that article and actually got called to see the Secretary of Defense to talk about that article in 2017, and he totally disagreed with me because, historically, we’ve always gone to war with allies. So, saying we’re going to do something unilaterally doesn’t do much strategically or historically. And in fact, it lets allies off, which for the last 10 years we’ve been trying to get allies to do more for themselves—and ourselves—for our collective aim. So, that was my motivation for writing that. I’ve dealt with the debate inside the Pentagon about all the things we’re trying to pay for and trying to prioritize. And so, I was trying to come up with constructs. I’m very conscious, as Yogi Berra said, you know, “In theory, there’s no difference between theory and practice, but in practice there is.” And, the same thing is [true] with the two-war theory.
Strategically, it makes sense. I have very, very great friends who have written on behalf of this in various think tanks and people with great government experience. They’re very smart. They’re for that, but they’re also for a grand strategy that is different than what this administration is pursuing. We’re not pursuing global dominance, hegemony. We’re not underwriting an international rule-based order anymore. So, that’s where I [sense] that it’s obsolete. But in theory, it’s useful.
But what I was worried about was the advocacy of this particular construct, externally with Congress, is about trying to get a military that’s the military we want to have—large, robust, forward-deployed, deterring. It’s about the bureaucratic interest of the machine to want to have this robustness and risk reduction. But in the practice of it, what I find is we end up with a very conventional legacy-focused capability, and we buy what we have today, and the production lines are open on the Hill that the Congress wants to keep producing. And so, we’ll end up with tanks and rifles and airplanes and helicopters. We don’t invest in some of the things that either represent broader threats, new threats, [or] new domains that we need to be investing in.
And so, I think it expands the gap and increases the risk involved in both the first and the second conflict. I’ve called this the lose-lose strategy because I don’t think that Congress is going to give us 100 percent of the force structure for two wars, 100 percent of the recruiting money, the readiness money, and the equipment modernization money that you need. So, you end up with something like 80 percent of what you need for either of the two wars and, if you go to war, you could end up losing both of them.
And so, you know, that’s the difference between the theory and the practice. You know, we don’t get that kind of money, and we end up accepting readiness shortfalls. We ended up not investing in our people and MILCON [military construction]. We end up not investing in munitions inventories [and] all the things that are the places the service chiefs have to go to, to scrape up the resources to pay for a very large force structure. And we end up accepting—unconsciously—a lot of risk in areas that I thought were disadvantageous for the future.
Strategic deterrence and nuclear modernization’s a shortfall. Missile defense has been a shortfall, both national and theater. Capacity for protracted conflict with munitions we’ve seen since the Ukraine [invasion] were far shorter than we need. So, we’ve been accepting risk in all these buckets, unconsciously, with this desire to go out and fight and win foreign wars. And we’ve left the homeland, I think, a little bit open in the meantime, too. So, we’ve accepted a lot more risk with this construct than a reduction of risk. And, I wanted to spread that risk and make it more conscious, so, I proposed this mission-based kind of thing where you could put dollar amounts on this column, and then, at some point in time, you’re going to draw the red line. And that’s why I think we need to rethink that construct. It’s interesting to see how the administration has dealt with it. At least in the shell of the NDS, there’s a page on there that deals with this called the “simultaneity problem,” and they acknowledge that we can’t do both. And they basically told the allies, both in the Middle East, in South Korea, and in Europe, you’re kind of on your own for conventional deterrence. There’s some risk in that, particularly how you phase and time that.
But, we basically solved our problem by telling everybody else that some of these commitments and obligations we’ve had in the past are now up to them, which is going to be a hard thing to transition. And we’re probably accepting some risk. But I look over from my writing of 2017 and writing now, [and] that risk equation is a dynamic that changes every year. You know, 10 or even eight years ago, we could have talked about Russia in one way.
We, in the Pentagon, discussed Russia as sort of a near-term, reckless, declining power. I would have imagined that it would be less of a problem today. And it is—from its own actions, [for example regarding] the strategic suicide of what they’re doing in Ukraine, they basically expended their ground force and their armor capabilities. They haven’t expended their navy or their air force or certainly not their nukes. They’re still a great power in that sense but, I mean, there’s definitely a reduced risk on the second MTW [major theater war] if you were counting on Russia in a conventional mass sense. [There are] other threats in that region that’ll do all that. And Iran, with its, you know, trio of proxy forces, each of which has been heavily decremented of recent vintage. Iran is a less of [an] opportunist aggressor right now, too.
So, I’m more accepting of where the Pentagon has placed itself with the China situation and allies and partners, but we’re still obligated and still going to support them, and the strategy says that. The risk that we’re, I think, really absorbing in near- to mid-range right now from this decision in the 2026 Strategy is that the things that Europe would require of us, if it was doing its conventional fighting on its own—command and control, space, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], theater missile defense—those are all the high-value, low-density kinds of things that we’re trying to focus into the Pacific, as well.
So, there’s a demand on this that needs to be acknowledged and somehow massaged in some sense to balance off that risk. Right now, if we did end up in a dual situation, we’d be asking for the same assets to try to be in two different theaters simultaneously.
Echevarria
Back to your point about the mission-based focus, it was one of the things that I liked about your piece back in the summer. Of course, it’s still an issue—how much do you size for each of those missions? I think you laid out the right missions and so on. And, even if we aren’t in a major war, we’re seeing right now with the USS Abraham Lincoln having to have steamed its way like crazy to get in proximity to Iran in order to be able to do something there if needed, just after having Operation Midnight Hammer and Absolute Resolve in earlier months.
What advice, if any, can you offer for the sizing aspect of the prioritization? I think about right and shifting away from two-war to the mission-based construct, but I still worry about the sizing aspect of each of the forces dedicated to those particular missions.
Hoffman
I share a concern about size, but my concern is, as we expressed in the 2018 Strategy. The China problem, as we depicted it back then, was believed to be very, very significant in terms of capacity and force size. [It was] heavily naval and air force [focused], of course. There was such a shortfall there that the second MTW was improbable for execution with the resources we had. And, I don’t think that problem has been reduced. In fact, I’m more concerned about, you know, the first MTW than before.
China has done more than I anticipated between 2017 and today, and we have done less with a less sense of urgency and scale. So, I’m still more worried about the first MTW as a shortfall. The advantage on the mission-based thing is you get to break out some of the functional aspects to make sure that they don’t get subsumed in the ship count or tank count, you know, issues. So, you get to break out space, strategic deterrence. And I like what the administration’s done here, [which] is they’ve added the industrial base to deal with the protracted war problem and made that part of the strategy—kind of explicitly as opposed to a standalone strategy as we’ve done in the past. So, it’s much more integrated. You know, I'll give the administration some credit on that.
Host
What are some long-standing assumptions about Homeland Security, escalation, [and] strategic depth that we should probably let go going forward, and what would we replace them with?
Hoffman
We have a lot of assumptions in the American way of war, which I’ll characterize as, you know, we're all about expeditionary power projection. The American homeland is a sanctuary. We have uncontested exit from our ports of embarkation and debarkation, and we can transit, you know, transoceanic maneuver uncontested with our lines of communication sustained. All those assumptions in that version of the American way of war are pretty much invalid now, and we’re going to take casualties and losses, I think, in the American homeland. We’re going to find ports and airports struck in some way, whether it’s cyber or physical attacks or sabotage, particularly the Chinese infiltration into critical infrastructure. That’s really the biggest issue for me was the homeland. And it’s interesting to see how the administration has tucked that into their first line of effort, as I did. You know, it’s kind of rhetorical that we’re going to take care of America, but in the past, we were so strong—and the homeland was behind these two oceanic moats—that we could ignore threats to the homeland. It didn’t make the American taxpayer feel great that we were spending scarce dollars in either Asia or the Middle East and not taking care of the American people. So, rhetorically, we’ve always needed to say that defending America was our first priority, and the administration has done that, but they’ve tucked in the strategic deterrent into that, which I think is questionable.
Our strategic deterrent is also our extended deterrent with our allies in Europe and Asia. So, to me, it’s kind of a broader mission than the homeland. Of course, they’ve tied in the whole Western hemisphere, which I think thinking of the homeland in a broader sense to include Canada and Mexico and Latin America and the Panama Canal, makes sense organizationally, institutionally. So, I think that’s definitely a plus. Just because the homeland is the number one priority doesn’t mean it gets more money than LOE [line of effort] number 2 with China. It just means that we’re going to resolve those risks in that line of effort with sufficient funding, I believe.
And then, you know, to me, LOE 2 in China is the larger problem that’s going to get the larger amount of resources. It’s also where I think we’re, right now, consciously accepting quite a bit of risk. Until we get our technologies and our advanced systems online, we’re facing an opponent that has three times our mass, three times our people and, right now, about a 100 times our shipbuilding capacity. I don’t know where we are on missile production comparatives, but since they’re the world’s largest manufacturer, I don’t think they’ll have a lot of shortfalls right now. They’re very competitive with us on advanced technology, particularly in the emerging technologies in quantum, hypersonic, and AI [artificial intelligence]. Most people are now saying either months behind us or a month ahead of us. So, there's a lot of prioritization there.
Before, we could always assume technological supremacy, and we used to assume blindly that the American arsenal of democracy was behind us. And, those assumptions are definitely outdated.
Echevarria
Yeah, I would say the same thing. The assumptions are kind of everything. And when you’re doing strategy, or we’re trying to execute it, if assumptions are wrong and you can’t adapt to the new reality—I mean, look at the Russian attack across the Ukraine border in February of 2022 [there were] some really poor assumptions on part of the Russians, and they were really unable to adapt and to adjust to the new reality that confronted them on the ground.
You have to make assumptions. I don’t want to move forward with strategy or planning or any of it, but I hope that we will retain the flexibility of option B, whatever option B might be, if the initial assumptions turn out to be flawed for whatever reason.
Hoffman
It’s wonderful. I think it’s in the Lippmann Gap. You know, there’s a desire to sometimes measure with a micrometer and think that you can measure everything, but you also need a little bit of extra capacity to deal with the unexpected.
It’s prudent, and I’m a Colin Gray devotee [regarding] prudence and adaptability—prudence about risk and adapting to the unexpected—the two cardinal virtues of force planners. And, if we get overcommitted and underfunded, it’s not very prudent. And then you’re relying an awful lot on adaptability. The Ukrainians and the Russians are in a contest for adaptability right now. And it’s fascinating to watch their two systems, their two industrial ecosystems, try to outcompete each other in new ways that they, in 2022, had never imagined.
Host
If each of you had to advise the Secretary of War today, where would you recommend accepting risk? And where must the nation not accept risk under any circumstances?
Echevarria
I’ll turn the question around a little bit and say that we need to be focused on increasing the risk to our adversaries rather than defensively looking at where we should minimize or accept our own risk. I think that [for] our strategy moving forward, I would like to see [us] get directly at the risks to autocratic regimes and so on.
We tend to assume, getting back to assumptions, that costs [are important]. Eventually, our adversaries get tired of paying various costs for whatever the endeavor is and so on. But, I think that we can get to that point faster if we ensure that the costs we are imposing speak directly to the risks that those regimes [face]—usually about regime security, stability, and all of that—as opposed to how many soldiers are losing in the field or on the seas, in the air, what have you.
So, I think that’s what my first line of effort in terms of advice would be with regard to risk. So, I would look at that.
Anyway, over to you, Frank.
Hoffman
Yeah, well, I took the question as given, having been in this particular question. I’ve had to answer this question [while] tap dancing in front of a big desk on the third floor [of the Eisenhower Executive Office Building].
Again, consistent with my article, and because of Iran’s proxy decline and Russia’s strategic suicide, I’d accept more risk on the second MTW as the strategy does. But I’m cautioned by my concern about the dual-use or high-density items, low-density, high-value items that Europe is going to count on. That’s a concern. Another area I’d probably take a little more risk [on is the Golden Dome]—I like how it’s been qualified in the NDS. A Golden Dome could be a huge sump hole for at least $1 trillion. There’s estimates that go much higher. The $1.1 trillion is actually, I think, the middle mark.
The Strategy calls for cost-effective missile defense. You could spend the entire Pentagon budget and still have huge swaths of the United States uncovered, particularly from cruise missiles, but also ballistic missile defense. [It would be] very expensive. Opportunity costs are high for the other things that we need to do. So, I like the way they’re pursuing cost-effective defense, I think, as a risk minimization issue that hopefully that’ll be prioritized.
The things where I’d not accept risk right now, as I wrote in my article, I think space is a war-fighting domain that’s underinvested. It’s not something where things pass through like information. I think we’re going to maneuver platforms, maybe even people and, certainly, strike options and defense options in space that we’re not prepared for. Theater missile defense and integrated air defense is a shortfall that we need less risk. Secure C2 [command and control] is definitely an area where we need less risk, given the threats.
Strategically though, looking for a counterintuitive answer, I would take less risk in our relationships with allies. You know, we need allies strategically, not just because of values or democracy but also for access, for trade, for standards and trades, and for standing up to China.
Echevarria
If we’re on the right course with our allies, one way to help distribute costs—and to make burden sharing more effective—is to have meaningful allies, [a] clear understanding of what we need from them, and what we’re willing to provide to them.
So, absolutely.
Host
Thank you both.
Listeners, you can read the genesis article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 55, issue 2. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

This podcast argues that Ukraine offers a cautionary tale regarding the two main modern models of force generation. Neither the professional high-tech war model, favored by Western militaries, nor the whole-of-society war approach, said to have saved Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, proved successful formulas for Ukraine. Considering that Ukraine is fighting for survival, with Russian forces inside the country, the failure of both models in action has serious implications for NATO member states as they deliberate their choices regarding future force generation.

Stephanie Crider (Host)
You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m in the studio with Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria today.
Joining us remotely are Dr. Ilmari Käihkö and Jan Willem Honig.
Käihkö and Honig are the authors of “Ukraine's Not-So-Whole-of-Society at War: Force Generation in Modern Developed Societies,” which was published in the Spring 2025 issue of Parameters.
Käihkö is an associate professor of war studies, guest researcher at the Swedish Defense University, and a guest researcher at the University of Helsinki, Finland. He’s also a veteran of the Finnish Defence Forces.
Honig is professor of international security studies, emeritus, at the Netherlands Defence Academy and a visiting professor in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London.
Echevarria is currently a professor of strategy at the US Army War College. He has held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research and the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies and is the author of six books on military strategy.
Welcome to Decisive Point.
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
For the benefit of our listeners, would you two please summarize your article for us? It’s been a while, just to refocus everyone.
Jan Willem Honig
What we tried to explain was that, where as we all expected and thought that initially Ukraine, as a society, mobilized and resisted the Russian attack in 2022, it very quickly turned out that it was a very partial mobilization of Ukrainian society [and] that very limited parts of the population, largely volunteers with a regular element, managed to stop and resist and turn back some of the invasion.
And that was something that seemed to be very important because not only was it the case that Ukraine struggled to mobilize all of society in a case of a war that should be the most clear-cut that you could imagine [as] it is a war of aggression. You would expect the population to rise up against this invading force.
[It] didn’t quite happen, but it provides us with warnings and potentially lessons [about] whether we can mobilize as a population when we need to. But also, it reflects on Russia, where people don’t tend to realize maybe [the] extent to which the Russians also struggle to mobilize their population [and] that the numbers of forces on the Russian side that fight on the frontline is also very limited.
And the result of that is a very particular type of war, not the high-technology professional type of war that we tended to project on what the Russians would do but also how we have prepared—and are still preparing—to fight warfare. It turned out that in the case of Ukraine, neither side could fight this high-intensity, militarily decisive, high-technology, professional type of war. That holds a second major sort of warning lesson for the West, in our view, that not only can’t we rely, in all likelihood, on all of society to mobilize and fight, but we probably can’t also rely on our professional high-technology forces to successfully fight war.
Echevarria
Ilmari, did you want to add to that?
Ilmari Käihkö
Yeah, I think this was a very good summary of the article. And also, theoretically, what we did was go back to a column on Clausewitz and one of his trinities of the army, the government, and the people and to look at the relationships between these three. And more generally, one can, of course, say that there are always tensions and suspicion between these three elements.
They are more general than only [the] Ukrainian phenomenon, and this is one reason why we should be mindful about Ukrainian examples and lessons from this war. I don’t think we have looked at the sociological aspects of this war closely enough. There are many things that we don’t yet understand. And when it comes to the Ukrainian society’s role in the war, in 2014, when the war in Donbas started, when Russia invaded Crimea and then got involved in Eastern Ukraine, there was this limited societal participation in the war in the form of so-called volunteer battalions.
The assumption of even the volunteers, who re-mobilized in 2022, was that now, when this war is existential, then surely everyone will get involved in it, all the Ukrainian people. But nevertheless, it has been a limited war in this sense. And, there is something here that I think we should pay more attention to.
Echevarria
I wonder if I could draw either or both of you out a little bit more and talk about some of the factors that caused the whole-of-society concept to fail or to be only partially implemented. Some factors, like [the] political implementation of it, came very late in the game, according to some of the interviews that we were able to do earlier. Zelensky did not want to put that policy completely into effect because he was afraid it might antagonize the Russians and maybe provoke an attack. So, that was one thing.
And the other thing might be the fact that Russian and Ukrainian populations along the border, leaving aside the Donbas, for instance, have shared commerce, shared interactions, and shared relationships [and have] relatives on either side of the border. The line between the two states might be clear on a map, but socially and culturally, [things are] much more intermixed.
And so, it is difficult sometimes, perhaps, to get the whole society involved when you’re living next door to someone and [they don’t] really appear to be a threat to you.
The third thing I was going to ask about [is] the issues of corruption throughout Ukrainian government, all the way down and in the military and so on. [I am] not saying Russia, has not also had that problem. It certainly does. But getting any kind of policy implemented when you face a bureaucracy, leaders, and so on who are supposed to implement these policies but are taking money from the other side or somewhere else other than from their own government and so forth [is difficult].
Honig
I would say three things. [The] first one is something optimistic about this conflict that you can conclude, I think. We’ve always wondered how big the proclivity for war of populations of people was. What I think the war in Ukraine illustrates is that certainly, in developed societies, the populations on the whole—and massively, more massively than ever before, it seems—don’t like war [and] don’t want to get involved.
That is true for Ukraine, even in an existential conflict. It’s true in Russia as well, despite the fact that it isn’t a democracy but an autocratic regime. And it’s also likely to be true, or it is true, because Western armed forces can’t really recruit very well. It’s also true in the rest of Europe. So, in a way, this is a very positive thing that people don’t like war [and] don’t want to get involved. Now, [the] problem with that is that it opens the door to people who do manage to mobilize significant forces and do dastardly things, but still, it’s a positive thing. I would want to emphasize that.
And the other two points are that what you, Tony, bring out is the gulf between government and population, where on the one hand, it ties into Ilmari’s earlier point about the trinity of Clausewitz with government, people, [and] armed forces, is that government—or the government in Ukraine—did not really trust its population to be loyal and to get mobilized.
And, that is a fairly, as we tried to explain very briefly in the article, a historically common phenomenon. Regimes tend to be, on the whole, always unsure. Look, before the First World War. Regimes, whether they’re democratic, totalitarian, [or] autocratic, don’t know to what extent they can trust their peoples to come to their aid in a war. But on the other hand, what you also see in Ukraine is that the population as a whole not only didn’t like to go to war, didn’t want to really to fight, it also very much distrusted the regime. It distrusted the state. And that reinforced [the low] degree of mobilization and made it very difficult for the state to create massive armed forces. If you then look at Western Europe, the regimes, their trust of populations, it’s a bit of an open question. Do people overwhelmingly trust their states? I hope it is higher than Ukraine. We’ve got less corruption. But again, I think that certainly the absurdly incertitude of the governments as to their reliability to the population is just as strong in the West as it is in Ukraine.
Echevarria
Ilmari, anything to add?
Käihkö
Yeah, there’s an interesting puzzle here because the 2014, the Donbas war, we got this notion that it was the society that saved Ukraine through these volunteer battalions. But we don’t see the society being harnessed militarily before 2022. If now the society was so successful in 2014, why wasn’t this done during the eight years after, before the large-scale invasion?
And there are, of course, several reasons for this. One is, obviously, that the military in 2014 was very hollow, and this kind of massive reform would be very difficult. There was also not that much money reserved for this kind of project. So, Ukraine lost half of its GDP (gross domestic product) in 2014. So, even by doubling the defense expenditure they actually did not have more money in real terms to do this.
There was also the lull in terms of the war in Donbas that kept distracting from major reforms. But perhaps most importantly, there were these, both foreign and domestic, military preferences for this kind of professional force. But the problem was that this kind of force, it was much too expensive for Ukraine but also, it wasn’t supported by the population. They didn’t really want to be part of it, or at least when it comes to the alternative—the universal conscription.
So, there [were these] foreign and domestic military preferences that the government thought they [could] make the military more politically reliable through it. And then foreigners—the RAND Corporation—was invited to the country in 2015. They all recommended this kind of professionalization of the force. But as noted, Ukraine couldn’t afford it. The alternative then, was this kind of universal conscription. But this wasn’t supported by the population. In order to understand why, one can go back to the Soviet legacy of the conscription where people, even from military families, didn’t want to go to the military. When I did interviews of volunteer battalion fighters, some of them told me that their parents, [who] belonged to the military, bribed doctors to make sure that their sons were exempted from the service.
Well, funnily enough, in 2014, they’d then have to bribe new doctors to make them eligible for military service when they wanted to go to serve because the conscription was selective and you could bribe your way out of it. Because the conscripts were really poorly, poorly treated [and] they didn’t get proper training, they just didn’t see it worthwhile. Then what happened after 2022 was that there was this interesting phenomenon that if you look at the most trusted institution in Ukraine, it is the armed forces. So, in some polls it gets 95 percent support of the population. The only problem here is this kind of cognitive dissonance that this doesn’t mean that these people who in polls say that they trust the military that they actually want to serve in it, and this is a bit of a problem for a country involved in a major war.
But all this then ensured that, first of all, the Ukrainian military would be limited before 2022. Also, that it would face troubles growing after the Russian invasion. When it grew, it would be, first of all, just kind of more ideological volunteers that would rush into it, including literally all of my volunteer battalion informants that I had worked with. And it also meant that the society would still influence who the government could and would start to forcefully mobilize into the war when that became necessary. And this is why the average age of soldiers is at least 43 years, according to several sources. It could now be a lot older as well. And all these things have influenced Ukraine’s possibilities when it comes to force generation in this war.
Echevarria
On that note, to what extent do you think had the Russian attack come later, after a national identity had been able to formulate and become stronger, would timing of the offensive had affected your results had it come later, for instance, had they waited for some of these things that you’ve been discussing to perhaps grow stronger [like] more willingness to serve in the military in some ways or, certainly, a more stronger identification with the state itself—the government, head of state? Would that have made a difference?
Honig
I would say that if they’d had more time to build up their armed forces, it might have made a difference. But things like forging a national identity and really creating a population that is reliable is one of those big projects that nobody really, I don’t think, understands very well how that works and to what extent it really produces a society that stands shoulder to shoulder.
And a point I earlier mentioned about regimes independent of regime types, in the end, always tending to distrust or not fully trust the population is quite common. So, the question of where the population stands, where the people stand, is one that has really been a sort of red thread in military history, where people have been consistently quite surprised, and we don’t have to think back very long, [for example the] 2003 invasion of Iraq. We didn’t quite understand where the Iraqi people stood, but in the end, it turned out it wasn’t quite with us. [If] you go back through conflict to conflict, you find consistently that you don’t quite know where the population is going to move, but you don’t also understand how you can convince the population to be really with you or to minimize the degree to which an enemy population is against you.
So, I don’t know whether giving Ukraine more time to forge a national identity would really have worked.
Käihkö
It’s good to remember that what happened in 2014 was that Ukraine lost some of its most pro-Russian parts, and this is something that made a very divided, politically divided, country less divided. But many of these divisions still existed in Ukraine.
Another thing to think about is that many of these ideological volunteers from the Donbas war didn’t actually serve in the military because the kind of military they saw wasn’t the kind of military they would like to belong to themselves. And this has been an issue even after 2022. So, even if almost all of these volunteer battalions were pretty quickly integrated into the armed forces, many of the most ideologically minded volunteers just left the military.
And, hence, this kind of suspicion between these volunteers and the military remained. And these were, of course, then, the people that were the first to take to arms after the Russian invasion in February 2022.
Echevarria
On the question of military professionalization, I wonder if you could speak a little bit about the divided culture that the Ukrainian armed forces found themselves confronting at the beginning of the war. They had legacy Soviet ways of doing things, and NATO began to take over more and more of the training for Ukrainian recruits. NATO tried to impose its own particular way of training and fighting and so on, some of which were absorbed by some of the younger soldiers in Ukrainian armed forces. And it wasn’t [an] entirely even split between ranks, for instance, or even ages. But with training the Ukrainians according to what NATO knew, as far as trying to develop junior leadership and initiative and trusting subordinates and those sorts of things, can you speak to anything you might have found in your research on professionalization and whether or not these factors had anything to do with the larger public trust in its military but still that reticence to actually want to serve and put yourself on the frontline [and] in danger and so on?
Honig
One should not, we think, exaggerate the difference between the Soviet model of doing military operations and the Western model of operations. It is quite dangerous to sort of ascribe to them a particular mindset that makes them operate in a way, and that has proven to be not so effective because this war has turned into a sort of quite simple, brutal conflict.
What you see is that there is indeed [a] certain model of professional warfare, which the Ukrainian armed forces found difficult to pull off because the manpower wasn’t really available and trained in the same way as they would have liked. And, they were lucky that they found that there was a reservoir of volunteers who found a way of dealing with the immediate tactical problems they found on the battlefield, which translated into a major strategic success of stopping the Russian attack.
What you see, I think, with the training that we’ve offered to the Ukrainians, my reading of it is that it isn’t as popular and successful with what you could call the rank and file or the volunteer element of the Ukrainian armed forces. They have found themselves in a conflict in which they, on the whole, [are] well-educated [and] have been able to adapt [and] improvise to what the battlefields seem to require of them.
And, well, a number of things which our military tried to teach them fitted in with that, but other elements were new. The drone thing was not something that our armed forces offered as part of the training package, and many of our armed forces were quite unwilling to accept that as part of the training package. There was quite a bit of resentment and surprise on the part of the Ukrainian recruits that were being trained that the Western trainers didn’t really want to engage with what they saw as the realities of war and were offering a package that fitted a particular type of war that they were not fighting and that was not fit for [their] purpose.
I think that the challenge is that, just like the Soviet Russian armed forces may have had a particular concept of warfare, concept of modern warfare, which neither the Ukrainian regular military nor the Russian military were able to pull off, we also have a particular idea of what war should look like, and we find it very difficult to be flexible about that. And we may want to talk about that a little bit later, but we have created what I would call a one-trick pony, [meaning] that if the war doesn’t fit our preconceived notions of what modern warfare should be like, then we may not be very good at adapting to the situation on the ground and have our armed forces fight in a different way, as could be evidenced by [the fact that] we haven’t won a war for a long time, with our Western armed forces, which should be something of a warning about how flexible are we?
And to assume that we know better than the Ukrainians, or we know better than the Soviet Russian armed forces, is a little bit presumptuous. We have to be careful.
Käihkö
Yeah, the training aspect is very interesting because what we say in the article is that this is a pretty primitive war in some aspects. And what has contributed or led to this primitivization is that both in Ukraine and Russia, the training establishments were, decimated early in the war.
So, basically what happened was that it was very difficult to continue training new forces, to generate new forces, when you didn’t have trainers anymore. And, this is one reason why the Ukrainians have been so dependent on external support, external training support, which then hasn’t necessarily always been what Ukrainians have wished for. We have also heard about these reports that the Ukrainians and Russians have had difficulties in coordinating operations by units bigger than companies [and] that this is, even in this sense, a primitive, primitive kind of fighting.
This set very early on what was lauded, on the Ukrainian side, especially, and contrasted with this kind of Soviet Russian rigidity [that] was the initiative and these kind of notions of missile command on the Ukrainian side. But this is, of course, because you did have small units of volunteers who were not very well attuned to military expectations, fighting on their own terrain against these lumbering Russian forces.
We lauded all this, but then the question is that where are all these now and this kind of very positional and attritional fighting that we have seen? These qualities that we thought were brilliant in spring of 2022 may not be that much appreciated, even by the Ukrainian high command at this time. And in places like the coast, where they can actually become liabilities.
And this is, of course, connected now to these volunteer notions of special treatment and negotiation.
Echevarria
By way of closing, can I ask you two to offer the key insight you would like our NATO leaders to take away from your research, your article?
Honig
The first thing is to remain critical of our own conception of warfare [and] to think carefully about the possible shortcomings of a professional, high-technology type of armed force where you have invested so much money in very few weapons that you can’t really sustain a conflict. But at the same time, you need to be aware of the possible risk that you cannot fall back or cannot fall back in time [and expect] society to come out in support and save the day.
We’re faced with a very big challenge of how, on the one hand, you prepare your armed forces in a way that sort of withstands the first possible onslaught but offers you the possibility, the need, of sustaining the conflict later on. That doesn’t mean, necessarily, that you can mobilize all of society, but you need to be looking towards models of at least preparing for that bomb part, [which] would be that you invest significant amounts of money and effort into simple weaponry, that the war in Ukraine is basically fought by handheld arms, simple artillery, as well as supported by drones.
It doesn’t get that much more complicated. We don’t talk those weapons in serious numbers at all. Those are a first. They should be a major priority and then try and get the population used to the idea that they might, at some point have to do some military service. Don’t rely, however, too much on volunteerism because volunteers only represent part of society, and those are not necessarily from the part of society that you want to sort of dominate the political discourse, not only during the war but after the war.
The volunteers in Ukraine tend to be from more conservative sides of the political spectrum. So, you do want to have some kind of model that spreads the burden of defenses [as] equally as possible over society, that the whole of society, in a way, is seen to have some kind of stake in it.
The problem with it is that you can’t really do too much in peacetime, so you’ve got to leave it to a moment when the conflict is beginning to intensify [so] that it becomes easier to get people interested in it. It’s a very difficult tightrope to walk. At the same time, we should remember that the Russians—Putin—doesn’t have overwhelming support of his population. He’s stuck in Ukraine. He can’t really do too much elsewhere. So, his options are, in a way, more limited than our options, [we might believe] that we’ve got time to build up a defensive capability in an era when we still don’t round up much risk, despite all the talk from Brussels.
Käihkö
What we are facing most immediately is deterrence and deterrence against an opponent that is obviously willing to pay high costs. Now, I [am] speaking about Russia, which has maybe lost the value crispix—just over a million—well, about 1.1 million casualties, [which] might be 250,000 deaths in this war. How can we build an effective deterrence against this kind of opponent? Well, our militaries often highlight these kind of different technological solutions—that we have a high technology where you can operate a war—this kind of war that is happening in Ukraine.
We don’t need to go into this war of attrition if we compete with Russians with technology. I would be skeptical, or at least critical, about these kind of notions because their opponent also has a say in these things. This didn’t work in Ukraine. I’m not sure that they would work in our case either. And if they don’t work and this is what we, of course, need to then prepare for, is that then we need to have a greater societal involvement.
And this is what we need to think about. Well, if we can have this as a societal involvement, we can have this, perhaps not that well trained, but [we can] create reserves. This is a great deterrence against Russia, but this also requires quite a bit from our military establishments when it comes to their command style and training methods, for instance.
And also, if you try to have a whole-of-society approach, the militaries also need to be more attuned to what the society feels and thinks. And this is something that often gets lost in the discussion.
Echevarria
Thank you very much, gentlemen, this has been great. Over to you, Stephanie.
Host
I echo Dr. Echevarria. Thank you very much for making time for this today.
Listeners, I encourage you to read the genesis article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 55, issue 1. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

This podcast argues that Russia’s Arctic land forces have been weakened by the Russia-Ukraine War and NATO’s northern expansion, creating a strategic window for Western militaries to bolster their Arctic capabilities. Unlike existing studies that focus on maritime operations and the Northern Sea Route, it integrates technical assessments of ground-based Arctic platforms with analysis of military-district reforms. Using a mixed methodology that incorporates equipment specifications, Russian government documents, media reports, and NATO strategic-response evaluations, this podcast constructs a comprehensive baseline understanding of Russia’s Arctic land-force potential and readiness. Policy and military practitioners will benefit from actionable insights into Arctic force-design shifts, equipment vulnerabilities, and strategic recommendations to exploit the temporary imbalance between NATO and Russian readiness.

Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
I’m talking remotely with Troy J. Bouffard and Lester W. Grau, coauthors with Charles K. Bartles and Mathieu Boulègue of “Russian Arctic Land Forces and Defense Trends Redefined by NATO and Ukraine,” which was published in the Autumn 2025 issue of Parameters.
Bouffard (US Army, retired) has a master’s degree in Arctic policy and a PhD in Arctic defense and security from the University of Alaska Fairbanks, where he’s an assistant professor of Arctic security. He is the director of the University of Alaska Fairbanks Center for Arctic Security and Resilience and a research fellow with [the] United States Military Academy’s Modern War Institute.
Grau, lieutenant colonel (US Army, retired) specializes in Russian military studies and is a senior analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a PhD from the University of Kansas in Russian and Central Asian history. He’s written numerous books and articles on tactical, operational, and geopolitical subjects.
I’m happy you’re here. Thank you for joining me, Troy and Les.
Lester W. Grau
Thank you.
Troy J. Bouffard
Thank you.
Host
Please give our listeners a brief recap of your article.
Bouffard
Well, we wrote this because there were significant baseline circumstances involving Russia’s Arctic interest in the defense side, especially with land forces. When Sweden and Finland joined NATO, it had a profound effect, I think, on the Kremlin, and we saw immediate reactions that were significant strategically. One of those was the fact that Russia, in previous years, had established a new military district for the Arctic.
It was the Northern Fleet District. It was a joint Arctic-type military district, which is strategically significant. They did this in 2014, and it remained provisional until 2021, when it became full equal status to the other four military districts. Then in 2024, they dissolved it immediately—right after Sweden and Finland joined NATO.
Grau
The indications are, however, they’re not giving up on the Arctic. As a matter of fact, since the article was written, the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade has disappeared and been replaced by the 71st [Guard] Motorized Rifle Order of Kutuzov Division in Pechenga, [Murmansk Oblast]. A division is larger than a brigade.
[Russia is] not as constrained as we would be in developing a new division in that the logistics structure of the brigade and the division are the same. It’s the [ground-combat] folks [being added]. However, what they already had [was] three brigades in a corps when this whole Ukrainian thing started and now, it looks like they’re going to have at least two divisions—the naval infantry division and this division up in the Arctic. So, when Ukraine comes to a halt, the emphasis on the Arctic is going [to] spring back quite [impressively].
Furthermore, they develop their kit specifically for the Arctic, and the Arctic conditions are so different than the rest of the world that you really need to purpose-build your equipment for the Arctic, rather than taking a piece that’s in existence and saying, “Well, let’s see how many things we can strap on this without increasing it by three tons.” It’s a very different thing. And, of course, the Navy is the major player in Arctic development / Arctic policy.
The Northern Sea Route is [has] certainly proven viable. The Chinese are [sailing] it all the time. The Russians are running oil and LNG (liquified natural gas) on it all the time. And, South Korea is going to have a test run in July on the Northern Sea Route to see if it’s viably convenient because if you’re China or South Korea and you’re trying to get stuff to your European customers, the Northern Sea Route cuts two weeks off of transit time, and you avoid the problems of piracy and getting through the Suez Canal and drone attacks out of Yemen and all the other problems that they’re having in that region.
So, the Arctic is important. It’s at least 10 percent of the national annual wealth of Russia and is going to be more so. So, it’s viable, it’s there, and it’s only going to get bigger.
Bouffard
We had to write the article because there was such a decided shift from the direction Russia was going in the Arctic. They’re kind of flatlined in the Arctic right now because of Ukraine, but we know what they were doing before, where they were at, and we know when they do come back full steam, they’re going to make these, I think, developments that Les talked about.
But for now, with Sweden and Finland having joined NATO, Russia had a decided reaction to that by dissolving the military district and putting even more emphasis on the Baltics, which is the epicenter of strategic importance to Russia, for one fact—and I think it’s good for the listeners to just have a reminder—the Baltics are so important to Russia, more than anything else, because of St. Petersburg as a maritime port. This is their most important maritime access point in the entire planet. Out of all of their vast and major coastline, that is the most important place on the planet for them. And, if Russia lost maritime access just from that point around St. Petersburg, the effects are unimaginable. So, this is why it is the epicenter of importance to Russia.
So, when Finland and Sweden joined NATO, it had an obvious effect on Russia, and they pulled a lot of the development from the Arctic, in terms of strategic command and emphasis, to the Leningrad and Moscow Military District that was reestablished. And, we have yet to see how that’s all going to work out, but it was clear that something was changing and it wasn’t too difficult to understand how.
Host
Russia not being as focused on the Arctic—what did that create as far as opportunities go for America?
Bouffard
Russia has shown us that they are serious about their development of the new threat that’s going to consume us for the next many decades, which are hypersonic cruise missiles. They’ve already operationalized this. And these are air, land, and sea launched. They’ve done this in the Arctic not once, but twice—with two different missile systems. So, this is going to replace ballistic missiles that we’ve lived with for decades as the primary threat to North America with, you know, a new threat.
We have to redo everything in order to deal with hypersonic cruise missiles because they behave completely different than ballistic missiles. This is what has us really, I think, interested in what we need to do for future threats. The Arctic is part of that in those ways that Russia has demonstrated its development of hypersonic cruise missiles. This is going to grip the world for decades.
Host
Les, do you want to chime in?
Grau
Well, I was just thinking, if we are involved in the Arctic, all of the services have to be involved in the Arctic, including the Navy—especially the Navy—and the Navy is stretched right now. China has more ships than the US Navy, and the US Navy has no ice-class vessels. If you’re going to sail in the Arctic waters, you need ice-class vessels.
Russia has over 40 icebreakers. We have three—one permanently in the Great Lakes. Two of them are ancient; one of them we just bought—a used one—from Norway. You need to be able to function in that area. The Coast Guard is now buying icebreakers. They’re going to take a while to get out there.
China has three icebreakers. One of them in development is an atomic-powered icebreaker. And, they also have what they call research vessels, which are mini-icebreakers that are zipping all over the area. They’re not an Arctic power, although they like to claim that they’re going to be.
It’s not just an Army problem. It’s not just an Air Force problem. It’s a Navy problem, as well. And, it’s all three of them working together. There are some major challenges out there, and all of the services are trying to manage their budgets for where they consider their customer base is. And the Navy says, well, most of the [world’s] ships right now are down going through the Suez Canal or around the Horn of Africa.
The Northern Sea Route is viable. That’s proven, and it’s going to become increasingly so. And, I think we’re going to have to be involved by [having] all services in there in the region.
Host
The Northern Sea Route. As it becomes more viable for international shipping, how do you see the tension between Russia’s claims and the principle of freedom of navigation playing out, especially with interest from non-Arctic nations like China, and, I think, was it Les, you mentioned also South Korea?
Grau
We’ve had one freedom of navigation [test] sailing on the Northern Sea Route, and that was what—10 years ago? 14 years ago?—[when] a French naval supply vessel went across from Europe to the Pacific without coordinating previously with the Russians. They did not go back [that way]. They went the long way home and went [by] the Suez route to get home, but that hasn’t been the only challenge I know of [to] freedom of navigation in the Arctic. The Russians have since come up with a structure for passage on the Arctic [Northern Sea Route]—icebreakers, aid stations, aerial support, satellite support, all sorts of things on this—but they’ve also come up with a set of rules which are not freedom of navigation.
There’s a great deal of legal question[s] on who really owns what piece of the Arctic. You’ve got to have rules of navigation, et cetera, to come [sail] up there. You don’t want to go wandering through the Arctic waters without a pilot. And, quite frankly, nobody knows what the Arctic bottoms look like better than the Russians because they’ve spent decade upon decade upon decade charting these things, where nobody else has.
This is an area that all the nations are going to have to work together. We haven’t seen a freedom of navigation [test voyage] since then. I don’t expect to see one. The Coast Guard took their icebreaker up to the North Pole, but they clearly skirted getting into any part of the Northern Sea Route in doing so. It’s one of those areas in the future that all the nations are going to have to get together on. As the Northern Sea Route becomes a reality, it could be shortened, and if some of the plans that Russia was talking to Norway and Finland about come into fruition, that route could be shortened even quicker with rail offload. You don’t have to go all the way around Norway and down to Rotterdam to offload. This could really become a trade advantage for Europe and European customers, but these are all areas that are going to have to be worked out by governments over the coming years.
And I know Troy dabbles in this area more than I do, and good on you, Troy.
Bouffard
The Northern Sea Route is becoming reality, as Les mentioned, and Southeast Asia, led by China, is investing heavily in this. There’s a lot of evidence. And they stand to gain, you know, as the world’s largest collective economy, from using the Northern Sea Route. And, they’re studying this. And they’re testing it in many ways that are further indications this is the real deal.
And, it’s important for everyone to understand, for the Northern Sea Route, what the United States and many other nations are concerned about is freedom of navigation based on Russian laws and regulations that are conflicting with normal international norms and principles out of the UN [United Nations] Conventional Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). So, whereas most nations establish a baseline that officially, sort of, sets a boundary along a coastline, out from there to about 12 nautical miles is what’s known as territorial waters.
And generally, nations more or less control the surface waters, water column, seabed, and below, under those circumstances, right? Those boundaries are global. UNCLOS helps to manage this. And beyond that, you’re supposed to allow innocent passage and freedom of navigation. Well, Russia is taking that—because of UNCLOS Article 234, which has special consideration for sea ice—and extended that exact type of total control all the way out to 200 nautical miles (what’s known as the exclusive economic zone.)
So naturally, the United States has a huge problem with this. Controlling access to waters, surface waters, all the way out to 200 nautical miles is quite the stretch and not based off of norms. Even though Canada has a similar situation with its archipelago. And considering those internal waters, that’s a very practical situation where they’re following norms. It’s not safe to go through the Northwest Passage. Those waters in that Canadian claim are very realistic. Russia’s just aren’t. You know? And they’re feeling the pressure, too, because, you know, things are changing in the North, and they want to establish this control over surface-water access through the entire Northwest Passage out to 200 nautical miles, as customary law, as soon as possible.
And that’s the great contest, I think, in the world is should Russia have that amount of control over access to surface waters like that? We’re a solid no on that. So, we’re hoping, you know, again, our article contributed a little bit to that understanding.
Host
Maybe this isn’t a fair question to you all. I know you don’t have a crystal ball, but with Russia occupied elsewhere, can we scramble—us, Europe, whoever else—to reshape what things look like in the Arctic? Do you think we can do it fast enough?
Grau
We don’t have icebreakers. We don’t have ice-class [hulls]. It’s a little tough to do [anything in the Arctic without] that. And you don’t want to do this—even in the summer. If you’ve got a good icebreaker escort, you can go [sail] safely without an ice-class vessel during the summer months. I think one of the other things is, as we’re learning from Ukraine, drones are shifting what militaries can and cannot do and how they operate.
And drones [have] certainly always played a role in the Russian Arctic, but that was a rather constrained role. That role is developing and, I think, is going to become very much involved. Just to give you an example, the Soviet ground forces have a new branch for the military, a branch being something like armor, infantry, artillery. These are land and air drone managers.
And, this whole drone technology is going to play a major role in the development of the Arctic and how militaries function in this region. There [are] some real challenges that are coming out of the current conflict, and when this conflict comes to an end, the problems aren’t gonna go away. They’ve just been brought to the forefront, and there they shall remain until addressed properly.
Bouffard
With their stunningly poor performance in Ukraine, we can expect when they come back, they’re gonna retool everything—doctrine and equipment. Their equipment didn’t work. It’s the first time we’ve seen large-scale combat operations [with] Russian military equipment being used against NATO (a lot of different NATO-related equipment), and it didn’t do well.
So, you can expect Russia to retool their entire military and, as Les has taught me, you know, it’s going to take four and five years alone just to rebuild their officer corps because officers run everything in the military. They don’t have an NCO corps. So, we’re taking that time, and then what Russia had accomplished in the Arctic, which surpassed the West. You know, in terms of large-scale combat operations and what we consider military superiority based on multidomain, precision-enabled combined arms warfare, when you’re really good at that versus your competitors, you’re probably gonna win.
And we saw a moment there—a little time, briefly—when Russia was superior to the United States, largely because the land forces (why we wrote this article, specifically) as part of combined arms of warfare. Total military, Russian military, had surpassed us, and that gave a larger operational capability of Russia’s Arctic forces than we had. Now, that doesn’t exist right now. Those land forces had since gone and deployed to Ukraine and been absolutely decimated. But what we do know now is that as that happened, there was a moment Russia was superior in many ways. We now have a decent window of opportunity to close that gap, and it’s got everyone’s attention.
We [have] got a lot of work to do, and I know the French authorities have reached out to Les to ask, “What should we expect from Russia?”
The Arctic is becoming more and more important on a daily basis.
Grau
I do think one thing is [that] there are two countries who know how to fight and survive [during]drone combat, and you have a lot of spectator / supporting nations who are trying to gain this experience. But, we don’t have the experience and the experienced personnel who have survived drone attack[s] in our armed forces, and this is something that we’re going to have to play catch-up ball on.
This is one of the challenges that’s going to be facing us, not only in the Arctic, but throughout the spectrum.
Host
Well, I knew this was going to happen. We’re running out of time. So, if we missed anything [or] if you have any concluding thoughts, now’s the time.
 Bouffard
Russian land forces in the Arctic was the focus of our article. Land forces are often not thought of during a lot of strategic assessments and plans. What Ukraine taught us, besides the fact that drones are here to stay, and we have got to, you know, understand that and build that into our strategies and operations, is that where a lot of people thought maneuver was dead—I’ve literally seen articles, you know, with that title—at the end of the day, what always holds true is in order to win any battle, you have to take and hold land. And that’s land forces, right? So, paying attention to land forces and not forgetting them and all the, you know, incredible importance of power of maritime and air forces is necessary.
And Ukraine really taught us that.
Grau
If you want to be able to function militarily in the Arctic, you have to be in the Arctic. You have to train in the Arctic. You can’t have your Arctic force, as small as it is, deployed in Borneo and places like this, which it has been. We have done some things, but we need to get there.
Host
Thank you both very much. I’ve been looking forward to this chat, and you did not disappoint.
Listeners, you can read the genesis article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 55, issue 3. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.