350 episodes
- Last time we spoke about the fall of Moulmein. In January 1942, as Singapore crumbled, the Japanese 55th Division pressed into Burma with methodical efficiency. General Wavell, commanding the ABDA theater from Java, ordered Moulmein held as long as feasible—a strategically important but tactically fragile position across the mile-wide Salween River. General Smyth, commanding 17 Division, disagreed with the forward strategy but obeyed orders, positioning the 2nd Burma Brigade and the 4th/12th Frontier Force Rifles to defend the town. When the Japanese attacked on 30 January, they infiltrated from multiple angles, collapsing the perimeter. Brigadier Ekin, just arrived to assume command, contracted the defense and ordered a daylight evacuation. Ferries hastily organized by Major Dick Ward RE carried most troops across, though some units were cut off and forced to cross later by sampan. The evacuation was skillfully executed; most casualties were deserters. Though the Japanese had achieved their objective, the loss of the airfield—enabling them to operate closer to Rangoon—proved far more damaging than the fight itself.
#228 The Fall of Martaban and Pa'an
Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.
The loss of Moulmein, though costly in equipment and morale, was in truth only the opening move in a far larger drama. The town's fall had stripped away the southern anchor of the Salween defense and given the Japanese an airfield from which to range deeper into Burma. But General Iida's real objective was not Moulmein itself—it was the open road beyond it, the passage to Rangoon, and the destruction of whatever British forces stood in the way.
The burden fell on the 46 Brigade. The brigade was commanded by Brigadier Ekin—the same officer who had just overseen the evacuation of Moulmein—and was one of 17 Division's original three brigades, though the other two had long since been dispatched to Singapore and lost in that catastrophe. The brigade had been equipped for fighting in Iraq, where it was to have received proper training. Instead, it was about to receive its baptism of fire under circumstances that could hardly have been worse.
Brigade headquarters was established at Thaton, with the brigade reserve—the 2nd Battalion, the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (2nd KOYLD), minus one company—positioned nearby. The main garrison at Martaban held the 3rd/7th Gurkhas with one company of the 2nd KOYLI under command. At Kuzeik, the ferry terminal opposite Pa-an, the 7th/10th Baluch Regiment was taking over from the 1st/7th Gurkhas. Further north at Duyinzeik, straddling the Donthami river on the road between Pa-an and Thaton, lay the 5th/17th Dogra Regiment. Supporting the whole position were the 12th Mountain Battery and 60 Field Company of the Madras Sappers, based at Thaton.
On paper, it looked like a defensible arrangement. In reality, it was a soldier's nightmare. Smyth had foreseen the danger, and it was now becoming grimly apparent: with so wide a front and so few troops, the Japanese could concentrate overwhelming force wherever they chose to strike. They now had one full division—two regiments strong—facing a single battalion at Martaban, and another division facing another single battalion at Pa-an. The arithmetic of war, it seemed, had already been decided before a shot was fired.
Lieutenant-Colonel Stevenson, commanding the Gurkhas at Martaban, had every reason to feel alone. He had no artillery support. His brigade headquarters was 38 miles away. Behind him, the road and railway that ran parallel to the Salween—his only lifeline to the north—were exposed and vulnerable to enemy interference at any point. Martaban itself lay at the end of a long, narrow ridge around which the Salween took a sharp bend. The main road and railway traced the western side of this ridge, while a shorter seven-mile road climbed the eastern slope. One or two footpaths connected the two, but they offered little comfort to a garrison under pressure.
During the first week of February, Japanese patrols had tested Martaban repeatedly, attempting to cross by boat from Moulmein. Each time they had been driven back. But the testing was over. On 8 February, the RAF retaliated for these probes by bombing Moulmein and Kado. That night, the real assault began. The 43 Regiment moved north from Moulmein in boats, paddling upriver under cover of darkness. They landed on the western bank of the Salween at Hmawbi, eleven miles upstream from Martaban, then turned west toward the Martaban-Thaton road. By dawn, they had established a roadblock eight miles north of Martaban, cutting the telephone wires as they went. With telephone contact severed and no functioning radio link to brigade headquarters, Stevenson's garrison was effectively cut off from the outside world.
Stevenson had no idea yet how many Japanese had landed or how serious the threat truly was. He sent a patrol up the main road to locate the break in the telephone line—it could have been sabotage, it could have been bombing—but the men ran straight into the Japanese roadblock. Captain Stourton and nearly every member of the patrol were killed. Only one man escaped to tell the tale.
A reconnaissance patrol from the Gurkhas probing up the eastern road encountered what appeared to be a small Japanese party—in fact, a flank guard for the main force crossing the northern road. Stevenson reacted swiftly, detaching two companies under 2nd-Lieutenant Carver to deal with them. The Gurkhas came upon a roadblock, fought through it in a brisk action, and charged with bayonets. They killed several enemy soldiers, captured weapons including an infantry gun and two grenade-dischargers, and cleared the position. It was a small victory, but it bought time—precious time that Stevenson would need.
That evening, standing with Major Haughton of the 2nd KOYLI, Stevenson watched in growing horror as large numbers of Japanese soldiers appeared to the west, moving across country from the river. The truth crystallized in an instant: he was surrounded. A strong Japanese force now blocked his escape to the north. His garrison, however brave, however determined, could not hold indefinitely against an encircling enemy.
Stevenson faced the oldest and most agonizing choice a commander can make. His orders were explicit: hold Martaban firmly. He was not to know that his brigade had been trying desperately—and unsuccessfully—to tell him to withdraw. To disobey orders when you cannot know that disobedience is authorized is to risk having your name blackened by history. Yet to obey orders when obedience means certain defeat is to sacrifice men for pride. Stevenson made the harder choice. He rightly judged that staying would only bring defeat without achieving anything of value. There was no point in it. That night, he would break out.
His plan was bold but desperate: move the battalion up the eastern road to its end, destroy the vehicles and captured weapons so the Japanese could not use them, then strike north across country before wheeling west to hit the Thaton road. 'D' Company would cover the main road, three miles from Martaban, holding until the main body had passed, then following in the darkness. It was a gamble. It depended on speed, on darkness, on the enemy not discovering the movement until it was too late.
The march was brutal. The troops had little food, little water, and no sleep. Men fell behind from exhaustion; inevitably, there were stragglers. Twenty of them were taken prisoner before the night was done. 'D' Company, covering the rear, had a particularly harrowing time—but most of them eventually made it through. By the second evening, the exhausted 3rd/7th Gurkhas and their attached company of the 2nd KOYLI reached the road north, made contact with HQ 46 Brigade, and were provided transport to Thaton. The escape had succeeded, but the cost had been steep. The 3rd/7th Gurkhas suffered 80 casualties—killed, wounded, and missing—from what should have been a fighting retreat. It was, however, a far better outcome than the alternative: the complete destruction of the garrison.
While Stevenson's Gurkhas were fighting for their lives at Martaban, the enemy's main assault was unfolding further north. Contact had first come at the beginning of February, when the 1st/7th Gurkhas held the west bank of the Salween near Pa-an, their platoon standing patrol watching the ferry crossing from the opposite shore. The BIA militia lay dormant in the town itself, waiting for the moment to strike. On 1 February a Japanese reconnaissance party—scouts probing for weak points—entered Pa-an and left their calling card: the Union Jack on a prominent building was torn down and replaced with the rising sun. Two days later, on the 3rd, the mounted infantry platoon of 2/75 Regiment rode into town. The Gurkhas were ready. Sharp fighting erupted on the riverbank; medium machine guns hammered across the water (here barely 800 yards wide) and as the Japanese built up their numbers in the town, the patrol had no choice but to withdraw in a motorboat. The Japanese lost 12 men including two officers. In retaliation they shelled the main position and launched an air strike, but when the RAF struck back—twice—they suffered another 26 casualties in the forest where they had assembled. The crossing point had been contested and held, but everyone knew it was only a matter of time before the Japanese returned in overwhelming force.
On 8 February, Lieutenant-Colonel "Jerry" Dyer arrived to take command of the 7th/10th Baluch Regiment at Kuzeik. His orders were clear but daunting: deny the ferry crossing at Pa-an and, through aggressive patrolling across a ten-mile radius to the north and five miles to the south, identify and delay any enemy river crossings. The theory was sound—vigorous patrols would buy time for the brigade reserve battalions, the 5th/17th Dogras and the 2nd KOYLD, to counterattack and drive any Japanese who got across back into the water. In practice, Dyer faced a nightmare of logistics and terrain. Two platoon patrol bases were established—one at Myainggale to the south of Kuzeik, another to the north—but the main position was far from ideal. It was a shallow half-saucer of open rice fields, about 600 yards long, with the river along its eastern edge and the Duyinzeik road forming its southern boundary. The surrounding slopes were steep and heavily wooded—ideal cover for infiltration.
The position had barely been improved beyond simple slit trenches. There was no barbed wire. No field artillery. These were luxuries that didn't exist in Burma in 1942. Brigadier Ekin, trying to shore up the weakness, sent two mountain guns from the 5 Mountain Battery at Thaton, bouncing them over the roads in 30-cwt trucks. They would fire some shells into Pa-an on the 9th, but it hardly mattered—the actual crossing place was outside their range, and the main position was too shallow for them to deliver meaningful defensive fire. The 7th/10th Baluch, unknown to themselves, were about to face the full weight of a Japanese regiment.
Across the river in the dense forest near Pa-an, the Japanese were making their move. The 2/5 Regiment (less its 3rd Battalion) was concentrating in strength, gathering intelligence on the British positions. The 2/4 Regiment was there too, preparing to cross at Kawku, eight miles to the north. The divisional engineers were even constructing rafts, towed by motorboats, to ferry the horses across.
On the night of 10/11 February, the first Japanese infantry boats pushed out from the east bank. Small boats rowed by local Burmese carried 2/215 Battalion across to Pagat, four miles south of Pa-an, where the river narrowed to about 800 yards. 2/5/7 Company crossed first and immediately attacked the Myainggale patrol base. Within minutes they were joined by 2/5/5 Company, and together the two Japanese companies overran the position in a rush. Subedar Mehr Khan, the commander of the base, was killed along with many of his men. The British observation posts had been withdrawn only hours earlier in anticipation of a relief—a tragic stroke of timing. 'A' Company of the Baluch had just pulled back, leaving only a single platoon. A relief platoon under Subedar Mehr Khan had only just arrived when the Japanese came screaming out of the darkness. The rest of 'B' Company, moving forward to take over the patrol base, suddenly found themselves engaged with most of 2/215 Battalion. After a sharp fight and with difficulty they extricated themselves and fell back to the main position, the enemy at their heels.
The next night, 2/2/5 Battalion also crossed at Pagat, using the same boats and the same narrow stretch of river. The Japanese plan was taking shape: 2/2/5 Battalion would assault the main position from the south-west while 1/215 Battalion moved up on their left flank and established a road-block across the Duyinzeik road—cutting off any hope of retreat or reinforcement. Meanwhile the Japanese Air Force added its weight to the assault. On the 9th, 10th, and 11th, waves of enemy fighters bombed and machine-gunned the Baluch position. There were about thirty-five casualties and considerable damage to kit and ammunition, but worse than the physical destruction was the psychological weight—the knowledge that the Japanese held complete command of the air.
By the evening of 11 February, the atmosphere in the Baluch perimeter was tense and expectant. The telephone wire to Brigade HQ at Duyinzeik had been cut that morning, and despite continuous efforts on the wireless, no contact could be established. Everyone knew an attack was coming. Two-hour officer watches were organized at battalion headquarters, and men sat in their shallow trenches, waiting. At about 0200 hours, the first shots rang out across the dark rice fields. 2/2/5 Battalion had moved forward in darkness so complete that it was nearly 0200 before they were in assault positions. They had chosen their method well: a silent attack with the bayonet, a specialty of the Japanese army and a tactic honed through long campaigns in China. Soldiers carried unloaded rifles. Only the machine gunners on the western flank and a few light machine gunners were permitted to fire. Bayonets were coated with mud to kill their shine. The plan was ruthlessly simple—get as close as possible in darkness, then charge with steel and grenades, hoping to catch much of the garrison asleep.
The 7th/10th Baluch were awake and alert. As the Japanese shadows materialized out of the darkness, mortars fired parachute flares that burst overhead like ghostly suns. Surprise was lost, but the Japanese didn't pause. They advanced by short rushes, lying down between bursts of fire, closing steadily on the shallow British perimeter. The Baluch were dug in along a semicircle facing west, their backs to the river. 'C' Company, commanded by Captain Siri Kanth Korla, a pre-war regular officer, held the crucial south and south-west sector where the main assault fell. Beyond them to the west was 'B' Company—just one platoon and a section of machine guns—under Second-Lieutenant John Randle, only 20 years old with five months of service. Beyond Randle to the west and north was 'D' Company with two platoons under Second-Lieutenant "Jake" Jervis. 'A' Company, covering the river front to the east, held one platoon and another machine gun section under Captain Bill Cayley. Battalion HQ and the guns were positioned near the track along the river bank, close to the ferry.
The fighting erupted first on 'C' Company's front—savage, close-quarters combat in the dark. Captain Korla stood in the thick of it, leading counterattack after counterattack. His company of Dogra Brahmins held their ground for nearly four hours against mounting pressure, and every survivor would later testify to his personal courage. But the weight of numbers was against them. The fighting spread rapidly to the small 'B' Company position, where Randle and his men made excellent use of their machine guns. Colonel Dyer, the battalion commander, left his headquarters to see the situation for himself, but within minutes he and his adjutant were pinned down by crossfire—some of it from their own troops—and could not return to HQ until dawn. For nearly four hours the battle raged in confusion and darkness. Gradually, inexorably, the Japanese began to gain the upper hand. 'C' and 'B' Companies were overrun. The Japanese surge pressed on toward 'A' and 'D' Companies, tightening the noose. Dyer went forward again to rally his men, but a Japanese bullet fired at close range shattered his jaw. Wounded and barely conscious, he was helped to a sheltered position near the river bank by Second-Lieutenant Coubrough. He could take no further part in the battle.
At 2/5 Regiment headquarters, just before dawn, there was still uncertainty about how the night had gone. The commanders feared that with daylight would come superior British firepower that might yet turn the tide. They took no chances. At first light, 2/215 Battalion's infantry gun company—which had been held in reserve with regimental HQ—was ordered to join the fight as infantry. Leaving a small party to guard the guns, the rest of the gun company moved around the west side of the Baluch position and attacked south down the river bank. They came through like a scythe. Battalion HQ was overrun. The guns were captured. In the chaos and carnage they killed everyone in their path, including the wounded Colonel Dyer, who refused to surrender. By 0800 hours it was over. The Japanese were mopping up the last pockets of resistance. What remained of the 7th/10th Baluch scattered into small parties, fighting north toward Duyinzeik in a desperate bid to escape. They had fought with exemplary courage—a green battalion, unsupported by artillery, facing a much more powerful and experienced enemy. It had been a heroic but futile stand.
When the survivors regrouped, the tally was brutal. The Japanese claimed 289 British dead, including those killed at Myainggale. Five officers, three VCOs (Viceroy's Commissioned Officers), and 65 men had fought their way out of the encirclement. Six officers and 229 men were taken prisoner—most of them having fought their way clear only to find themselves surrounded by 1/2/5 Battalion, which had reached the Duyinzeik road by 0300 hours. Both mountain guns were lost, along with numerous machine guns and mortars. The Japanese claimed only 17 men killed and 33 wounded.
In the aftermath, Captain Siri Kanth Korla—taken prisoner but later escaped—was awarded an immediate DSO, a rare distinction for such circumstances. The 7th/10th Baluch had earned the respect of 17 Division with their stand at Kuzeik. They had given everything against overwhelming odds. But there was another, darker reckoning. The survivors were convinced—and the casualty figures seemed to bear it out—that many of the wounded had been shot or bayoneted after capture. Few of the prisoners were themselves wounded. The Japanese had learned in China to wage a kill-or-be-killed war, and this savage pattern, since the Japanese would never surrender, was increasingly becoming the custom for both sides in Burma. It was a grim harbinger of the war that lay ahead.
Captain Bruce Toothill had been at battalion headquarters when the final assault came. As the Baluch position crumbled on the morning of the 12th, he led a small party into the forest, trying to hack their way westward through the trees toward the Duyinzeik road. Three miles from the river, they burst from the forest directly into a mass of Japanese soldiers. Toothill bolted behind a tree and opened fire with his revolver, determined to shoot his way through. But the Japanese were too many and too close. A bullet caught him—then another. The third shot came from point-blank range, shattering through his mouth, smashing teeth, mangling his gums, and breaking his jaw in one catastrophic impact. He slumped, bleeding, barely conscious.
The Subedar-Major fighting alongside him attempted to throw a grenade. A Japanese soldier closed in and bayoneted him to death before he could release it. Toothill, convinced he was dying, made a gesture of surrender to the Japanese soldier standing over him—a soldier who, against the brutality becoming endemic to this war, refused to finish him. What followed was, for a prisoner in a Japanese-dominated Burma, almost miraculous. Other captured soldiers improvised a stretcher from bamboo, signal wire, and matting, carrying Toothill to the Japanese company headquarters where he was given straw to lie on for the night. From there, his own men bore him back down the river to Pa-an and eventually to Moulmein, where Japanese medical orderlies attended to his shattered face and broken body. In Rangoon jail, he would receive a bed, mattress, pillow, and blanket—luxuries he had no reason to expect. Though eating and drinking remained agonizing, he was never interrogated, never ill-treated. His captors seemed to have recognized his courage. He would survive the war.
While Toothill fought for his life in the forest, 46 Brigade headquarters at Thaton was locked in a fog of uncertainty. Brigadier Ekin had only taken over the southern half of the Salween front on the 9th of February, inheriting command of some 40 miles of river that he was expected to watch and defend with forces wholly inadequate to the task. Without armoured vehicles or motorised infantry, reacting swiftly enough to stop an enemy crossing seemed barely possible. On paper it looked impossible. The first crisis was Martaban. On the 9th, Divisional Headquarters ordered its evacuation, but an armoured patrol sent to carry the message never reached Stevenson—most of its men were killed. As far as Brigade knew through much of the 10th and 11th, the garrison was either still holding out or had been annihilated. Then, on the 11th, reports arrived of a substantial enemy crossing south of Pa-an. The plan to defend the Salween suddenly looked like fantasy.
That afternoon, at 1400 hours, a wireless signal arrived at Brigade Headquarters from what appeared to be the 7th/10th Baluch. The message was reassuring: they had successfully repelled the Japanese force that had crossed the river. Ekin could breathe easier. Or so he thought. The signal was a forgery—a masterpiece of Japanese signalcraft. The operators of 33 Division had been monitoring British transmissions in clear, studying their style and phraseology, and had simply impersonated them. The British would not know they had been deceived until it was far too late. Based on this false report, Ekin hesitated to commit his reserve—the 5th/17th Dogras—to reinforce Kuzeik as originally planned. Then Dyer's written message arrived in the evening of the 11th: he expected to be attacked that night and was asking for support. This triggered a new order: the Dogras were to advance to Kuzeik immediately.
Whether Ekin sent the order that night, as he later claimed, or the next morning, as the Dogra war diary records, remains unclear. What is certain is that getting the second half of the Dogra battalion across the Donthami River took hours. The battalion did not leave Duyinzeik until 1100 hours on the 12th—by which time the battle at Kuzeik was already over, the Baluch overrun, the position lost. The Dogras made contact with the Japanese almost immediately. According to Japanese accounts, they repelled what they believed was a company-strength attack, losing one man killed and two badly wounded. According to the Dogra records, a patrol of unspecified size engaged the enemy and suffered a few casualties. What matters is this: within hours of leaving Duyinzeik, the Dogras were ordered to withdraw. The relief attempt had become meaningless.
Across the Salween front, the pattern was becoming grimly consistent. The British, despite courage and determination, could not hold what they tried to defend. The reasons lay in fundamentals that no amount of bravery could overcome. The Japanese were a unified force—one nation, one language, one faith. From childhood, their officers and men had been schooled to believe that the greatest honour was to die for the Emperor. Many of their officers and NCOs were battle-hardened veterans of China. Their organisation and training had been purpose-built for warfare in countries with few roads and sparse communications. On the surface, a Japanese division resembled a British one, but the hardiness and adaptability of Japanese soldiers allowed them to concentrate fighting strength at the expense of support—a Japanese rifle company might field 200 men where a British company had 100, making them twice as strong in the places that mattered.
The British and Indian Army, by contrast, was fractured by language. Urdu served as a common lingua franca, but most officers had only recently learned it, and imperfectly. The Indian Army had expanded sixfold in less than a year, reaching the end of 1941 in a state of profound weakness. The majority of officers were newly commissioned cadets. In the newest units, such as those in Burma, roughly 85 per cent of the men were recruits with only months of basic training. These young soldiers—Jawans, in Indian Army terminology—had never travelled far from their villages before arriving at their training depots. Pitchforking them into battle overseas against a first-class enemy, with only rudimentary artillery and air support, was asking the impossible. The battle at Kuzeik was the first major test of British will against Japanese assault. The position was hastily prepared, lacking wire and artillery support, held against overwhelming opposition. It could not have succeeded. Yet it had been a courageous fight, gallant in its desperation, and the lessons learned would shape the campaign to come.
General Hutton was drowning in responsibilities that no single man could reasonably carry. Burma was nominally marching toward independence, with its own parliament and Prime Minister, yet Defence and Foreign Affairs remained under the Governor's authority. This split command meant that Home Affairs and Finance fell to the Burmese government—a situation that created endless complications and political friction. Wavell was nominally his Theatre Commander, but 2,000 miles separated them. The Supreme Commander was so consumed with his vast international remit that Burma could claim only fragments of his attention. As a result, Hutton found himself performing the duties of a theatre commander in everything but title: liaising with the Chinese, coordinating with American officials concerned with China, navigating the treacherous waters of the Burmese government's political establishment.
Meanwhile, GHQ India—another 1,500 miles to the west—controlled all administrative decisions: reinforcements, personnel, equipment, supplies. Hutton had to manage them all. He was simultaneously Chief of the General Staff at the Burmese War Office, entangling him in Rangoon's political machinations while handling a thousand administrative headaches for the Burma Army itself. As Army Commander he coordinated the Navy and RAF, neither of whom answered to him. He planned the campaign. He controlled the fighting. He acted, in effect, as his own corps commander.
By 13 February, Hutton could bear it no longer. He sent an urgent request to Wavell: appoint a proper corps commander to handle tactical operations, and establish a high-level liaison team to coordinate with the Chinese. Both requests were vital—and had Wavell been in India, would have been granted immediately. But the Supreme Commander was in hospital, battered from his fall off the Singapore dock, wrestling with the collapse of the Dutch East Indies and the final hours of Singapore. Hutton's plea went unanswered.
Following Wavell's final directive, Hutton had ordered Smyth to hold the Thaton-Duyinzeik line before falling back to the Bilin River—and to do nothing without clearance from Army Headquarters. It was a perilous instruction. The British had yet to grasp a fundamental truth about Japanese warfare: they did not fight the way Western military academies taught. They did not need roads. They did not advance in neat columns. They came through the jungle, around flanks, through positions that had been declared "secure." On 13 February, 2/5 Regiment opened fire on the 5th/17th Dogras at Duyinzeik—now reinforced by the battered survivors of the 1st/7th Gurkhas. But it was only artillery and mortar fire. No infantry assault followed. The bombardment came and went, leaving Smyth and Ekin exchanging anxious glances. Something was wrong. The Japanese were not attacking frontally. They were moving—methodically, deliberately—around 46 Brigade's northern flank. The trap was closing.
Smyth had always believed the Bilin was the place to make a stand, not this thin, scattered line on the Salween. He had warned against spreading his forces so widely they could be defeated in detail. Now, with Japanese columns threading through the jungle to the north, there was no time to debate strategy. If he did not move immediately, the Bilin would be cut off entirely. He ordered the withdrawal and informed Hutton of his reasoning. It was the right decision. It was also the wrong one—at least from Hutton's perspective. The Army Commander, determined to hold to Wavell's forward strategy, would later reprimand Smyth for the unauthorized retreat. The 2nd KOYLI formed the rear guard at Thaton, holding the line while 60 Field Company demolished two bridges south of the town. They were supposed to be evacuated by train. Hours passed. No train appeared. Eventually they set off on foot, assuming the rail personnel had not been informed of the withdrawal—or perhaps had simply gone ahead without them.
But the train was coming. Hours late, it appeared and steamed through the advancing Japanese positions, oblivious to the front line now well behind it, and rolled into what appeared to be an abandoned Thaton. The town seemed deserted. All except for two Yorkshiremen—privates from the 2nd KOYLI who had discovered a contractor's store and had been contentedly working their way through its supply of liquid refreshments when their battalion departed. When the train arrived, these two enterprising soldiers emerged from their hideaway, loaded several cases of valuable stores (mostly liquid) aboard the coaches, and rode the train back toward Bilin. They narrowly escaped a very warm reception as the locomotive clattered back through the front line—a minor miracle of neglect and good fortune that allowed two forgotten soldiers to rejoin their unit, thoroughly laden with contraband.
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
The Salween line crumbles as 46 Brigade, spread impossibly thin, faces overwhelming Japanese force at multiple points. At Martaban, cut off by an enemy roadblock, Stevenson executes a fighting withdrawal. Further north at Kuzeik, the 7th/10th Baluch endure a desperate bayonet assault, their position overrun despite heroic resistance. The relief attempt arrives too late. The defense collapses. - Last time we spoke about the race to Rangoon. Japan pressed into Burma with brutal efficiency, marching men, elephants, and oxen over impossible jungle ranges to seize Tavoy, Mergui, and Victoria Point at minimal cost, while Aung San's Burma Independence Army trailed behind, courting recruits and stoking anti-British sentiment. Japanese bombers pounded Rangoon, aiming not at docks but at civilian morale, triggering mass flight—though defenders, aided by radar and the Observer Corps, inflicted surprisingly heavy losses. General Hutton, newly arrived, correctly guessed Rangoon would be the main target and positioned his thin forces accordingly, sending 16 Brigade under Jones to Kawkareik under the ailing but capable Major-General Smyth. When the Japanese 55th Division attacked in January, panic, rumor, and miscommunication—not enemy strength—shattered the defense: a ferry sank, mules were mistaken for attackers, and whole units dissolved into disorderly retreat. Kawkareik fell almost bloodlessly, exposing how untrained troops, thrust into unfamiliar jungle terrain, could be undone by fear alone rather than by the Japanese themselves.
#227 The Fall of Moulmein
Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.
Between 23-29 January, the Japanese launched an all-out bid for air superiority over Rangoon. The week's fighting was lopsided in Britain's favor: 17 Japanese aircraft downed and ten damaged, against just two AVG and ten RAF losses. The Japanese pulled back to sporadic night raids, but the victory was pyrrhic — Britain had no fighters left. Reinforcements came just in time: three Hurricane squadrons from Egypt, though many were obsolete Mark Is with poor spares support, meaning never more than 30 were flyable at once, a number that kept dwindling. Two Lysander squadrons (RAF and Indian Air Force) and a single Blenheim squadron, capable of fielding only six planes on a good day, rounded out the meagre force.
Wavell ordered the Japanese met as far forward as possible — logical given the need to protect the Mudon and Moulmein airfields (shielding Rangoon, Burma's supply lifeline), preserve the rail link supplying China, maintain Chinese confidence in British resolve, and honor Britain's century-long relationship with the loyal Karen people of Moulmein and Tenasserim. But these sound strategic reasons created real tactical headaches for General Smyth, who knew his inexperienced troops risked being destroyed piecemeal if spread too thin. Hutton, trying to satisfy Wavell while heeding Smyth's concerns, found himself in constant friction with his subordinate.
Moulmein — Burma's third-largest town, population near 100,000, under British protection since 1826 — was hard to simply write off. Yet it sat on the far bank of the mile-and-a-half-wide Salween River, with no British boats or ferries available. Defending it with a major river at one's back was tactically dubious, but a 22 January telegram from Wavell's Java headquarters settled the matter: Moulmein would be held. The defense fell to the 2nd Burma Brigade (3, 7, and 8 Burma Rifles, plus the 4th/12th Frontier Force Rifles), supported by a mountain battery, a Bofors AA troop, about 50 Madras Sappers and Miners, and supply/medical units.
Wavell himself, overwhelmed running ABDACOM from an improvised HQ in Java, still managed one of only two personal visits to Burma during his tenure — a grueling overnight flight landing him in Rangoon on 25 January. He confirmed Hutton's plan to hold Moulmein as long as feasible, without fighting to the last man, then flew back the next night. Air raids had already battered the town, forcing Sappers to demolish buildings to halt spreading fires; most Burmese civilians fled to the countryside. District Commissioner Colonel Pelly and the brigade staff quietly evacuated British and Indian women and children by rail, and surplus stores began withdrawing too. Casualties from the raids were light, but morale suffered — punctuated by one act of doomed bravery. Major Hugh Wilberforce witnessed two Buffalo fighter pilots, facing a full enemy squadron, scramble into the air rather than take cover, "urging their planes on like jockeys riding a finish" before both were shot down within moments. The Army called it heroism; veteran RAF officers called it a needless waste of trained pilots.
On 28 January, Hutton and Smyth toured Moulmein and quietly began contingency planning for withdrawal. They also arranged — unusually — for Brigadier Ekin to take operational command from Brigadier Bourke if fighting erupted, officially because Bourke would be consumed managing the civilian evacuation, though Smyth's backhanded praise ("stout in figure and stout in heart") hinted at doubts about Bourke's battlefield acumen. Awkward as it was, the two brigadiers reportedly worked together without friction. The same meeting also greenlit a guerrilla resistance network in Karenni, homeland of the Karen people, many of whom — especially Christian Karens — remained devoted to Britain throughout the war. Major Hugh Seagrim, fluent in Karen and deeply attached to the community, volunteered to stay behind with a small stock of rifles to organize resistance. It was a promising idea undone by circumstance: the British retreat happened so fast and so completely that Seagrim was left isolated, unsupported, and unable to strike at Japanese supply lines in any way that might have altered the campaign's outcome. Had Rangoon held even briefly, his efforts might have proven decisive. Instead, the Karen homeland fell almost immediately, leaving Seagrim to carry on alone.
Having crossed the Dawna Range, 55 Division concentrated west of Kawkareik, scavenging what little the retreating British had left behind — a handful of trucks and not much else. Where equipment was lacking, ingenuity filled the gap: the division's sappers cobbled together a new ferry at Kya-in out of requisitioned sampans. On 26 January, General Iida of 15th Army gave the order that would set the campaign in motion — 55 Division was to capture Moulmein, while 33 Division concentrated east of the Salween, poised to strike toward Pa-an and cross the river there.
Two days later, 55 Division set its columns moving. 1/143 Battalion pushed down the north bank of the Gyaing River toward Kado, at its junction with the Salween, while HQ 143 Regiment — with 2/143 Battalion and 143/3 Company attached — advanced south of the Gyaing toward Moulmein itself, screening the right flank as the rest of the division crossed the Haungtharaw River at Kya-in and struck south along the road to Metheraw. Before reaching that town, 1/2 Regiment (minus 3/112 Battalion) and 55 Division's headquarters peeled off westward through Winpot, making straight for Moulmein, while the Reconnaissance Regiment continued on to Metheraw before swinging west toward Mudon — some fifteen miles south of the target — setting up a pincer from the south .
Meanwhile, on the British side, the 4th/12th Frontier Force Rifles had arrived at Moulmein around 12 January and been shuttled down the railway to its terminus at Ye, a hundred miles south — only to be recalled to Moulmein the very next day. A week later they were sent south again, this time to bolster the Tavoy garrison, but when Tavoy fell they turned back once more, a detachment of 60 Field Company blowing three railway bridges between Ye and Mudon as they went.
On 26 January, a motorised patrol under Captain "Sam" Manekshaw, probing the low, forested hills east of Mudon, ran straight into an ambush laid by the Japanese Reconnaissance Regiment. After a sharp, close-run fight, the patrol fought its way clear and fell back to a defensive position in the woods north of Mudon, where the rest of the battalion — minus one company — joined them on the 28th. The following day brought new orders: fall back to Moulmein. But 'D' Company was left at Mudon to cover the withdrawal of 'C' Company, 1st/7th Gurkhas — the same company that had been guarding the approach through the Three Pagodas Pass and had made contact only the day before. That night, disaster struck: 'D' Company was hit hard and cut off from Moulmein entirely. Both it and the Gurkhas were forced south, striking out across country to the Salween, crossing by sampan, and finally rejoining their units a week later at Kyaikto. It was a costly detour — the 4th/12th FFR now had only three companies left to help hold Moulmein, just as 55 Division closed in.
Inside the town , Brigadier Bourke had stretched his two-and-a-half battalions of Burma Rifles around an eleven-mile perimeter covering the south and east, leaning on the Salween to the north and west and the Ataran River along part of the eastern edge. A separate Burma Frontier Force police unit guarded the airfield, which sat outside the perimeter proper but within range of 12 Mountain Battery's guns. Dominating the whole position was the Ridge — a long spine running the length of the town, crowned with pagodas and the single most important piece of tactical ground on the map. Brigade headquarters sat at its southern end, alongside the 4th/12th FFR in reserve. It would not take long for events to prove what should perhaps have been obvious from the start: a perimeter this long could never survive the Japanese habit of slipping through the dark in small infiltrating groups.
The southern sector fell to 8th Burma Rifles — recruited from Sikhs and Punjabi Muslims settled in Burma, and by common consent the steadiest of the brigade's Burma Rifle battalions. The eastern sector belonged to 3 Burif (minus two companies), while 7 Burif held the river banks to the west and north. On paper, 3 Burif had just been reinforced by thirty Chin soldiers escaped from Tavoy — but the wild rumors these newcomers brought with them did the battalion's nerves more harm than their rifles did good.
For the attack, the Japanese could muster only three infantry battalions — the unit that had taken Tavoy hadn't yet arrived, and 1/143 Battalion (minus one company) was still stuck on the far side of the Gyaing. They did, however, have the Reconnaissance Regiment and five companies of mountain artillery, each fielding just two guns apiece thanks to a shortage of ammunition. Those mountain guns, though lighter — a 14-pound shell against the British 20-pounder — could reach more than twice as far. The plan called for a three-pronged assault: the Reconnaissance Regiment from the south, 1/2 Regiment (minus one battalion) from the south-east, and 2/143 Battalion from the east.
Soon after 0700 on 30 January, four British trucks packed with Japanese soldiers came rolling up the main road from the south and — whether by bold design or simple miscalculation — tried to bluff their way straight through the perimeter wire. A sharp-eyed Sikh sentry answered with a burst from his light machine gun, and every post nearby joined in. The Japanese tumbled out of their vehicles and scattered for cover, leaving more than a dozen dead behind. A full assault on the southern sector followed but was beaten back, 12 Mountain Battery lending crucial support. On the eastern side, though, the news was worse: 2/143 Battalion forced a crossing of the Ataran at Hmyawlin, and 1/2 Regiment (minus one battalion) got over further south, near the airfield
Brigadier Ekin had learned only that morning that he was taking command, and he crossed from Martaban to reach Moulmein around noon on the 30th — by which time the battle was already well underway. One look at 3 Burif told him the battalion was badly shaken, and it took no great insight to see that a perimeter this size could never be properly defended. He ordered an immediate withdrawal to a shorter line anchored on the Ridge, threw his reserve — the 4th/12th FFR — into the center of it, and shifted his headquarters from the southern end to a more central spot.
At the airfield, the small Burma Frontier Force garrison put up a stiff fight, holding the Japanese at bay for hours before finally being pushed back. Under cover of darkness they scattered, and most made it safely to Martaban, having given at least as good as they got. Through the day, 8 Burif held firm in the south, but in the north 7 Burif began to come apart, and after dark the Japanese turned their attention to the Ridge itself — only to find the 4th/12th FFR standing solidly in the way. At 2300 hours, Ekin drew the perimeter in once more, this time into a compact box covering the Ridge and the main jetties — roughly four thousand yards north to south, a thousand east to west. Firing sputtered on through the night, and while some Japanese accounts describe fierce combat, no real attack materialized, and casualties on both sides appear to have been light.
At dawn on the 31st, 143/3 Company — pulled from its parent battalion at Kado and held in reserve with HQ 143 Regiment — moved along the estuary bank to slip into Moulmein from the north. The 7 Burif company holding that stretch was caught completely off guard and bolted for the main jetties. The Japanese swept on into the unarmed gun crews of the Light Anti-Aircraft battery, overrunning all four guns — though two breech blocks were saved before they fell.
Ekin had no choice but to pull his northern line back further. Word arrived from the CO of 8 Burif that his men in the south were nearing the end of their strength, and Ekin concluded the town could not hold much longer regardless. There was a darker calculation too: if Japanese gunners managed to bring their pieces to bear on the river crossing itself, the ferries would stop running altogether. He put the situation to Smyth and received authority to withdraw whenever he judged the moment right. When word reached him that Burmese soldiers were already drifting down to the riverbank in numbers, he decided further delay would only cost lives for nothing gained. At 8am he gave the order: contract the box into a bridgehead around the main jetties.
Major Dick Ward of the Royal Engineers had fifteen ferries standing by in Martaban, and now they steamed across, five to a jetty at each of the three main landing points. The vessels' Burmese civilian crews had grown increasingly uneasy over the preceding days — every air raid warning sent them scrambling to push their boats out into mid-stream — so armed guards of sappers from 1 Burma Field Company had been placed aboard each one, partly to steady nerves and partly to make sure the boats stayed put when needed.
Each unit had its assigned jetty, and the wounded went first, along with the medical units. Officers supervised the loading, and despite some friction with Burmese stragglers trying to force their way aboard, the embarkation went smoothly — the covering troops, mostly from the 4th/12th FFR, holding the perimeter and counter-attacking wherever the enemy pressed too close.
The final hours produced their share of quiet heroism. Major John Hume of 12 Mountain Battery led a party back into danger to rescue two guns that had been cut off, saving all four pieces of his battery. Second Lieutenant Mehr Dass tried the same with the Bofors guns, dragging one all the way to the quayside — only to find there was no way to get it aboard. He went back for his men and was captured in the attempt. The very last boat out from Mission Street Jetty carried Brigade HQ, along with the sappers of 60 Field Company, fresh from demolishing the power station and telephone exchange. As the final party boarded, Japanese troops appeared on the quay itself, and the sappers were sent ashore one more time to clear them off. They succeeded — though their leader, Captain Jardine, was killed in the attempt. The steamer pulled away with the bridgehead's last defenders necessarily left behind. It was, in the end, a stroke of luck that the Japanese had only a single gun positioned to fire on the departing ferries; all but one made it across safely.
For those who didn't make the boats, survival meant one thing: staying out of Japanese hands. Fortunately, the Japanese themselves were spent after their grueling advance, and more interested in the captured food dumps than in hunting stragglers. One of the more remarkable escapes of the whole retreat was engineered by Jemadar Malligarjunan of 60 Field Company. After Captain Jardine fell, the Jemadar took charge of the party and hid them beneath Mission Street jetty — right under the nose of a Japanese mortar crew that set up on the jetty itself without ever noticing them.
Also sheltering under that same jetty, having received no order to withdraw, was Colonel Taylor, CO of 3 Burif, along with two of his officers. After dark, hearing strange noises from a nearby yard, he went to investigate — and found something he hadn't expected: "Peeping round a wall I was staggered to find the Sappers industriously building a petrol-barrel raft with their Jemadar giving instructions in loud whispers. Having completed the raft, they launched it, but the Jemadar, apparently not being satisfied, had the raft pulled ashore and taken to pieces to replace a leaking barrel. It was then re-launched, but still the Jemadar was not happy about it and had it rebuilt a second time. Then he smiled his satisfaction, came up to me, and saluting smartly said 'Raft taryar hai, Sahib' (The raft is ready, Sir). We climbed aboard but, as we dared not use paddles, the Jemadar and his men stripped and gently slid the raft into the water and guided it to safety. By keeping calm and cool in the face of the enemy, he saved me, two other officers and all his men from capture."
British records — necessarily rough estimates — put total losses at the operation at 617 men killed or missing, most of them believed to be Burmese troops who simply melted away rather than fought to the end. The 4th/12th FFR itself lost only four soldiers and three followers killed in the fighting. The Japanese, for their part, claimed 225 British killed and 148 taken prisoner — figures that look badly inflated given how light the 4th/12th FFR's own losses actually were. Colonel Oharazawa, commanding 1/2 Regiment, reported wave after wave of fierce charges and heavy fighting, but he had something of a reputation for embellishment; a nervous man who leaned heavily on drink, he would be relieved of his command not long afterward.
On the Japanese side, 2/143 Battalion recorded 14 killed, and the Reconnaissance Regiment 20 killed and 11 wounded — though no figures survive for the two battalions of 1/2 Regiment. Among the spoils, the Japanese claimed one unserviceable Blenheim bomber, seven "armoured cars," four Bofors guns, assorted vehicles, mules, equipment, and stores. Far more valuable was a discovery in the rubber plantation near the aerodrome: a hidden cache of 5,000 drums of aviation fuel — a windfall that let them put the captured airfield to use the moment they could fly bombs in, which they lost no time doing. Puncturing those drums before the town fell would have denied them this prize, but with no joint Army/RAF command structure in place and every other crisis screaming for attention, it seems the idea was never even raised.
With Moulmein's capture, the Japanese had achieved the first objective of their invasion — and done it using only a single, inexperienced division. Yet General Iida was far from satisfied with 55 Division's showing. He saw through Colonel Oharazawa's embellished reports and noted dryly in his diary that this division never advanced until the enemy had already withdrawn.
For the British, the sharpest blow was the loss of the airfield, which handed Japanese fighters a base far closer to Rangoon and pushed the RAF back to Mingaladon. But the deeper truth was this: however politically and strategically necessary it had seemed to make a stand at Moulmein — on the wrong side of a broad river, no less — the position was tactically indefensible from the start. Without adequate boats, and with the near-certainty that Burmese boat crews would eventually desert their posts, an early withdrawal was never really in doubt.
What the affair produced, in the end, was a morale boost for the Japanese and a costly loss of equipment for the British. Yet the evacuation itself, conducted in broad daylight and without any air cover, was executed with real skill — the casualties, most of them men who simply walked away rather than fought, were remarkably light for so hazardous an operation. A longer defense would very likely have ended in disaster, with the whole garrison cut off by a Japanese thrust across the Salween further upstream.
Both sides were still finding their feet in this new kind of war. Had the rest of the Burma Rifles matched the steadiness of 8 Burif, the Japanese might have paid a far steeper price for their victory. What Moulmein made unmistakably clear was that the Burmese units — invaluable for reconnaissance and irregular fighting — simply could not be counted on to hold a fixed position in a pitched battle, and in a set-piece defense they were as much a liability to their neighbors as an asset. General Smyth grasped this at once and pushed to have the Burmese units converted to a guerrilla role. Political obstacles stood in the way, however, and while Hutton was sympathetic to the idea, he judged it far too late in the campaign to attempt so sweeping a change.
February 1942 loomed as a catastrophic month for the British in South-East Asia. While Singapore careered toward disaster, Burma appeared manageable at the month's start—the Japanese had taken Tenasserim but had not yet crossed the Salween. Yet fate dealt the high command a series of bruising setbacks.
General Hutton needed to move 1 Burdiv south to bolster 17 Division's stretched 160-mile front on the Salween, but Japanese concentrations in Thailand forced him to look elsewhere for relief. He arranged to meet Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek near the Burma-China border, flying north to Lashio on 2 February in a Lysander with his ADC in a second aircraft. The flight unraveled quickly. After refuelling delays, the pilot pressed on to land after dark with only rudimentary navigation aids. Lost and nearly out of fuel, he crash-landed in a forest clearing. The pilot was knocked unconscious and trapped as fire broke out. Hutton, badly bruised but mobile, fought to free him, beating back flames with his own greatcoat. The second aircraft, also starved of fuel, descended to 2,000 feet. Its pilot—recognizing the danger—ordered Hutton's ADC, an inexperienced flyer, to parachute into the darkness. The young officer obeyed, landing safely in a tree. The second pilot then crash-landed his own aircraft nearby and walked away unharmed. Between them, they finally dragged the first pilot—unconscious and severely burned—clear of the wreckage. Villagers appeared and took him to hospital, where he died days later. Hutton, bruised and borrowing a spare greatcoat, reached Lashio and completed his productive meeting with the Generalissimo before returning to Rangoon.
Wavell arrived on 5 February after a gruelling ten-hour flight from Bandoeng. Touring 17 Division HQ at Kyaikto the next day, he came away reasonably encouraged—48 Indian Infantry Brigade had landed, and British strength could yet outpace Japanese expansion if key positions held firm. He stressed that the Japanese were not supermen, that attack remained the best defence, and that aggressive fighting patrols must dominate the Salween. Before flying back to Java that night, he made a fateful decision: struck by the tank-friendly terrain west of the Sittang, he diverted the battle-hardened 7th Armoured Brigade from Malaya to Rangoon.
Smyth impressed Wavell but concealed a troubling reality: he was growing unfit. An anal fissure—painful and unhealed—had worsened in Burma's brutal heat. Hutton sensed something and dispatched the senior medical officer on 7 February. On the 8th, Smyth wrote candidly to Hutton: "...The wound only stopped bleeding ten days ago and is still discharging...I should hate to go sick—it's a thing I've never done in the whole of my service. I feel if I could have a month off...I should be absolutely OK for a command in the field again...Meanwhile I shall carry on here perfectly happily as long as you like. So sorry."
The medical board on the 11th found nothing organically wrong, though post-war letters suggest the doctors privately deemed two months' rest essential and started iron arsenate injections. Officially, Smyth was passed fit. Hutton took no further action.
Brigadier "Punch" Cowan arrived on 11 February to replace Brigadier Jones. He found Smyth in a "very nervous and jittery state; not at all the Smyth I knew." Cowan stayed as Brigadier General Staff, effectively becoming second-in-command. On 10 February, Wavell fell from a Singapore dock into darkness, breaking two small bones in his back. He dismissed it casually: "...Damage not serious but I shall be in hospital for a few days, and somewhat crippled for two or three weeks probably." Yet the injury proved debilitating at the worst possible moment—as Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and Burma itself hung in the balance.
With the arrival of 48 Brigade, Smyth now had most of a complete division on his hands—though still critically short on artillery. His own strategic instincts ran counter to his orders. He believed it was reckless folly to hold so far forward, scattering his forces so thinly that they risked being picked off in detail. His preference was clear: withdraw to the Bilin River, conduct a methodical delaying battle, then fall back to the Sittang for Rangoon's final defence. Brigadier "Taffy" Davies, Hutton's Chief of Staff, agreed with him entirely. But Wavell, intent on reinforcing Burma and buying time for reinforcements, had decreed a forward strategy backed by aggressive action. Hutton, caught between the two visions, ordered Smyth to do what seemed impossible: hold the Salween line, defend key crossing-points like Martaban, Pa-an, and Papun, and maintain fallback positions at Thaton and Bilin—all with insufficient forces.
By early February, Smyth had arranged his brigades accordingly. 16 Brigade, headquartered at Thaton, held the southern half of the Salween front, while 46 Brigade covered the north. 48 Brigade sat in reserve near Bilin, tasked with dealing with any amphibious landings along the coast. 2 Bur Brigade remained at Kyaikto, responsible for defending the area and guarding the vital Sittang Bridge.
As intelligence accumulated that the Japanese were preparing to cross, Smyth shuffled his hand on 5 February, reversing 16 and 46 Brigades so that 46 now held the south. He tightened the brigades' frontages by sending 2 Burif (less one company) forward to Papun in an independent role. These moves consumed several days and involved constant battalion swaps between units—always a destabilising factor when trust between commanders had scarcely begun to form. The troops gained little time to prepare for the assault they knew was coming.
General Iida's strategy was straightforward and ambitious. His 55 Division would cross the Salween, seize Martaban, and drive north along the road and railway toward Thaton and Bilin. Amphibious operations along the coast were explicitly forbidden—too risky if the British navy intervened. But the formidable 33 Division had already made its move. Crossing the frontier at Miyawadi, they had marched up the Kawkareik road to milestone 24, then struck inland through forest and rough country via Nabu and Dawlan, emerging near Pa-an. From there they were ordered to cross the Salween in the Pa-an area, destroy any British forces they encountered, and swing northeast toward the Sittang—moving inland of 55 Division's axis of advance.
The Japanese were travelling light. No wheeled transport had yet reached Kawkareik from Thailand, so ammunition and supplies were scarce and had to be rationed carefully. They would make do with captured mules and vehicles, supplemented by requisitioned local bullock-carts. A divisional order issued by 33 Division at this time reveals the Japanese command's anxieties about their own troops. Having witnessed the brutality they inflicted in China, the Japanese leadership made clear that such conduct would not be tolerated in Burma. The order stipulated:
a. Soldiers are not allowed to go into civilian houses alone.
b. Rape, pillage and arson are strictly prohibited.
c. Goods obtained from local people must be paid for.
d. When a company purchases goods from local people, there must be an officer or staff-sergeant in charge and for this cash will be made available.
It was a shrewd precaution. The Japanese were counting heavily on Burmese support—and with the help of the BIA (Burma Independence Army), they would largely get it. Many Burmese welcomed them as liberators, a stark contrast to the fear and hatred that had followed them across China. The discipline order was designed to preserve that goodwill.
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In January 1942, Japanese 55 Division crossed the Salween and attacked Moulmein, held by three Burma Rifles battalions and the 4th/12th FFR. Brigadier Ekin contracted the perimeter around the Ridge as Japanese infiltrated from multiple angles. After fierce fighting, he ordered a daylight evacuation across the Salween. Most troops escaped by ferry, though some were cut off and crossed later via sampan. The Japanese captured their first objective. - Last time we spoke about the invasion of Burma. Burma, culturally tied to South-East Asia, had been absorbed into British India through nineteenth-century wars, breeding lasting nationalist resentment and a hunger for independence. When Japan entered the war in December 1941, Britain's regional defenses collapsed almost overnight—Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk, Malaya crumbling, and Burma left thinly defended by a single division stretched across an enormous frontier. Japan invaded methodically, having spent months on reconnaissance and jungle training. Colonel Suzuki recruited Aung San's "Thirty Comrades" into the Burma Independence Army, which fought alongside Japanese troops for political rather than military effect. The 143rd Regiment landed first, meeting fierce Thai resistance at some beaches before Thailand reversed course and allied with Japan. Victoria Point fell without a fight, though two British officials there vanished into Japanese custody under murky, possibly grim circumstances. A British sabotage raid against Japanese rail bridges failed for lack of accurate maps. Wavell, newly responsible for Burma, found promised reinforcements diverted to Malaya, leaving the colony dangerously exposed as the invasion gathered pace.
#226 The Race for Rangoon
Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.
While Victoria Point had fallen without resistance, the Japanese were about to prove that no terrain, however forbidding, would be allowed to stall their advance. Meanwhile, some 1,500 men of the 3rd/2nd Battalion Group, under the command of Major Oki, set out from Bangkok on 3 January with orders to take Tavoy. It was a plan of characteristic audacity. The force travelled first by train to Kanchanaburi, aided by the local BIA contingent, then pushed upriver by motor-boat along the notorious River Kwai to Wanpo. From there, they turned to face the real obstacle: the steep, jungle-smothered Tenasserim Range separating Thailand from Burma.
There were no maps, no trails—only a route an advance party had scouted as difficult but not impossible. Each man carried seven days' rations along with either 120 rounds of ammunition or a fourteen-pound mountain artillery shell, on top of his standard kit. Oxen supplemented the Japanese horses in hauling the heavier loads, while several elephants, lent by the Thai army, led the column—their surprising agility over rough ground proving invaluable—with engineers following behind to hack out a path.
Progress was brutal. Horses and oxen collapsed and were lost along the way, leeches tormented the men without pause, and the column crawled forward at barely two miles a day. Rations dwindled to the point that pack animals were slaughtered and their loads abandoned. But on 14 January, they finally crested the range, and the terrain eased. By the 15th, they broke free of the forest onto open grassland, with the village of Myitta before them—and beyond it, a motor road leading over one last, gentler ridge to Tavoy, still 34 miles distant. Tavoy itself was no minor outpost—a town of 30,000, defended by the 6th Burma Rifles, one of the newly raised battalions, bolstered on the eve of battle by two companies of the 3rd Burma Rifles arriving by boat from Mergui. The defenders held an outpost at Myitta and a fortified position astride the road on the ridge behind it. When the outpost opened fire on the approaching Japanese on the 16th before falling back, the invaders occupied Myitta unopposed, resting through the following day.
That evening, under cover of darkness, they resumed their advance—and roughly two hours later collided with the British position. Japanese scouts drew fire, losing three men, but the response was swift and overwhelming: machine-gun bursts and five rounds from a mountain gun sent the Burma Rifles into retreat and the village into Japanese hands. Rattled by wild rumors and expecting the worst, the three forward companies abandoned their planned fallback position at Wagon entirely, dissolving into the jungle and striking out for Moulmein—some 200 miles to the north. On the 18th, the Japanese pressed on in daylight, cloaking men and horses alike in cut branches to evade detection. Twice they froze as British aircraft passed overhead, apparently unseen, before making camp just short of Tavoy to prepare for the final assault.
By now, the town's defense had thinned dramatically—down to a single company of the 6th Burma Rifles, two companies from the 3rd, and detachments from the Kokine Battalion and the Tenasserim Battalion of the Burma Auxiliary Force. When the attack came around 9am on the 19th, it opened against the airfield, where the police detachment fought with real spirit, and briefly held the line at one point in the main perimeter—inflicting casualties the Japanese themselves acknowledged. But as his officers fell one by one, Lieutenant-Colonel Cotton read the situation clearly: his men could not hold much longer. Just past midday, he gave the order to evacuate.
The Burma Auxiliary Force detachment carried out the demolitions with remarkable composure even as the position disintegrated around them, while a rumor of massive Japanese reinforcements sent most of the remaining Burma Rifles fleeing into the forest, bound for home rather than the front. What remained of Cotton's force withdrew up the road and was recovered some twenty miles north by the 4th/12th Frontier Force Regiment, dispatched from Moulmein in support.
By 3pm, Tavoy belonged to the Japanese. The entire operation had cost them just 23 dead and 40 wounded—a remarkably light price for the town they'd won. Trailing in their wake, a BIA detachment under Captain Kawashima moved quickly to establish an autonomous administration and begin recruiting volunteers; within two weeks, they claimed, the town had returned to normal. The Burma Rifles units involved suffered a collapse in morale they never truly recovered from, and the damage spread to other units besides. Worse, it planted a lasting image—of Japanese forces materializing without warning from supposedly impassable jungle—that would haunt British and Burmese forces for months to come.
Yet the psychological toll on Burmese troops demands more sympathy than judgment. A powerful independence movement, and with it a current of anti-British, pro-Japanese sentiment, had been building among Burma's politically engaged classes—and it swelled with every British setback and Japanese advance. For any soldier associated with the losing side, the calculus was becoming brutally clear: defeat meant danger for himself, and worse, it meant leaving his family exposed and friendless in a land about to change hands. Under that kind of pressure, the temptation to desert and return home was only growing stronger.
With Tavoy secured, the 3rd/2nd Battalion turned north along the coast road toward Moulmein—only to find the town had already fallen the day before their arrival. Mergui was now isolated, cut off from any hope of relief. Originally defended by the 2nd Burma Rifles Battalion along with two companies of the 3rd, the garrison had been bled dry when those companies were diverted to Tavoy's defense. On the 19th, Army Headquarters in Rangoon recognized the position was untenable and ordered the garrison, along with non-Burmese civilians, evacuated by sea to Rangoon. Valuable stockpiles of rubber and tungsten had already been shipped out ahead of them. The withdrawal proceeded on the 20th and 22nd, the power station and other key installations reduced to rubble behind them. Both Victoria Point and Mergui endured Japanese bombing—Mergui considerably more so—yet at neither location did ground forces ever actually meet the enemy. Running alongside these military maneuvers was a quieter but equally consequential campaign: Colonel Suzuki's Burma Independence Army trailing in the wake of Japanese advances, moving into Victoria Point, Mergui, and Tavoy to establish control, swell its ranks with new recruits, and free the Japanese regulars to push on and rejoin the main force.
Japan, recognizing air power would be decisive, shifted an air division from Manchuria to Thailand to strike Rangoon. On 23 December, 87 bombers with 34 fighter escorts hit Rangoon and nearby Mingaladon airfield—deliberately targeting the city itself rather than the docks or refineries, aiming to terrorize civilians and drive off laborers. With no shelters and crowds watching from the streets, casualties were heavy, triggering a mass exodus: Burmese fled to their villages, Indian dockworkers began the long trek toward India. A second, larger raid on Christmas Day (67 bombers, 32 fighters, 25 Oscars) pushed even more people to flee. Burma had no anti-aircraft guns and only weak air defenses—18 outdated Buffaloes and 21 AVG Tomahawks—but a functioning Observer Corps and one working radar gave enough warning to intercept both raids effectively. The defenders shot down ten bombers and five fighters while losing only ten aircraft themselves, an unexpectedly costly outcome for the Japanese.
Reinforcement arrived from India on 31 December in the form of the 8th Heavy and 3rd Indian Light Anti-Aircraft Batteries—desperately needed, since the combined RAF and AVG squadrons had dwindled to just 29 aircraft against a Japanese force exceeding 150. On 4 January, defenders successfully turned back a raid of 21 Japanese fighters, and a lull settled in, broken only by occasional night nuisance raids. For the time being, Allied airmen had done the improbable: they'd made the Japanese think twice. It bought something invaluable—a window in which troopships could slip in and land reinforcements Burma desperately needed, unmolested from above.
Hutton, newly arrived with Chief of Staff Brigadier 'Taffy' Davies, assessed Burma's defense problem in early January. The frontier with Thailand ran for hundreds of miles, but only a few routes crossed the Salween River: tracks from Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai in the north (long, hilly, and partly reduced to pack-animal trails), a forest road from Phitsanulok over the Dawna Range to Kawkareik and Rangoon, and a mule trail from Kanchanaburi through the Three Pagodas Pass to Moulmein. Rangoon was the linchpin—Burma's main city, port, and industrial center, and the gateway to the Burma Road supplying China (whose continued resistance tied down half of Japan's army). But that same road ran exposed along the frontier for 700 miles, vulnerable to being cut. Unable to defend everywhere, Hutton judged the main Japanese thrust would come through Raheng toward Rangoon, and committed accordingly: a light force in the north near Toungoo, relying on Chinese support; acceptance that Tenasserim in the south couldn't be held and should only be delayed; and the bulk of his effort directed at the Raheng approach. He ordered 16 Brigade to Kawkareik to cover it, and on 9 January, Major-General Smyth VC arrived to take command of the 17th Indian Division, moving forward to Moulmein to oversee both the 2nd Burma Brigade and the incoming 16 Brigade.
'Jackie' Smyth was a decorated and highly regarded Indian Army officer—a VC winner from World War One, later earning a Military Cross on the North-West Frontier, and one of the few chosen for the elite Staff College course at Camberley, where he became close with Lord Gort. That friendship paid off: when Gort became BEF Commander-in-Chief, Smyth got a frontline brigade command in France, serving through Dunkirk before Auchinleck brought him back to India with a promised division. He briefly commanded the 18th (later 19th) Indian Division before being tapped in January 1942 to lead the 17th Indian Division into Burma. At 48, Smyth had courage, training, and charisma—seemingly the ideal commander. But he was secretly unwell: a bout of malaria and a severe anal fissure that summer, plus dyspepsia symptoms possibly masking a mild heart attack. Reassured he'd recover, he'd accepted the 18th Division command; by the time Wavell offered him Burma, he felt sick again but assumed it was flu. Unable to turn down such a critical posting without appearing to lose his nerve, he said nothing and hoped for the best—then spent a week in bed recovering while his staff deployed to Burma ahead of him.
On 16 January, the 46th Indian Infantry Brigade came ashore at Rangoon and was sent forward to the Bilin River, likewise placed under Smyth's command. He now had three infantry brigades at his disposal, along with three Sapper and Miner field companies—the 1st Burma, 24th Bombay, and 60th Madras. What he lacked was any field artillery worth the name: his only fire support came from the 5th and 12th Indian Mountain Batteries and a lone section of four Bofors guns from the 3rd Indian LAA Battery. And this modest force was expected to cover a stretch of frontier running from Mergui in the south to Papun in the north—some four hundred miles in all.
Hutton's plan to redistribute his forces took time to unfold, made no easier by Japanese bombers, which repeatedly struck Martaban, Kyondo, and above all Moulmein during these weeks. Even without enemy interference, the logistics alone were formidable. A railway did connect Rangoon to Martaban, opposite Moulmein on the Salween's northern bank, but it ran on metre-gauge track, mostly single line, with painfully limited capacity. There was no through road at all, since the only bridge spanning the Sittang River belonged to the railway. A metalled road existed for much of the distance, but for fifteen miles on either side of the Sittang bridge, it dissolved into a dusty track, useless the moment rain fell. Most vehicles, as a result, had no choice but to travel by rail, while three ferries across the Sittang could shift only a limited number more. Further ferries were needed again at Martaban to cross the Salween estuary into Moulmein, and two more beyond that for anyone continuing on to Kawkareik—rickety country-boat crossings capable of moving roughly one vehicle an hour. It was, in short, a wholly inadequate lifeline for a force that depended on motor transport to fight.
Since early December, the approach from Raheng had been watched over by the 4th Battalion, Burma Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel Abernethy—a battalion belonging to 2 Burma Brigade, whose headquarters sat some eighty miles away in Moulmein. The battalion held the tangle of tracks crossing the densely forested Dawna Range toward Kawkareik, a small town set back from the border itself. Malaria had already thinned its ranks to barely two-thirds strength. To reinforce this thin screen, Smyth ordered 16 Brigade, under Brigadier J.K. 'Jonah' Jones, forward to Kawkareik to relieve 4 Burif. But recognizing the value of 4 Burif's hard-won local knowledge—and wanting to speed the whole movement along—he instead kept the battalion in place under 16 Brigade's command, and shifted the 4th/12th Frontier Force Regiment across to 2 Burma Brigade in its stead.
16 Brigade was also tasked with covering the approach to Moulmein via the Three Pagodas Pass, eighty miles south of Kawkareik—a job handed to a company of the 1st/7th Gurkha Rifles. Meanwhile, a company of the 1st Royal Battalion, 9th Jat Regiment, was sent to escort a section of mountain guns moving by road to Kawkareik, though this group was recalled before covering much ground. As a result, neither the Jat company nor the Gurkha company would see action in the fighting soon to come at Kawkareik or Moulmein.
With these arrangements settled, Smyth shifted his own headquarters back to Kyaikto, roughly midway between the Bilin and Sittang rivers. Between the 8th and 15th, 16 Brigade made its way by river steamer up the Gyaing to Kyondo, then onward by truck—of which there were few, this being essentially a marching brigade—along the long route via Metheraw to the Haungtharaw river ferry at Kya-in.
While the British pieced together their defense, the Japanese were assembling their own machine with characteristic thoroughness. The Imperial Guards Division had crossed into Thailand from Cambodia back on 9 December, establishing a presence in Bangkok, and remained there until 55 Division arrived to take over—at which point the Guards, leaving behind a single battalion for internal security amid a string of anti-Japanese incidents, moved south to join the invasion of Malaya.
55 Division, tasked with spearheading the drive into Burma, moved its 112 Regiment (minus the battalion already committed at Tavoy) from Saigon to Bangkok by road and rail at the close of December. Alongside it, 143 Regiment—which had come ashore earlier across the Kra Isthmus beaches—rejoined the division with two of its three battalions, the third having been diverted to Victoria Point. On 28 December, an advance party—a platoon of infantry alongside a BIA contingent, led by the commanding officer of the 2nd/2nd Battalion—set off for Mae Sot, a Thai village hard against the Burmese border, to scout the crossing of the Dawna Range toward Kawkareik. The rest of 55 Division followed by rail to Phitsanulok, then by divisional transport to Raheng, roughly forty miles short of Mae Sot.
The Raheng–Mae Sot route crossed jungle-covered hills via a footpath impassable to vehicles, forcing the Japanese to rely on horses, elephants, and oxen while troops manhandled heavy loads (even bicycles) over four grueling days. By mid-January the 112th Regiment had arrived at Mae Sot, followed by most of the 143rd and, by the 19th, 55 Division's headquarters. With BIA assistance, the Japanese scouted multiple crossing points beyond the main Miyawadi–Kawkareik road: the Kyawku pass to the north (via Nabu and Mepale) and the Kwingale pass to the south. General Takeuchi advanced mainly along the main road and the southern Kwingale route, sending only a patrol north. Specifically, 112th Regiment's 2nd Battalion took the main road while its 1st Battalion crossed further north at Yebu; the reconnaissance regiment pushed south through Palu and Kwingale toward Myohaung; and the 143rd Regiment stayed in reserve at Mae Sot. On the British side, Brigadier J.K. Jones, leading 16 Brigade, set up headquarters at milestone 22, north of Kawkareik, to prepare for the Japanese advance along the difficult 38-mile frontier road—a steep, jungle-choked climb that only leveled into open ground near Miyawadi.
By 20 January, 4 Burif had two companies watching the northern tracks—one at Nabu, one between Mepale and Tichara—while its headquarters and a third company held milestone 18, and a fourth sat in reserve at 'Misty Hollow,' awaiting relief by a company of the 1st/7th Gurkhas. Misty Hollow was a small plateau where vehicles and mules could shelter off the road, roughly four miles from the crest of the range. The Gurkhas themselves had one company and battalion headquarters at the main position, milestone 36, with a second company positioned two miles short of Miyawadi and a platoon pushed into the village itself; their third company, after starting out toward Kwingale, was by the 20th en route to Misty Hollow. The Jats had a single company forward at the Kwingale pass, watching the southern approaches to Kawkareik, while headquarters and two more companies sat in reserve near the town. The lone company of Burma Sappers, meanwhile, was busy preparing demolitions along the road between milestones 38 and 49.
Only 4 Burif had had any real time to learn the ground, but Brigade headquarters found unexpected help close at hand. Mr. Maurice Maybury, the British Sub-Divisional Officer of the Burma Civil Service at Kawkareik, proved invaluable, as did a local forest officer named Raymond Hall, who worked for the teak firm Steel Brothers and had lived for years at a forest bungalow near Mepale. Well known and deeply respected throughout the district, Hall's extensive local contacts had already made him a vital source of intelligence on cross-border activity since the war began; once 16 Brigade arrived, he was promptly recruited as the brigade's Intelligence Officer. Equally valuable was the Indian postmaster at Miyawadi—a man badly rattled by his exposed position in a village nearly emptied by Thai police gunfire across the river, yet who kept watch on the Mae Sot airfield regardless, telephoning word of every aircraft that arrived or departed. His reports gave early warning to both Kawkareik and Moulmein and helped the RAF land several effective strikes.
With the brigade spread so thin across such difficult country, reliable communication was everything—and here the picture darkened. Neither Indian Army battalion carried wireless sets of its own, forcing divisional headquarters to detach a small Indian signal section to fill the gap. Even this equipment worked only sporadically, hampered by battery failures since there was just one charging set available. Cable had been laid between brigade headquarters and the two Indian battalions, but for a time, every unit along the road simply tapped directly into the telegraph line running from Miyawadi to Moulmein.
It is not hard to imagine how isolated the forward company of Gurkhas near Miyawadi must have felt, facing what was already known to be a substantial and growing concentration of Japanese troops just across the river. Lieutenant-Colonel Abernethy, whose own 4 Burif had held that ground before them, had argued forcefully that pushing so far forward was militarily unwise. General Smyth overruled him, convinced that a visible military presence steadied local morale and kept the flow of intelligence from across the border alive.
The first blow at the frontier came from the air. On 12 January, Japanese bombers struck Kyondo, sinking a steamer and wrecking the landing stage; the following day brought a raid on Sukhli and Misty Hollow. These raids soon became a near-daily ritual, climaxing in a heavy series of strikes on Sukhli on the 20th. Fortunately, the troops were well dug in and concealed, and casualties stayed surprisingly light.
The real assault opened at 0500 on the 20th. The platoon holding Miyawadi was caught in darkness and overrun; the survivors fell back on their company two miles behind, which now bore the full weight of the attack. 'D' Company kept in touch with battalion headquarters until 0930, when the telephone line went dead. Their last message reported that they were surrounded and running low on ammunition. Colonel White, the battalion commander, set out with the brigade Intelligence Officer, a company of Gurkhas from Kwingale, and a platoon each from the Jats and 4 Burif to restore the situation. They collided with the advancing Japanese at the foot of the hills, and in the skirmish that followed took a string of casualties—among them Raymond Hall, killed in the fighting, a genuinely painful loss of a remarkable man. Colonel White himself went missing, and the relief force fell back to a covering position at Thingannyinaung. Brigadier Jones placed Abernethy in temporary command of both battalions until White reappeared that evening at Sukhli with the covering force. With no word from the Gurkha company near Miyawadi and fears mounting that it had been lost entirely, Jones ordered a general withdrawal to the main position at milestone 36 and told the Burma Sappers to blow every demolition between Thingannyinaung and Sukhli. He also shuffled his units—sending the two Burif companies forward to join the Gurkhas at milestone 36, while redirecting the Gurkha company at Thingannyinaung to milestone 18 under 4 Burif's command. Why he chose to intermix the battalions this way remains something of a puzzle.
As it turned out, 'D' Company—under Captain Eric Holdaway—had not been lost at all. They held their ground for hours, and when relief clearly wasn't coming, Holdaway broke his company out of encirclement, abandoned their two trucks, and led his men north-west through the forest with their weapons and mules intact. In these opening clashes, the Japanese 2nd/2nd Battalion suffered 20 killed and roughly 50 wounded, and their advance grew markedly more cautious as a result.
On the Palu-Kwingale track, the story unfolded very differently. A Jat patrol ran into the mounted infantry of the Japanese 55th Reconnaissance Regiment advancing from Palu, opened fire, claimed casualties, and withdrew by truck to report the contact. After dark, this Japanese battalion struck the Jat company holding Kwingale. In the chaos of a night attack, the company commander misjudged the situation and ordered his men to disperse back down the track toward Kawkareik—a serious blunder that tore open 16 Brigade's right flank. By dawn on the 21st, neither the main position at milestone 36 nor the 4 Burif company covering the north flank at Mepale had come under attack, yet the Japanese were now advancing freely along the southern flank. Brigadier Jones responded by pushing his two reserve Jat companies forward to cover the tracks emerging from the hills at Tadangu and Myohaung, and ordered the main demolition near milestone 37 blown at first light—duly carried out by Lieutenant Eustace Lord and his sappers, tearing away the roadbed where it crossed a rocky precipice. It was meant to cost the Japanese dearly in time. But without trucks to worry about, they could simply divert their pack animals around the gap, so the demolition, while a nuisance, only briefly slowed them.
The night of the 20th and 21st was a wretched one for everyone involved. None of the troops in Burma had yet learned to handle night fighting in the forest, and rumors of Japanese infiltrators seemed to spring up everywhere at once. Nearly every unit spent the night firing wildly at shadows. Colonel Abernethy later remarked—pointedly not about his own Burmese troops—that the effect of the jungle on these young soldiers was striking: officers and men alike swore they saw the enemy moving through the trees, when it was nothing more than shifting light and shadow. There was no enemy anywhere near.
The disorderly retreat ordered at Kwingale rattled the entire Jat battalion, and wild rumors spread unchecked. The battalion's own war diary admits bluntly that the commanding officer acted indecisively, and that this uncertainty rippled swiftly through the ranks. Jones, sensing that his reserve companies would not hold under serious pressure, had already advised Maybury, the Sub-Divisional Officer, shortly after midnight to evacuate civilians from Kawkareik and destroy anything of value to the enemy, and had asked him to arrange boats at Kyondo and bullock-carts on the far bank. Jones then reported the situation to 17 Division, and Smyth—who had never wanted to hold this far forward in the first place—secured Hutton's permission to pull back if 16 Brigade risked being cut off.
Jones shifted his own headquarters to Hlaingwa, three miles west of Kawkareik, and moved his administrative units further back still, to milestone 7. That morning, a now-empty Kawkareik was pounded by a heavy air raid that destroyed the telephone exchange.
Word soon arrived that the Jat company at Myohaung had run into the enemy and lost its commander. With the Japanese clearly continuing their push along the southern flank, Jones decided he could wait no longer. At 1800 hours on the 21st, exercising the discretion Smyth had granted him, he ordered a night withdrawal from the main position. The only road home to Moulmein crossed a wide river at Kya-in via a small, locally operated ferry that could carry just one vehicle at a time—an agonizingly slow bottleneck. Jones ordered non-essential kit jettisoned and surplus vehicles burned, a decision that, however sound tactically, did nothing to steady anyone's nerves. The convoy set off at 2000 hours for the ferry, ten miles distant. Then disaster struck: the first vehicle across, an overloaded ammunition truck, tried to drive off the ferry on the far bank before it was properly secured. The ferry tipped, filled with water, and sank—taking the truck with it and severing any further hope of moving vehicles across.
The plan called for withdrawal to begin at midnight. The Jats would hold a lay-back position north of Kawkareik while trucks collected the troops marching down from the main position; 4 Burif and its attached Gurkha company would let the main force pass before falling in behind; a covering position would form at milestone 13, through which the Jats would eventually pass to establish a bridgehead at Kyondo. Abernethy sent a mounted runner ahead to redirect his two northern companies to rendezvous near Moulmein, at Zathabyin.
The main body of Gurkhas and one Burif company withdrew down the main track without incident. But wild rumors—spread by police claiming the Japanese were already approaching Kawkareik from the south using poison gas—drove the Jat commanding officer, at 2200 hours, into ordering a chaotic withdrawal of his own battalion into the town, a panic sharpened further by ammunition trucks igniting prematurely and sounding uncannily like an attack. When the Gurkhas reached milestone 18 by vehicle, having marched the first ten miles on foot, they found no sign of the Jats or anyone else—communications had collapsed entirely, and neither the Brigadier nor his Brigade Major could be reached. The Gurkhas took charge of the supplies dumped there and, together with the sappers, set about destroying what equipment they could before driving on through Kawkareik to milestone 13.
Around 0430 on the 22nd, the 4 Burif column sent its mules ahead and followed by truck. The Jats, by now back in Kawkareik and believing the last troops had already passed through, mistook the approaching mules for the enemy and opened fire. The mules stampeded back up the road and vanished into the forest, scattering their loads, while the fleeing drivers insisted to Abernethy that the enemy held the town. Though skeptical, Abernethy couldn't rule it out, so he turned his column around, withdrew a short distance, found no trace of any enemy, then burned his own trucks and led his men west across country toward Kyondo.
Back in Kawkareik, meanwhile, the Jats were now convinced they were under attack and scrambled onto vehicles to flee. Their war diary records the episode with blunt honesty: "no clear picture can be painted of this [occasion] as it was nothing short of a panic." Brigadier Jones, having ordered the Gurkhas to hold the lay-back position at milestone 13 to cover the Jats' withdrawal, had gone forward himself with his Brigade Major to meet them—leaving his headquarters to fend for itself. In his absence, panic broke out there too, triggered by the sound of exploding ammunition in the burning trucks and the confused firefight with the mules. Convinced Kawkareik had fallen, the Staff Captain and most of Brigade HQ retreated in disorder to Kyondo, where they met the Sub-Divisional Officer, who had spent the day arranging transport and evacuating police and government staff. The Staff Captain telephoned Smyth in Moulmein with a badly garbled account, claiming the Japanese held Kawkareik and that the brigade—and its brigadier—were lost. Granted permission to withdraw, he pushed the administrative units on to Moulmein, destroying headquarters vehicles and wireless sets and throwing mortars and machine guns into the river as he went. The Sub-Divisional Officer, seeing his own carefully laid plans no longer needed, followed him out.
By daylight, order finally returned. By midday on the 22nd, everyone except Abernethy's group had reached Kyondo, only to find the ferry there damaged by yet another air raid, with no sign of the Sub-Divisional Officer and no idea what arrangements, if any, remained in place. In the confusion, many mules were simply turned loose rather than swum across the river—an unfortunate choice, since mules were exactly what the Japanese needed most, having already lost heavily among their own horses on the brutal march to Mae Sot. Jemadar Jug Lal of the Jats managed to recover many of the machine guns and mortars that had been thrown into the river. Eventually the whole force crossed the Haungtharaw and marched south of the Gyaing to Kawbein, arriving on the evening of the 23rd, and by steamer reached Martaban early on the 24th. Abernethy, meanwhile, made his own way overland along the Gyaing's north bank, welcomed and fed by villagers along the route; one of his northern companies rejoined him at the Zathabyin rendezvous, and together they reached Martaban by boat on the 25th. The Japanese entered Kawkareik on the 23rd; the next day, five RAF Blenheims bombed the town but missed its most conspicuous building entirely—which happened to be housing the headquarters of 55 Division.
It was a dispiriting way to open the campaign. The Japanese 55th Division had never before seen action, though many of its men and officers carried battle experience from elsewhere, and it was, in truth, not an especially powerful division—only four infantry battalions were engaged in this phase, each fielding three rifle companies rather than the standard four, as was typical of divisions raised in 1941. The terrain offered the defenders every advantage, if only they had been able to use it, and even the Japanese commander of the 112th Regiment had been shaken by the early resistance he met. And yet, of the entire brigade, only a single company of Gurkhas had actually fought the enemy in earnest.
Hutton wanted Jones sacked, but Smyth refused, correctly judging the fault lay elsewhere—Jones later performed well and earned a DSO. The Jat commander, however, was replaced. Wavell's dispatch was blunt: the setback stemmed from poor local leadership, inadequate training, and in places a lack of fighting spirit, damaging morale on both sides. Kawkareik exposed a deeper problem: the troops' greatest weakness was psychological, not material. Inexperience bred anxiety, rumors of an unstoppable enemy fed panic, and few soldiers had learned to master the natural fear of dense, dark jungle—something the Japanese had already turned to their advantage. Ultimately, the failure traced back to a total lack of pre-war jungle warfare training, through no fault of 16 Brigade itself.
I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.
Japanese forces crossed jungle-choked hills toward Kawkareik, probing multiple passes as British defenders spread thin across the frontier. Panic, rumors, and communication failures triggered chaotic withdrawals, near friendly-fire incidents, and a botched ferry crossing. Though tactically avoidable, the collapse revealed untrained troops' psychological fragility more than any real Japanese superiority. - Last time we spoke about the end of the Third Battle of Changsha. Japanese forces under Toyoshima and Kanda, exhausted and low on ammunition, launched desperate assaults—including a suicide-bomb charge at Liuyang Gate and poison gas use against Chinese defenders—before being ordered to withdraw. The retreat became a brutal ordeal: Chinese armies under Xue Yue, Luo Zhuoying, Yang Sen, and others encircled and harried the fleeing Japanese, inflicting heavy losses despite Japanese air support helping some units escape. Villages bore painted slogans warning invaders that Hunan was their "graveyard." By January 6, the last Japanese troops crossed back over the Xinqiang River, ending the battle. Casualty estimates varied wildly—Chinese claims topped 55,000 Japanese dead, while Japanese records cited far fewer—but both sides suffered severely. The victory earned Chinese commanders honors and elevated the 10th Corps to legendary status as the "Mount Tai Army" for its stubborn defense of the city.
#225 The Japanese Invasion of Burma
Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.
Today we are going to be entering what I expect will be a rather long mini series. Aside from the fighting happening inside China itself, the Burma Campaign was China's biggest military effort outside its own borders. It's also tragically the theater most people overlook in terms of the Pacific War. Over at the pacific war week by week series, I covered this extensively for years, but rest assured veteran listeners, this will be a much different take. I will try my best to keep it focused on China's participation, but forgive me, for most of the initial battles it will be heavily British based. Buckle up everyone because we are going to be diving into an exciting part of WW2.
Burma's history sat uneasily alongside its geography. Ethnically and culturally it belonged to South-East Asia, yet in the nineteenth century it found itself drawn into the orbit of British India through a series of wars rather than any natural affinity. This was, in truth, a country of striking internal diversity, and that diversity would go on to shape everything from colonial administration to the loyalties tested when war finally arrived.
The Bamar, or Burmans, formed the demographic and cultural core of the country—Buddhist, Burmese-speaking, concentrated in the fertile river valleys and lowlands of central Burma, and heirs to the old royal dynasties that had once ruled from Mandalava and Ava. It was the Bamar kings whose ambitions had repeatedly clashed with British India, and it was Bamar territory that formed the heartland of whatever state emerged from British conquest. But Burma was never simply Bamar. Ringing the central plains was a mountainous horseshoe of frontier country inhabited by a patchwork of distinct peoples—the Karen, concentrated in the hills and delta regions to the south and east; the Shan, spread across a loose federation of princely states in the east bordering Siam and China; the Kachin in the rugged north; and the Chin in the western hills toward India. These hill peoples were ethnically, linguistically, and often religiously distinct from the Bamar—many Karen, for instance, had converted to Christianity under missionary influence—and centuries of uneasy relations, sometimes verging on outright hostility, existed between the hill peoples and the lowland Burman kingdom that had periodically tried to subjugate them.
British rule layered a further complication onto this picture. Colonial administration governed the Bamar heartland directly, but left much of the frontier hill country under a separate system of indirect rule, administered through local chiefs and largely insulated from the political life of "Burma Proper." This division would have lasting consequences: the hill peoples, and the Karen in particular, came to see the British as protectors against Bamar domination, while the British in turn came to regard them as more reliable and martial than the Bamar themselves—a perception that shaped recruitment into the colonial army for decades to come.
On top of this ethnic mosaic, British economic policy imported a further population that would prove deeply destabilizing. As Burma's rice, timber, and oil industries expanded under colonial rule, large numbers of Indian laborers, clerks, moneylenders, and administrators arrived to staff the new economy, settling heavily in Rangoon and the delta. By the twentieth century, Rangoon itself had an Indian majority. Resentment among the Bamar population ran deep: Indian moneylenders had acquired vast tracts of agricultural land through foreclosed mortgages, Indian labor undercut Burmese workers in the new industries, and the visible prosperity of the Indian commercial class stood in stark contrast to the declining fortunes of many rural Burmans. This resentment fed directly into the nationalist movement and, later, into open hostility that would see Indian refugees fleeing for their lives when war came to Burma. A smaller but influential Anglo-Burmese and Anglo-Indian community, along with a longstanding Chinese merchant population, rounded out this complex colonial society—groups whose loyalties, like those of the Indian community, would be sorely tested once the Japanese invasion began.
It was into this fractured and unevenly governed territory that British power first intruded through force of arms rather than any natural affinity. Tensions between Burma and British India had simmered for decades, aggravated by Burmese incursions across the frontier. In 1824, the East India Company responded by dispatching an expedition to Rangoon. Two years of fighting followed, concluding in a peace treaty that ceded Tenasserim and part of Arakan to the Company—Britain's first territorial foothold in Burma.
Sixty years later, after further provocations, Lord Dufferin, Viceroy of India, sent a second expedition to Rangoon. This one pushed further, capturing Mandalay and deposing King Thibaw. After considerable hesitation in London, Burma was formally annexed to the British Empire with royal assent and folded into British India as one of its provinces—an administrative convenience that ignored the fact that Burma had little in common with India, either in religion or in its cultural roots in South-East Asia.
The Burmese resented this arrangement from the start. As their exposure to modern governance grew, so did their appetite to run their own affairs, with independence as the ultimate goal. In 1937, Britain finally separated Burma's administration from India, placing it instead under a newly created Burma Office in London. In practice, this reform introduced a fresh layer of bureaucratic friction: any communication between the Indian and Burmese governments now had to be routed through their respective Whitehall departments—a system that did little to encourage cooperation between the two administrations just as war was approaching.
Alongside this separation, the Burmese were granted greater self-government, which in turn fed a rising tide of nationalism. Educated young Burmese increasingly championed independence—a movement the Japanese would later be quick to exploit. British authorities were not blind to the risk this posed to internal security. Two regular British battalions, the 1st Glosters and the 2nd KOYLI, were stationed near Rangoon and Mandalay respectively to provide a measure of stability.
Burma also maintained its own small army, officered largely by men seconded from the British and Indian Armies. But the country had long been regarded as a military backwater—pleasant enough for those who enjoyed field sports, but a dead end for any officer with ambitions of career advancement. Command of the Burma Army was traditionally handed to an Indian Army officer as a semi-retirement posting. Despite repeated assurances from Whitehall between 1938 and late 1941 that war was unlikely ever to reach Burma, a handful of officers on the ground recognized the danger and pushed for reform. The four Burma Rifles battalions were expanded to eight, a Burmese Sapper and Miner Company was raised, and recruitment was widened—under political pressure—to include Burmans from the central lowlands, though these recruits proved less reliable than the hillmen traditionally favored for enlistment. New officers and instructors were drawn from existing Burma Rifles units and from the two British battalions, thinning their ranks in the process. From November 1940, service in the Burma Auxiliary Force became compulsory for European British subjects of military age, providing a useful reserve of men who knew the country and its languages.
Beyond the army, internal security rested on the Burma Military Police and, later, the Burma Frontier Force—largely Indian and Gurkha personnel domiciled in Burma. These forces had a solid peacetime reputation and proved useful for intelligence gathering and screening duties, but they were neither trained nor equipped for conventional warfare against a modern enemy.
Military reinforcement began in earnest only in 1941. In March, the Chiefs of Staff ordered the 13th Indian Infantry Brigade to Burma from India. That July, Burma's forces were consolidated into the 1st Burma Division under Major-General J. Bruce Scott, comprising the 1st and 2nd Burma Brigades and 13 Brigade, supported by mountain artillery, field engineers, and administrative units from India. General Wavell, on his own initiative, added a second Indian brigade—the 16th—at the end of November, held in reserve. No further reinforcements arrived before Japan entered the war a week later.
Even as troops arrived, the civil administration lagged badly behind what modern war required. Railways, inland water transport, and dockside labor all needed militarizing; a Movement Control staff was needed to coordinate transport; intelligence structures needed strengthening; the Military Police needed to come under army command; air raid precautions and an Air Observer Corps needed establishing. Yet with the British government publicly insisting that war was unlikely—so as not to provoke Japan—many Burmese officials saw little reason to surrender long-held control over commercial and transport systems to an unfamiliar military authority. Compounding the problem, Burma Army Headquarters in Rangoon was barely larger than a routine second-class district headquarters in India—wholly unequipped, in staff or expertise, to drive through the necessary reforms. Wavell recognized the urgency, but until Burma was placed under his command as C-in-C India, there was little he could do about it.
Meanwhile, in Singapore, GHQ Far East was left to plan for Burma's defense with scant resources. As war with Japan grew imminent, Lieutenant-General McLeod was instructed simply to protect the Tenasserim airfields, preserving the air route to Singapore and the Burma Road supply line to China—an assignment that meant defending, with a single division, a frontier longer than the combined borders of France, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. McLeod judged that Japan would likely commit two divisions, backed by eight bomber and four fighter squadrons—a remarkably accurate estimate, if a sobering one given that the RAF in Burma amounted to a single squadron of obsolescent Buffalo fighters. He guessed, in line with prevailing British military thinking, that the main Japanese thrust would come down the northern routes from Thailand, with only a brigade-sized threat via the more direct southern route through Raheng. He deployed accordingly: 1 Burma Division headquarters and two brigades covering the north, 2 Burma Brigade in the south, and 16 Brigade in reserve.
Then, on 8 December 1941, war with Japan began—and within days the entire British strategic edifice in the Far East collapsed. The sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse crippled the Royal Navy's presence, rendering the Singapore naval base strategically hollow. The RAF was overwhelmed in northern Malaya and never recovered the initiative. With Singapore itself now fighting for survival, GHQ Far East was in no position to direct operations in Burma. On 12 December, the War Cabinet finally agreed to transfer command of Burma to the Commander-in-Chief, India—a decision that, in retrospect, had come far too late.
Word now came down from the Prime Minister himself: General Wavell would receive the 18th British Division and the 17th Indian Division as reinforcements for Burma, along with four fighter squadrons and, later, six of bombers. Wavell moved immediately, dispatching no fewer than 61 staff and specialist technical officers to strengthen Army Headquarters Burma—among them Major-General E.N. Goddard to oversee administration, along with a Deputy Chief Engineer, a Director of Movements, a Director of Transportation, and an Embarkation Commandant. When he flew into Rangoon on the 21st, however, he already suspected what he would soon confirm: most of the promised reinforcements were being quietly siphoned off to Malaya instead. Still, he clung to hope of securing two East African brigades from Kenya and part of the 17th Division.
The following day, Wavell cabled the Chief of the Imperial General Staff with a stark assessment of what was at stake. Burma, he argued, was not a peripheral theater but the very hinge of the war against Japan:
"Burma is essential base for operations against Japan, it is only route for supplies to China, it is integral part of defence of Eastern India, where large proportion of munitions factories are sited. Its security is, therefore, absolutely vital to prosecution of War against Japan."
He pressed for a second division without delay, plus two bomber squadrons and two modern fighter squadrons—the aircraft being the most urgent need of all. Intelligence suggested that an immediate assault on Burma was not yet imminent, giving Wavell room to make a critical change of leadership: he relieved Lieutenant-General McLeod and installed Lieutenant-General T.J. Hutton, Chief of the General Staff at GHQ India, in his place. Hutton, a Gunner officer of formidable competence and staff experience, seemed exactly the man needed to drag Burma's defenses onto a proper war footing.
From Rangoon, Wavell flew on to Chungking to meet Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek—hoping to secure a squadron of American Volunteer Group fighters for the defense of Rangoon, and to pry loose urgently needed lend-lease material that sat stranded on the Rangoon docks, unable to be moved to China in time. He also hoped to discuss Chinese military support more broadly. The meeting, however, was a diplomatic misfire. Chiang, who understood far better than Wavell what his own troops could and couldn't do against the Japanese, refused to commit anything less than a substantial force to Burma—determined not to see it thrown away piecemeal. Wavell, mindful that Britain would have to shoulder most of the logistical burden for any Chinese troops deployed, asked for a smaller commitment instead—a request that visibly irritated the Generalissimo. Matters were not helped by Wavell's refusal to be drawn into discussions of broader Allied strategy, a subject on which he had no authority to speak. Despite the friction, Chiang relented days later, releasing one of his two AVG squadrons for the alternating defense of Rangoon and freeing up some of the stranded war material for British use.
Just as real momentum was building in Burma, a decision made on the other side of the world brought it grinding to a halt. On 12 December, Churchill had sailed for America aboard HMS Duke of York for a major Anglo-American strategy conference, not returning to Britain until 15 January 1942. General Sir John Dill—no longer CIGS, having been succeeded by General Sir Alan Brooke that December—accompanied him, alongside the other Chiefs of Staff. The conference produced two landmark decisions: to prioritize the defeat of Germany above all else, and to establish a Combined Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff Committee. But the question of how to organize the fight against Japan also came under discussion. With the Pacific naval war clearly an American responsibility and the China theater just as clearly a Chinese one, a gap remained—and it was here that Roosevelt and General Marshall proposed something bold: a unified American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command, headquartered initially at Surabaya (later moved to Lembang, near Bandoeng, in Java), with authority stretching from Burma on one flank to the Philippines on the other. As its Supreme Commander, they proposed none other than Wavell himself, with an American deputy. Flattered as he may have been by this vote of confidence from Washington, Churchill hesitated—he could already see the plan's structural flaws. But with Anglo-American unity weighing so heavily in the balance, he ultimately gave his consent.
And so, with the best of intentions and a world map spread out thousands of miles away, two of America's most powerful leaders inadvertently struck a crippling blow against one of their own central objectives: the defense of the Burma Road to China. When Wavell learned of the decision on 30 December, he immediately pushed back, urging that responsibility for Burma remain with the Commander-in-Chief, India—a position echoed by Burma's Governor, who noted pointedly that "since India assumed direct responsibility the situation here has been positively dynamic." The appeal was rejected, on the grounds that reversing course might damage relations with the Chinese—a rationale that overlooked the plain fact that China's overriding interest was simply that Burma be defended as effectively as possible. Wavell later reflected on the decision with undisguised frustration:
"I think that this decision was a serious error from the military point of view. From my headquarters in Java, 2000 miles distant from Rangoon and concerned as I was with an immense area and many international problems, it was impossible for me to give as close attention to the problems of Burma as was desirable; nor had I any reinforcements at my disposal to aid Burma. They must come almost entirely from India. Moreover, administration of the forces in Burma had necessarily to be conducted from India; and it is always wrong to separate operational and administrative responsibility... During the five weeks that Burma remained under ABDA Command, I was only able to pay two hurried visits and, owing to faulty signal communications, messages and reports from Burma sometimes took several days to reach me in Java. It was during these five weeks that the fate of Burma was decided."
While the British in Burma scrambled to prepare defenses that would ultimately prove hopelessly inadequate, the Japanese were reaping the rewards of eighteen months of patient, meticulous planning. Contrary to popular myth, the troops who would soon tear through Malaya and Burma had no special jungle warfare pedigree, no secret tropical training regime. What they had instead was intelligence—painstakingly gathered, rigorously analyzed, and ruthlessly applied. The groundwork had been laid as early as July 1940, when pairs of Japanese general staff officers, traveling under false names, slipped into Hong Kong, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, and the Philippines for two-month reconnaissance missions. Their brief was deceptively simple: assess the ground on which they might one day fight, and quietly sound out potential allies among the local population. Others followed in their wake, equally anonymous, poring over terrain and logistics with the same quiet thoroughness.
By late 1940, a dedicated planning staff had been assembled in Taiwan with a single mandate: learn everything of military value about these five territories. These were no armchair analysts. They mined every available source—travelers, businessmen, bankers, merchant seamen, and a network of agents woven into the fabric of everyday colonial life. Japanese expatriates living abroad were expected, as a matter of course, to funnel anything of interest back through their consulates. In Burma, this network included a Dr. Suzuki in Rangoon, whose patient list read like a who's-who of prominent Burmese society, and a Japanese Buddhist monk named Nagai, whose robes opened doors that no uniform ever could. The intelligence-gathering went far beyond the obvious categories of terrain, resources, and enemy dispositions—it extended to clothing, tropical disease prevention for men and horses alike, and the minutiae of jungle hygiene. Maps were acquired wholesale and reproduced with Japanese overprints, a task made remarkably easy in Burma, where the Survey of India had already done the hard work of charting the country in exhaustive, professional detail. Quarter-inch and one-inch maps could simply be bought off the shelf—and were, in bulk. By September 1941, Japan had printed full-color reproductions of the entire country at the standard military scale of 1:50,000.
By midsummer, all of this raw information had been distilled into concrete decisions on weapons, uniforms, and equipment suited to tropical operations. What followed were live trials—first an exercise carrying troops from China to Kyushu, then another to the southern Chinese coast—designed to answer brutally practical questions: how many men and horses could be packed into a single ship's hold, and how to keep them functional after days at sea in foul weather. Soldiers rehearsed climbing down rope ladders into landing craft, firing grenade dischargers and machine guns from pitching boats, and hurling themselves overboard into the surf, weapons in hand. Every lesson learned was distilled into a booklet issued to each soldier before embarkation—a compact masterclass in jungle campaigning. It is a telling contrast that no equivalent existed for the British and Indian troops who would face them; they went into Burma essentially blind, with no briefing and little idea of what awaited them.
Parallel to this military preparation ran a political one. Colonel Suzuki—no relation to the doctor of the same name—had been the senior of the original pair of staff officers sent into Burma, and on his return he founded an organization called the Minami Kikan, tasked with turning Burmese nationalism into a weapon of war. Suzuki was a natural choice for the job: magnetic, restless, and utterly convinced of his own cause—exactly the sort of man who could conjure an army out of political grievance. During a clandestine visit to Burma in 1940, he had recognized the potential in a group of young nationalist firebrands who called themselves the Thakins. The movement was split three ways: one faction sought independence through purely democratic means, a second would accept outside help but drew the line at the "Fascist" powers of Asia—a barely veiled reference to Japan itself—and a third was prepared to strike any bargain that advanced the cause. It was from this last, most pragmatic faction that a young man named Aung San had already slipped out of Burma with two companions, seeking backing from China. Suzuki tracked them down in Amoy with the help of the Japanese military police and made his pitch: Japan, not China, was the ally worth having. With backing from General Headquarters in Tokyo, he arranged for twenty-seven more of their comrades to be smuggled out of Burma aboard Japanese cargo vessels and trained in Hainan. They called themselves the Thirty Comrades. Suzuki, meanwhile, seeded four Japanese "businesses"—in truth, intelligence cells of the Minami Kikan—into the Thai towns of Chiang Mai, Raheng, Kanchanaburi, and Ranong, each one sitting squarely astride a strategic route into Burma.
What began as a plan for the Thirty Comrades to spark an independent uprising evolved, as invasion planning matured, into something more modest but equally useful: the Burma Independence Army would fight alongside, not instead of, the Japanese expeditionary force. Most of the Thirty Comrades crossed into Thailand in late December, and on 28 December 1941 the BIA was formally raised in Bangkok—78 Japanese officers and NCOs commanding some 200 Burmese volunteers. Once Thailand entered the war, rifles and light machine guns flowed in through Bangkok to arm them. Each sector had its Japanese commander and cadre of NCOs, but the BIA's own officers led its men—Aung San among them, now wearing the rank of major-general. Their military value would prove modest, but their political value to the Japanese cause would prove considerable.
The invasion itself had been carefully sequenced. Japan's 25th Army—three divisions strong, the 5th, 18th, and the Imperial Guards—would strike first into Malaya. Only once that offensive had gained real momentum would the 15th Army, built around the 33rd and 55th Divisions, turn its attention to Burma, with a sixth division, the 56th, held back in Japan pending available shipping. The 15th Army's opening objectives were deliberately narrow: shield the 25th Army's line of communication from interference out of Burma, seize the Tenasserim airfields, and keep the peace in Thailand. If Malaya went well, the 55th Division would push into Burma from Raheng and take Moulmein, with the 33rd Division following to seize the Salween crossings near Pa-an before both divisions turned toward Rangoon. Conquering the whole of Burma was, at this stage, a step too far—shipping simply didn't allow for it. That order would come later.
Command of the 15th Army fell to Lieutenant-General Shojiro Iida, a 54-year-old officer with the bearing and reputation of a hardened professional soldier. He came from military stock—his father had commanded the Imperial Guards' 4th Regiment with distinction in the Russo-Japanese War, later rising to command the division itself and earning a baronetcy for his service. Iida had followed a similar path, commanding the Imperial Guards Division in China before his elevation to army command; he had, in fact, originally been slated to lead the Malaya invasion before that honor passed to General Yamashita.
His two divisions could hardly have been more different in pedigree. The 33rd Division, raised in the mountains northwest of Tokyo, had been blooded in China since 1939 and was now a seasoned, battle-hardened formation—each of its battalions still carrying the older, richer establishment of four rifle companies plus a machine-gun company. The 55th Division, by contrast, hailed from Shikoku, the smallest of Japan's home islands, and reflected the leaner organization adopted for divisions raised after 1940—three rifle companies per battalion rather than four. Mobilized in cadre form back in the summer of 1940, it had only been brought up to full strength in October 1941, once the Emperor gave provisional sanction for war preparations to accelerate. About two-thirds of its men were veterans of two years' service or more; the rest were young conscripts with the better part of a year's training behind them. What both divisions shared—and what set them apart from their British and Indian counterparts—was a deep cultural and linguistic unity: officers and men from the same schools, steeped in the same military indoctrination, many bloodied together in the same Chinese campaigns. Both divisions had also swelled their rifle companies beyond normal establishment, to over 200 men apiece, a deliberate cushion against the attrition to come.
Overhead, Japanese air power was split, as ever, between rival Army and Navy commands. Responsibility for Malaya, Burma, and Indonesia rested with General Count Terauchi's Southern Area headquarters, with Lieutenant-General Sakaguchi overseeing air operations as deputy chief of staff. Aircraft were deliberately withheld from direct assignment to ground formations to preserve flexibility—which meant Iida himself commanded no aircraft of his own. Burma's skies were principally the domain of the 5th Air Division, organized into two groups: the 10th Dan, fielding 37 fighters, 28 light bombers, nine long-range reconnaissance aircraft, and 24 transports; and the 4th Dan, with 24 fighters, 28 light bombers, and 28 heavy bombers, transferred in from the Philippines by 22 January. The 3rd Air Division, based in Malaya, would also lend its weight to the devastating raids on Rangoon on 23 and 25 December.
The movement of troops into position had begun weeks earlier. On 13 November 1941, Headquarters 55 Division and its 112th Regiment sailed from Shikoku, reaching Haiphong in Indo-China by the 26th, where they lingered deliberately in the north to mask their true intentions. Only on 8 December did they finally move—by train to Saigon, by truck to Phnom Penh, and by train again in small, inconspicuous parties to Bangkok, assembling there by the end of December. The 143rd Regimental Group traveled separately, reaching southern Indo-China by 27 November and lying offshore near Saigon before splitting from the main Malayan invasion fleet to land further north in Thailand on 8 December. The 144th Regimental Group, held back in Japan entirely, was dispatched in the opposite direction to seize the lightly defended American outpost of Guam—later fighting on at Rabaul in the Bismarck Archipelago, and not rejoining its parent division in Burma until January 1944, at Akyab. The 33rd Division, traveling by sea from China, did not reach Bangkok until 10 January and arrived understrength, having left its 213th Regiment and two mountain gun battalions behind for lack of shipping. From Bangkok, it moved swiftly by rail and truck toward Raheng—the staging point from which the invasion of Burma would finally begin.
The 143rd Regiment had the honor of being the first Japanese formation to set foot in Burma. Its mission was threefold: land in the Kra Isthmus, secure the stretch of the Bangkok-Singapore railway that ran perilously close to the Burmese frontier, and seize the airfield at Victoria Point. For the landing itself, the regiment was placed under 25th Army's command to ensure tight coordination. Four beaches between Chumphon and Prachuab received the assault—three battalion-strength landings and one company-sized effort—but what should have been a straightforward amphibious exercise turned into something far bloodier. Although the Japanese ambassador and the Thai premier had signed an agreement at 9:30 that morning permitting Japanese troops to transit Thai territory, word of the deal hadn't reached every corner of the country in time. Thai forces, under standing orders to resist any invasion, fought back. At Prachuab, the resistance was fierce enough that fighting dragged on until midday on the 9th, costing the Japanese two company commanders and 49 soldiers dead, with another 28 killed across the remaining beaches. These were casualties Tokyo preferred the world not know about—officially, Japanese troops were simply being "welcomed" into Thailand.
The political ground shifted on the 10th, likely in the wake of news from Pearl Harbor, the sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse, and the rapid Japanese gains in Malaya. The Thai government—though not necessarily the Thai people—reversed course. Negotiations toward a Treaty of Mutual Assistance began almost immediately, reached tentative agreement on the 11th, and were formally signed on the 21st. By 25 January, under unrelenting Japanese pressure, Thailand had declared war on both Britain and the United States.
Further south, on 11 and 12 December, Colonel Uno—commanding the 143rd Regiment—pushed his 2nd Battalion forward by vehicle to Kra Buri, on the river marking the Burmese border. There, the force split: Uno and one company took to folding boats, while the rest of the battalion crossed to Marang and struggled south along the riverbank—three grueling days hacking through jungle to reach Maliwun. The boat party, moving faster, got there first. On the 14th, Uno's company landed at Maliwun, where the Burma Independence Army had vehicles waiting to carry them the twenty miles to Victoria Point. They met no resistance—the town had already been abandoned. A platoon of Burma Frontier Force police, following orders, had destroyed key installations and withdrawn by boat the day before. An Indian doctor at the local clinic stayed until the 14th before attempting his own escape by boat, only to be intercepted by a Minami Kikan patrol from Ranong; recognizing him, they let him pass. Less fortunate were Mr. Naiff, the Sub-Divisional Officer, and Mr. Achard, the Inspector of Police—both Anglo-Indians who had remained at their posts, never having received the order to withdraw after the wireless station was destroyed. Captured by the Japanese and handed over to the Minami Kikan along with control of the district, their fate remains murky. The official postwar report suggests they were taken to Bangkok as prisoners, but rumor at the time—widely believed—held something far darker: that they were thrown into the local jail and left to die of thirst.
While the Japanese were securing their foothold, the British were attempting their own opening gambit. A year earlier, GHQ Singapore had war-gamed a strike against the vulnerable Malayan supply line—a raiding party crossing from Burma into Thailand to destroy two major steel bridges on the railway just south of Prachuab. Given that this rail line was the lifeline for the entire Japanese invasion of Malaya, and that the enemy had evidently thought it important enough to garrison heavily, the stakes were real. The mission fell to the 2nd Battalion of the Burma Frontier Force—British and Indian officers commanding a force made up mostly of Gurkhas, who had spent months quietly reconnoitering the frontier beforehand, almost certainly not as secretly as they'd hoped. Organized into three columns, the force slipped across the Maw Daung Pass into Thailand at dusk on 12 December. The first column ran straight into the Japanese near Prachuab and was thrown back after losing 15 men. The other two columns merged under Captain E.J. Stephenson and pressed doggedly onward, only to find themselves lost—the Thai maps proving badly inaccurate. Exhausted, they finally reached the railway line itself but could locate no bridges to destroy. After twelve fruitless hours of searching, with Japanese patrols closing in, Stephenson called it off and led his men back into Burma on the 16th. It was, in principle, a sound plan given the shortage of aircraft capable of hitting the bridges from the air—but it demanded elite troops and the element of surprise, and even then, success would have required no small measure of luck against Japanese forces already braced for exactly this kind of raid.
Elsewhere, a Japanese detachment of roughly a hundred men under Lieutenant Furutuki had pushed up the coast from Victoria Point by boat and occupied Bokpyin. When this was confirmed, the garrison commander at Mergui dispatched a Frontier Force company under Major S.W.A. Love to drive them out. A boatload of mortar ammunition meant to support the attack never arrived, but Love pressed forward regardless. The Japanese, well entrenched on high ground overlooking a fortified police station and courthouse, held firm even as Love's men closed to grenade range. The attack faltered, and Love—a capable, forceful commander—was killed, his second-in-command wounded. What remained of the force, nearly out of ammunition, withdrew. A second attempt followed on 28 December, this time a company from the 2nd Burma Rifles backed by a small naval gun mounted on a motorboat. This attack succeeded: Lieutenant Furutuki was killed, and his men, their ammunition exhausted, retreated overland back to Victoria Point.
The RAF also got its licks in. On 20 December, two Buffalo fighters flying out of Mergui, led by Flying Officer P.M. Bingham Wallis, were sent hunting for targets of opportunity around Chumphon and Victoria Point. At Victoria Point, the pair caught the Japanese barracks completely by surprise and strafed it thoroughly—by Japanese accounts, 29 soldiers were killed in the attack, a small but satisfying victory in an otherwise grim opening chapter. By 23 January, the 2nd Battalion of the 143rd Regiment had moved on from Victoria Point, crossing back into Thailand and eventually reaching Moulmein by 27 February. The regiment's other two battalions had already pushed north through Bangkok to Raheng, where the 55th Division was massing for the invasion proper.
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While Britain scrambled to defend Burma, Japan invaded methodically—months of spying, mapping, and jungle training preceded the assault. Colonel Suzuki recruited Aung San's "Thirty Comrades" to form the Burma Independence Army. Japanese troops landed at Victoria Point unopposed, while British counterattacks and raids largely failed, marking Burma's grim opening campaign. - Last time we spoke about the Third Battle of Changsha. In the depths of winter, as snow blanketed the land around Changsha, Chinese General Xue Yue set a trap he called the "Heavenly Furnace Tactic," approved by Chiang Kai-shek himself. The plan called for Chinese troops to fall back strategically, luring the Japanese deeper into hostile territory before snapping shut around them. General Okamura's Japanese forces pushed forward aggressively, sensing an opportunity as Chinese defenses appeared to crumble. The 6th Division forced its way across the Xinqiang River, colliding violently with Chinese defenders along the Miluo River line. The 20th and 37th Chinese Armies fought a grueling delaying action, retreating under pressure but never breaking, even as brutal cold and blinding snowfall turned the battlefield into a frozen hell. Frostbite claimed as many victims as bullets did, and visibility collapsed for both sides. As the fighting raged on, everything hinged on one question: could the Chinese forces close their trap before the Japanese realized they were being drawn into a killing ground?
#224 Changsha: the Graveyard of Japanese Invaders
Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War.
On 24 December, at the very moment the Changsha operation began, Lieutenant General Toyoshima Fusatarō received a telegram from Imperial General Headquarters naming him commander of the Tokyo Imperial Guards Division—the emperor's own troops. It was an unmistakable honor, the kind of appointment that crowned a career. But his successor, Lieutenant General Takahashi Takaji, had not yet arrived to take over the 3rd Division, so Toyoshima remained at his post through the entire battle that followed—watching his men bleed for a fight that was already slipping away from him.
Nothing embodied that failure more than the fate of Katō's battalion. Drawn from Colonel Shigenobu Yoshida's 6th Regiment, garrisoned at Xinyang in Henan, it had been pulled into Hunan by Toyoshima himself on the strength of its reputation for night fighting—held in reserve, meant to deliver the decisive blow and lend the whole campaign some luster. Committed at last at midnight on the 2nd, one of its companies lost more than half its strength within the first hour. Katō, hungry for the stroke that would make his name, took just three men and charged the enemy lines himself. Had it worked, he would have been remembered as the man who turned the battle alone. Instead he was shot down almost immediately. The two companies that tried to reach him were trapped inside a residential block; the defenders soaked it in gasoline and set it alight. Two elite companies burned to death having accomplished nothing—a story neither Katō's comrades nor his family could easily be asked to accept.
Then, when 6th Division commander Kanda Masatsuka arrived to reinforce the faltering assault and divided up the remaining tasks with a smile that seemed to carry its own private meaning, Toyoshima felt the final indignity land. He turned the whole disaster over in his mind: even if he marched his troops back to Yueyang intact, how could a general handpicked by Imperial Headquarters and confirmed by the emperor himself return to Tokyo and face the capital, friend and rival alike, having presided over this? It was, he judged, the most humiliating turn he had faced since taking command of the 3rd Division on 28 September 1940.
So he wired Anami requesting a one-day delay in the withdrawal, framed as a search for Katō's body. What he actually wanted was one last push—a chance to redeem, in some measure, the price already paid and the face about to be lost. He didn't wait for a reply. Drawing his command sword, he led a compact staff group down through the smoke to the main assault regiment to direct the fighting in person, invoking, as Anami himself once had, the old maxim that a general in the field need not always wait on his sovereign's orders.
In the early hours of 4 January, around the bitterly contested arsenal and Taiyi Temple south of the city, gunfire and battle cries rose again like an iron gale. More than 7,000 men of the 3rd Division, with Toyoshima personally supervising, launched their final effort. By dawn a Japanese suicide squad had charged the arsenal position wave after wave; several soldiers detonated explosives strapped to their bodies, blowing apart the hidden firing points that anchored the Chinese line. The nearly annihilated defenders were shot down as the Japanese poured through the gap, and the position changed hands.
The Chinese answer came within the hour. At 8 a.m., Chen Xiyao formed the remaining eighty-odd men of his 30th Regiment into a suicide squad of his own. Chinese troops had set this precedent during the defense of Shanghai—attacks the Japanese themselves called "human bullets." More than twenty machine guns covered a dozen soldiers as they charged back onto the lost position; earth-shaking explosions followed. Veterans of these battles knew the decision to send out "living bombs" was never made lightly, but that no fortification, once committed, could withstand them—a tactic born of necessity in the war's early years, when Chinese soldiers without anti-tank weapons, some units lacking even a rifle for every man, had destroyed Japanese armor one machine at a time with their own bodies. It was the same impulse that decades later would send soldiers walking into minefields on China's southern frontier.
At 9:30 the squad recaptured the arsenal position. In the brief lull before the next Japanese assault, Chen Xiyao counted heads: including himself, barely twenty men remained able to fight. This ground, he reckoned, had already cost a full battalion drawn from two separate regiments—every man from commander to private—with still more reserves poured in after them; by now the position had consumed the equivalent of an entire regiment. He thought grimly that he was likely to become that regiment's commander in the underworld. All that remained on his person were a gold-plated pocket watch he was fond of and a last letter to his mother he had never managed to send. He decided the watch would go with him; the letter, soaked through with sweat, he tore to pieces and scattered over the ruins. So many generals had already died in this war, let alone regiment commanders, let alone the more than a million soldiers who had fallen—what more was there to say about death, for a soldier born into this struggle? He put the thought aside and went back to holding the line.
Reinforcement arrived almost at once: more than a hundred men scraped together from division headquarters' rear-service personnel by Fang Xianjue himself—supply troops, medics, drivers, cooks. Chen Xiyao even recognized one of Fang's own bodyguards standing in the ranks with a look of grim resolve. Seeing them, he understood the battle had reached its final stage.
At 1 p.m. more than 600 Japanese launched another strong assault. Chen Xiyao led a desperate counterattack, but the rear-service men were poorly trained, and within half an hour the position again teetered on collapse, Japanese bayonets already on the ground. In the middle of that despair Chen Xiyao heard, cutting through the gunfire, the sound of Chinese bugles—for a moment he wondered if it was a hallucination before death. Then the Japanese ranks began to break from the rear and the right flank: Ge Xiancai, commander of the 28th Regiment, had personally led nearly two scraped-together companies to the rescue. The Japanese were driven back once more, the position held, and when the two regiment commanders finally met, both broke into loud weeping.
The fighting in Hunan was never only a matter for the front line. Chiang Kai-shek, who had remained in military uniform since the campaign began, devoted most of his energy—beyond the ordinary demands of internal and external politics—to the battle for northern Hunan. On the morning of the 4th he sent a telegram directly to Li Yutang:
"The enemy has advanced deep into isolated territory, cut off from his rear, while our main forces are closing in from all sides. If the 10th Army can hold firm to the resolve to live or die with Changsha, it will surely crush this formidable enemy and win supreme glory!"
The message spread through every position in the city and morale surged. The army's political department raised a new slogan: "Fight bitterly through one more night, repel the enemy, hold Changsha, and bring back our army commander."
Later that day Chiang also received Xue Yue's telegram announcing that the enveloping counterattack would begin at once, with the war zone urging all units "to advance bravely and thoroughly annihilate the enemy; if the enemy escapes through any unit's operational sector, the responsible commanders and staff at all levels of that unit shall be severely punished." Chiang dictated a reply exhorting the troops to kill the enemy and win merit, and sharpened the warning at the end: "If the enemy escapes through any unit's front, its army and division commanders shall be shot."
As the aide finished drafting the telegram and brought it for signature, Soong Mei-ling arrived. Chiang showed her the text; she read it and smiled her approval. Then she asked why the air force had taken no part in the northern Hunan campaign. Chiang explained: bad weather, and airfields too distant from the battlefield. "In such an important operation," she said, "my boys ought to make an effort." She picked up his telephone herself, called Zhou Zhirou, the front-line commander of air operations, and asked him to find a way to bring the air force into the fighting despite the difficulties. Her reasoning went beyond the battlefield itself. The Declaration by United Nations had been signed only three days earlier, on 1 January, and she was already thinking ahead to a larger campaign—securing Western aid for China's war effort—in which this battle's international profile mattered, and in which the air force's absence from the record would be conspicuous.
Her interest in the matter was no passing whim. On the eve of the war she had become secretary-general of the Chinese Aeronautical Affairs Commission, hired the American adviser Roy Holbrook, who in turn recommended Claire Chennault to help her build and train the force. At the war's outbreak the air force nominally counted 500 aircraft but fewer than 100 truly combat-ready—yet it had dared to meet Japan's nearly thousand-strong air arm regardless. On 14 August 1937, the day after fighting began in Shanghai, it flew its first sortie and damaged the Japanese flagship Izumo; that same day Group Commander Gao Zhihang led 27 fighters against 18 Japanese aircraft over Hangzhou and shot down six without loss. On Soong's proposal the government had made 14 August "Air Force Day," and her work building the service had earned her the title "Mother of the Air Force."
Acting on her call, Zhou Zhirou ordered the 2nd Air Group in Chengdu to support the Ninth War Zone's operations around Changsha. Distance and weather limited the response: only nine aircraft managed to take off, on 8 January, pursuing and attacking retreating Japanese units around Xinshi and Changlejie. Nine Japanese fighters rose to intercept; the Chinese force shot down one and damaged two, at a cost of two of their own.
At 9 a.m. on the 4th, Toyoshima ordered the 18th Regiment to suddenly shift its attack from the south side of the city toward the East Gate—the Liuyang Gate—launching a surprise assault. Regiment commander Colonel Ishii Nobu sent a suicide squad wrapped in explosives to charge the gate. Zhou Qingxiang, commander of the Chinese 3rd Division, personally stood atop the city wall directing the counterattack. When the frontline soldiers saw the enemy's "human bombs" approaching, they rushed forward in swarms to pull the pins on their own grenades, detonating the explosives strapped to the Japanese soldiers' bodies. Amid several thunderous blasts, the charging soldiers and the suicide squad were torn apart together in a spray of blood and flesh. Witnesses said that for an instant, a blood-red rainbow appeared in the sky.
Immediately after, another wave of defenders charged out of their positions, engaging the oncoming Japanese in hand-to-hand combat before the Liuyang Gate. After an hour of chaotic, bloody melee, soldiers on both sides mostly lay fallen in pools of blood. Japanese company commander Yokota's sword dripped with blood, but he himself had been run through the throat and left ribs by two bayonets, dying with his eyes wide open. The 18th Regiment was forced to retreat toward the south side of the city; Colonel Ishii Nobu was severely wounded en route by defenders' mortar fire, and died during rescue efforts, tears streaming down his face, unable even to speak.
At 11 a.m., Fang Xianjue went to the 29th Regiment's position and announced to Regiment Commander Zhang Yuequn that the Chongqing Military Affairs Commission had granted him an exceptional promotion to major general regiment commander. That evening, at 6 p.m., Fang brought good liquor to the 28th Regiment command post to comfort Ge Xiancai and encourage him to hold out to the very end.
Around noon, Japanese aircraft dropped ammunition and supplies to their ground troops. Several large white parachutes descended from the sky, drifting lazily—most of them landing inside the defenders' positions, infuriating the Japanese soldiers, who cursed at the sky. Then came a moment soldiers on both sides would remember for years: an artillery shell from the Chinese gun position on Yuelu Mountain struck a supply crate in mid-air, bursting it apart in a shower of canned goods, rice balls, and canteens of drinking water. The defenders cheered wildly, the shouting lasting several minutes, morale surging. Veterans who took part in the defense, recalling it decades later, invariably mentioned this as a battlefield marvel—and the artillerymen argued for years afterward over who deserved credit for the shot.
At 3 p.m., the Japanese launched their final assault on the city. With most rifles run dry of ammunition, Toyoshima ordered hand-to-hand combat. In the cold wind, hundreds of bare-chested Japanese soldiers charged forward screaming, while the defenders answered with artillery, rifle fire, and grenades. The attackers fell in rows before the line like men throwing away their lives, until finally no more came forward, and the senseless, suicidal assault sputtered out.
At 5 p.m., the Japanese division commanders still in the city simultaneously received a stern order from Anami Korechika: withdraw from Changsha and reverse course immediately. With ammunition and provisions nearly exhausted, there was no other choice. They set fire to nearby houses, blew up equipment they could not carry, and began their retreat.
Before pulling back, the 6th Division made one last push on the northern side of the city, against the positions of the 569th Regiment on Xiangchun Road and the 570th Regiment at Huanan Girls' School, both under Zhu Yue's 190th Division. Here the Japanese used poison gas—the only sector in the siege where the wind direction allowed it. Over a hundred defending officers and soldiers were incapacitated. Gas masks were scarce and given first to the machine gunners; many other soldiers urinated on towels and held them over their faces to filter the toxin, refusing to leave the line. The Japanese could not break through, and after nearly three hours of fierce fighting, withdrew without success.
At 6 p.m., Kanda Masatsuka led the 6th Division out of its positions, seizing the key river crossing at Lishi, more than ten kilometers east of the city, to gather up the scattered soldiers of the 3rd Division and wait for the rest of it to break out and join them. By nightfall Toyoshima had led the remnants of the 3rd Division entirely clear of the outskirts, setting out on the long road of retreat.
With the Japanese gone, the 10th Army's first task was simply to regroup. After days and nights of bloody fighting, the frontline officers and soldiers were utterly spent; many had fallen asleep at their posts in the bone-chilling night wind without even meaning to. To this day, stories circulate in Changsha of soldiers that night carrying torches through the piles of the dead, calling out one by one—"Are you alive?"—and feeling each body for warmth. Some men who had survived the battle itself let their guard down the moment victory came, falling asleep or simply collapsing from exhaustion, never to wake again.
On the night of 4 January, Xue Yue readjusted his deployment once more to match the enemy's movements, and the great encirclement and pursuit began in earnest. Luo Zhuoying personally led the 19th Army Group headquarters, moving with the 26th Army to Pailoupu, twenty kilometers east of Changsha, commanding the 4th, 26th, and 73rd Armies to advance from south to north. Yang Sen, positioned at Pingjiang, commanded the 20th and 58th Armies of the 27th Army Group to intercept from north to south along the very route by which the Japanese had come. Wang Lingji commanded the fresh 37th and 78th Armies of the 30th Army Group to sweep from east to west. Fu Zhongfang led his entire 99th Army to sweep from west to east. Li Tang drove his 140th Division deep behind enemy lines to cut off the retreat along the Xinqiang River.
On the map, this posture looked both ferocious and unstoppable. After several earlier battles' worth of hard lessons, and more than ten days of bloody, life-and-death fighting since this operation began, Xue Yue was finally pushing the drama toward its climax.
That same night, the 3rd and 6th Divisions set out from Lishi and immediately ran into a head-on assault from Ou Zhen's 4th Army. After half a night of chaotic fighting, the Japanese fought their way through, only to be intercepted again at dawn on the 5th by Xia Chuzhong's 79th Army.
Delayed communications meant Luo Zhuoying did not receive the war zone's telegram on enemy movements until 3 p.m. on the 5th—but his forces had already set out that morning on their own initiative, searching for the retreating Japanese, and made contact by noon. Xiao Zhichu's 26th Army surrounded the exhausted 18th Regiment and supply units of the 3rd Division near Caojiaping and Chatang. Fighting raged from noon until late night, and this Japanese force was nearly wiped out entirely.
At that critical moment, the weather itself came to Japan's rescue. On the morning of the 6th the sky cleared, and the Japanese 1st Air Brigade sent up its entire strength—more than fifty aircraft, swooping low to strafe the pursuing Chinese troops and buy time for the breakout.
That night, at 9 p.m., Peng Weiren's 73rd Army, over ten thousand strong, marched on foot to Fulinpu, where Xue Yue had set up yet another interception line. By midnight gunfire and explosions were echoing through the surrounding mountains.
The Japanese official history, Changsha Operations, later described this ill-fated withdrawal in its own words:
"On the 4th, the entire army [the 11th Army] began its reversal amid an atmosphere of tragic solemnity. At the command post in Yueyang, all headquarters personnel, divided into two groups, solemnly read aloud the 'Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors.' Front-line officers and soldiers, in order to break free from the enemy, left behind the flame-engulfed city of Changsha with hearts full of deepest regret.
Late on the night of the 4th, army headquarters was shocked to learn that two Chongqing divisions had closed in on the retreat route of the 3rd Division. [On the 5th] at 3:30 p.m., army headquarters finally received the long-awaited news that the 3rd Division was turning toward Lishi. Though the staff officers breathed something of a sigh of relief, the intervening period had truly been one of extreme anxiety. Army Commander Anami recounted to his staff his experiences of hard fighting in North China, offering them encouragement…
On the 6th, radio contact with the 3rd Division was cut off. Both army communications and the nearby 6th Division communications station called desperately, but received no answer whatsoever… At Dashantang [8 km east of Fulinpu], the Kikawa unit, surrounded by the 37th Army, was fighting to the death with ammunition and food exhausted… On the approach to the 6th Division's line of advance, the defile at Kurihashi had already been seized by Chongqing forces. The 73rd and 99th Armies had also arrived east and northeast of Damo Mountain, reinforcing their intercepting posture. This intelligence deepened the fear among the officers and men of the 6th Division. As ill luck would have it, the night was clear under a bright moon, its cold light shining down; the staff, thinking of the front-line troops making their way north from Laodao River, could not help but resent this bright moon that so favored the enemy's pursuit. Thus did they pass a gloomy, oppressive night…"
Throughout the retreat, the pursuing Chinese forces seemed to take particular exception to the regimental colors the Japanese held sacred—a fixation the Japanese themselves recorded with something close to dread:
"…The moment our unit arrived, Chongqing forces fired flares while hurling grenades, swarming to surround us. Grenades exploded right beside the regimental colors; the regiment immediately ordered the 7th Company to charge into the enemy ranks, but the Chongqing forces, encircling from all four directions in the darkness, did not retreat easily. They continued to press their attack, closing to within a hair's breadth of the colors. Regiment Commander Colonel Noken Saburo drew his sword and fought desperately at this critical juncture. The Eastern Messenger Squad and the Colors Squad formed a defensive circle around the flag, engaging the attacking enemy in close combat to protect it. The colors were in extreme peril. Lieutenant Tanaka later said that had the Chongqing forces' grenades been thrown just ten meters farther, both the men and the colors would have been blown to pieces.
…At one point, the 18th Infantry Regiment placed its colors in a house on the far bank. Suddenly, an enemy mortar shell landed in the courtyard, instantly blowing off the upper half of the sentry guarding the colors. It happened that Lieutenant General Toyoshima Fusatarō, commander of the 3rd Division, was in the next room where the colors were kept; he immediately rushed out shouting, 'I will protect the colors!' and personally took on the duty of guarding them."
By this point most Japanese units had run out of ammunition and supplies entirely, and with air resupply no longer reaching them, they found themselves in a wretched position—in many engagements able only to hack their way out with bayonets. The 11th Army's deputy chief of staff confided to his campaign diary: "On the 8th, we resupplied the 40th Division with just 10 mountain-gun shells—what a strained operation this truly is!"
At 3 p.m. on 7 January, at the 27th Army Group's command post in Pingjiang, Commander-in-Chief Yang Sen received a call from Chiang Kai-shek himself. Chiang, far away in Chongqing, had placed his very first call to Yang Sen the moment telephone communications with the 9th War Zone were restored. Looking at the operational map before him—nearly worn through from days and nights of poring over it—his voice allowed no argument: "Taking Guhua Mountain on the east side of Fulinpu as the boundary, the western sector is your responsibility, Bojian, and the eastern sector is Deputy Commander Wang's. You must personally oversee all armies to block the enemy's escape northward. If any army lets the enemy escape on its front, its commander will be shot on the spot!"
After hanging up, Yang Sen took a sip of tea, but his heart was still pounding. Technically, he and Chiang were even distant relatives—but this was clearly not a moment when such ties meant anything at all. Since taking on the task of blocking the Japanese from north to south, he had not slept a peaceful night. Starting at 7 a.m. that same morning, his 20th and 58th Armies, positioned along the line from Yingzhu Mountain to Fulinpu, had already been locked in fierce fighting—with the 9th Composite Brigade, rushed straight from North China to link up with and cover the main Japanese force's breakout from the north, and with the 6th Division breaking out from the south. Yang Sen thought grimly: my two armies are already squeezed between enemies from north and south, which is more than enough to endure—and now you call to oversee the battle personally, threatening to shoot army commanders? Might as well just say you'll shoot me and be done with it; that would at least be clearer.
He ordered a car at once and drove to the 58th Army headquarters to oversee the fighting himself. "Old Chiang is bent on shaking this old bag of bones of mine apart before he's satisfied!" he told his guard before climbing in.
By the evening of the 8th, the 58th Army, under Yang Sen's personal direction, joined forces with part of the 20th Army to completely wipe out the Yamazaki Battalion—the assault force of the newly committed 9th Composite Brigade—at Yingzhu Mountain. The Japanese official history recorded the shock this caused at headquarters:
"The following day [the 9th], Army Commander Anami, upon learning that the Yamazaki Battalion had been annihilated at Yingzhu Mountain and that the main force of the 6th Division was trapped in a heavy encirclement, turned pale with shock. Since the retreat began, Lieutenant General Anami had remained consistently calm and composed, and whenever he encountered staff officers sunk in gloom, he always comforted and encouraged his subordinates with a gentle manner. Only on this day did he himself fall completely into anxiety."
The 6th Division, surrounded and attacked for two and a half days by five Chinese armies—the 20th, 58th, 73rd, 4th, and 26th—suffered heavy casualties. At dusk on the 10th, with the support of more than a dozen aircraft, it finally broke out. On the 11th and 12th, the pursuing Chinese armies inflicted further losses on the fleeing Japanese as they went.
In the early hours of the 13th, the various Japanese divisions reached the line of the Mishui River, gathering at places like Xinshi and Changle Street to collect the scattered survivors who had broken out from different directions. What could be seen were only ragged bands of defeated soldiers, straggling in twos and threes, helmets and armor discarded, fleeing north in disarray. At 8 a.m., Chen Pei's 37th Army caught up with them at Xinshi and pressed the pursuit relentlessly. The Japanese scrambled to cross the river, their ranks dissolving into chaos, and many drowned. After taking Xinshi, the 37th Army pushed on northward.
Between the Mishui and the Xinqiang Rivers, Xia Shouxun's 78th Army and Li Tang's 140th Division set up the final blocking line. On the 14th and 15th, fierce fighting raged between those trying to break out and those trying to stop them. Many Japanese trucks stalled along this stretch and could go no further; more than thirty were destroyed by both sides combined. On the 15th, as large numbers of Japanese aircraft covered the ground forces' breakout, a squad leader of the 140th Division brought one down with a single burst from a light machine gun.
Once past the Mishui River, the retreating Japanese found Chinese and Japanese-language slogans painted on the walls of every village they passed through:
"Hunan is the graveyard of the Japanese invaders!"
"Northern Hunan—burial ground of the Japanese devils!"
"Bandits, go back to your islands!"
"Swing the broadsword at the devils' heads!"
In truth, these words that so unnerved them had been painted there long before the fighting in northern Hunan ever began—the Japanese simply hadn't noticed them on the way in.
Corpses, wounded men, hunger—every step grew heavier. Pursuers behind, blockers ahead, and now and again strange figures appeared out of nowhere in the open fields, neither quite soldiers nor quite civilians. Old hunting muskets, hidden traps, the wind moving through the grass—all of it seemed to herald danger. The Japanese could not help but wonder: what kind of place was this Hunan, really? And why on earth had they come so far to reach it?
By the 16th, no Japanese forces remained south of the Xinqiang River; those who made it back across reoccupied their original positions, and the Chinese pursuit gradually came to a halt. On the 18th, the war zone command ordered its troops to resume their original disposition with only minor adjustments. With that, the Third Battle of Changsha came to an end.
Both sides paid a heavy price. Historian Richard B. Frank, drawing on Chinese sources, puts Japanese losses at nearly 57,000 men, 33,941 killed and 23,003 wounded.Yet even within the Chinese command, this figure met with skepticism: He Chengjun, Director-General of Courts-Martial for the Military Commission, noted in his diary on 25 February 1942 that when Xue Yue presented the number to the Military Commission, those in the room burst out laughing, and Chiang Kai-shek himself dismissed it as implausible. Foreign press estimates varied but told a similar story of catastrophic Japanese losses: The New York Times put the toll around 52,000, while the Nome Nugget reported 15,000 Japanese dead on 2 January alone, many of them officers, felled largely by artillery.
Chinese casualties were no less severe. The ferocity of the fighting, coupled with the army's unforgiving discipline, meant Chinese soldiers routinely held their positions to the death rather than retreat; one regiment was reduced to just 58 survivors after only a few days of combat. Japanese official figures told a far more modest story: 1,591 killed and 4,412 wounded, against claimed Chinese losses of 28,612 killed and 1,065 captured with the 3rd and 6th Divisions alone accounting for roughly two-thirds of Japan's reported casualties. The Ninth War Zone, for its part, reported 30,346 of its own men killed, wounded, or missing. The victory brought recognition. On 24 January 1942, Xue Yue and Li Yutang were each awarded the Order of Blue Sky and White Sun for their conduct in the battle. That same day, Li Yutang was named deputy commander of the 27th Army Group, initially retaining his post as commander of the 10th Corps, by now celebrated as the "Mount Tai Army" for its stand at Changsha. On 28 March 1942, he relinquished command of the corps to take up his deputy role full-time, and Fang Xianjue, commander of the 10th Reserve Division, succeeded him as corps commander. Six months later, on 8 September 1942, the Nationalist government honored the corps's three constituent divisions—the 3rd, the 190th, and the 10th Reserve—with Flying Tiger Flags in recognition of their defense of Changsha.
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In the brutal winter of 1941, General Xue Yue lured Japan's army into Changsha with his "Heavenly Furnace" trap. Amid snow and freezing rivers, Chinese troops retreated then counterattacked fiercely along the Miluo. Toyoshima's humiliated forces pushed for redemption, but suicide charges and relentless fighting left both sides shattered, testing raw human endurance.
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